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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NON-ENFORCEMENT AT THE
FOUNDING
Matthew Steilen

*

INTRODUCTION
Can the President refuse to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional? Take the Affordable Care Act. The Supreme Court upheld
the provision in the Act mandating that individuals purchase health
insurance, but leading Republicans continue to press the view that
1
the law is unconstitutional. Suppose one such Republican captures
the presidency in 2016. His first act in office is to recommend legisla2
tion repealing the Affordable Care Act, but a Democrat-controlled
Senate tables the proposal. Can the President instead dispose of the
law by refusing to enforce its provisions? Can he abandon enforce3
ment of the individual mandate? Can he decline to enforce federal
*

1

2
3

Associate Professor of Law, Affiliated Faculty, Department of Philosophy, State University
of New York at Buffalo. Email: mjsteile@buffalo.edu; Twitter: @MJSteilen. Comments and
criticisms from Justin Barnard, Mary Bilder, Guyora Binder, Jim Gardner, Bob Gordon,
Tom Grey, Dan Hulsebosch, Aziz Huq, Fred Konefsky, Larry Kramer, Michael
McConnell, Bernadette Meyler, Henry Monaghan, Will Partlett, Jeff Powell, Jack Schlegel,
Rob Steinfeld and Rick Su improved this Article, and probably would have more had I
followed all of their graciously given advice. Thanks also to participants at the Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the Arizona State Legal Scholars Conference,
the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law Constitutional Law Colloquium, and the
SUNY Buffalo Law School Summer Faculty Forum and Junior Faculty Forum, where versions or portions of this Article were presented. I received invaluable research assistance
from Greg Della Posta, Adam Faeth, Ian Laing, Anna McCarthy, and librarian Joe
Gerken. Research for this Article was supported by a summer faculty research fellowship
from SUNY Buffalo Law School.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (holding that the
individual mandate is constitutional under congressional taxing powers); Tom Howell,
Jr., Ted Cruz Sees Legal Landmines Ahead for Obamacare, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/9/ted-cruz-sees-legal-landminesahead-obamacare/ (“Sen. Ted Cruz . . . said many aspects of the Affordable Care Act are
‘constitutionally or statutorily suspect’ and that the entire law should be repealed.”).
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (giving the President the power to recommend to Congress the
“[m]easures as he shall judge necessary and expedient”).
The President might direct the Secretary of the Treasury not to demand payment for an
individual’s failure to obtain minimum essential coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012)
(providing for the individual mandate for purchasing health insurance); 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(g)(1) (2012) (“The penalty provided by this section shall be paid upon notice and
demand by the Secretary . . . .”).
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regulations of state health-care exchanges?4 Can he decline to pursue
insurers who deny coverage or employ underwriting practices in vio5
lation of the Act? Can he decline to pursue covered employers who
6
refuse to provide health insurance for their employees?
Many commentators would say yes, assuming that the President
acts on the basis of a constitutional objection to the provision in ques7
tion. Their principal ground for taking this position is an analogy
between executive and judicial power. They argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also
justifies the President in refusing to enforce laws he deems unconsti8
tutional. For example, according to Sai Prakash and John Yoo, “the
same constitutional reasoning that supports judicial review also militates in favor of a form of executive branch review in the course of
9
executing the laws . . . .” Prakash and Yoo are joined in this view by a
4

5

6
7

8

9

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)–(e) (2012) (specifying requirements for state exchanges).
Candidate Mitt Romney suggested during the presidential election of 2012 that he would
issue waivers to states exempting them from various requirements under the Affordable
Care Act, including those related to state exchanges. See, e.g., Philip Klein, Romney and
Obamacare Waivers, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 7, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/
article/993076 (“Romney said: ‘as president, I will repeal Obamacare, I’ll grant a waiver
on day one to get that started.’”). The position verged on non-enforcement, since the
waiver provision in the Affordable Care Act extends only to states that develop coverage
mechanisms at least as comprehensive as those mandated by federal law, a requirement
Romney aides suggested would not be strictly enforced. See id. (“[T]he Romney aide said
that under the campaign’s interpretation of the law, the administration would be able to
give broad leeway to states, allowing them to opt out of many onerous provisions of
Obamacare, including the individual mandate. And, the aide said, there was wiggle room
around how the various coverage requirements are defined.”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18052(b)–(c)
(2012) (detailing the restrictions on the granting and scope of state waivers under the Affordable Care Act).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012) (addressing the guaranteed availability of health
coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2 (2012) (addressing the guaranteed renewability of health
coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012) (prohibiting exclusion from health coverage based
on preexisting conditions).
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(d) (2012) (“Any assessable payment provided by this section shall
be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary . . . .”).
See infra notes 9–16. I set aside the question of whether the agency charged with enforcing the Affordable Care Act enjoys the discretion not to enforce the law under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102
GEO. L.J. 351, 394–95 (2014) (discussing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985),
which held that the APA does not grant judicial review of FDA decisions not to institute
enforcement proceedings).
See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of
Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 405–11 (2008) (identifying the Bush Administration’s use of the constitutional avoidance canon to declare that certain laws
should not be enforced).
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887,
924–25 (2003); see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91
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remarkable group, including Akhil Amar,10 Larry Kramer,11 John Har12
13
14
rison, Gary Lawson, Christopher Eisgruber, Michael Stokes
15
16
17
Paulsen, and Judge Frank Easterbrook, among others.
The view is wrong. The analogy these scholars draw between executive and judicial power simply cannot be sustained on a fair reading of Founding-era history. By the time of the Founding, and for the
first decade under the Constitution, few were thinking about the
President’s function in constitutional enforcement in terms comparable to a court of law. The vast majority of those engaged in the
tasks of ‘political science’ and statecraft simply did not express themselves on the issue. When they did speak, what came out was (unsurprisingly) a jumble, much of it at odds with modern views of the presidency. In contrast, by the mid-1790s, thinking about the role courts
played in enforcing the Constitution had firmed considerably. This is
true across the emerging Federalist-Republican divide. My purpose
in this Article is to explain these developments and thus to argue for

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

TEX. L. REV. 781, 800–01 (2013); Neil Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to
Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 533 (2012); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s
Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1645–46 (2008).
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 179 (2005).
See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 87 (2001).
See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L.
REV. 333, 336 (1998).
See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1287 (1996).
See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen,
83 GEO. L.J. 347, 350 (1994).
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 267 (1994) (positing that the rationale of Marbury v. Madison is applicable to executive review, even in the absence of judicial review of a particular law).
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 919–20 (1989–90).
For example, Judge Nina Pillard endorsed the analogy between judicial and executive
power, although she did not expressly conclude on that basis that the President may decline to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 687 (2005) (analogizing executive power and judicial review). Notably, the last twenty years have seen only
one extended effort to rebut the claim that non-enforcement can be defended on
originalist grounds. See generally CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1998). For leading textualist arguments against non-enforcement, see, as an example, Eugene Gressman, Take
Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381 (1986) and Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389 (1987). There have been significant booklength defenses of departmentalism without any emphasis on non-enforcement, but these
mostly date from an earlier period and have had little impact on the contemporary debate within legal scholarship. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231–70 (1988); JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME
COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 77–95, 139–67 (1984).
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an important disanalogy in the Founding-era understanding of executive and judicial power. To be clear, I do not argue that the President
under no circumstances may be understood to possess a power to decline to enforce laws he thinks unconstitutional. He may have such a
power. I argue merely that the analogy between non-enforcement
and judicial review is mistaken, and that if there is such a presidential
power, its source must lie elsewhere.
The effort to tie presidential non-enforcement to a broadly accepted practice like judicial review has had significant practical consequences. It has played a key role in justifying the expansion of
presidential authority. As the nation’s chief prosecutor, early Presi18
dents did “direct non-prosecution[s],” and thus blocked the en19
forcement of criminal law. Today, however, Presidents do not confine their claims of interpretative authority to the discretion
20
During the presidency of
traditionally afforded a prosecutor.
George H. W. Bush, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department
of Justice (“OLC”) advised the White House that “the Constitution
provides the President with the authority to refuse to enforce unconstitutional [statutory] provisions,” including those administrative or
civil in nature, like the provisions of the Affordable Care Act cited
21
above. In defense of this position, OLC drew an analogy between
presidential non-enforcement and judicial review, invoking a found-

18
19

20

21

MICHAEL PAULSEN, STEVEN CALABRESI ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
318 (2d ed. 2013).
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 49, 60–61 (2008) (identifying examples of nonprosecution during the presidential administrations of George Washington and John Adams). But see Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 585–90, 637 (1989)
(showing that prosecution in the 1790s was highly decentralized); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275,
286–90 (1989) (similar).
Notably, the examples cited by Calabresi and Yoo in which Washington or Adams ordered
an end to a prosecution did not turn on the President’s view of constitutional meaning.
See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 19, at 60–61. The first President to stop a prosecution
on constitutional grounds was apparently Thomas Jefferson. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text; PAULSEN, CALABRESI ET AL., supra note 18, at 318.
Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C.
18, 31 (1992); see also The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C.
131, 133 & n.8 (1993), in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL 565–66 (1999) (advising White House counsel that the President may decline to
enforce a “clearly unconstitutional law,” and citing a statement made by James Wilson to
show that the proposition of presidential non-enforcement is “consistent with the views of
the Framers”).
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ing-era justification for judicial review and citing Marbury v. Madison.22
Later, OLC sought to temper its advice; in a subsequent memo, issued in 1994, the Agency suggested that that non-enforcement authority was significantly limited, and should be employed only in cases where the President had reason to believe the Supreme Court
23
would concur in his judgment. Yet the limits proffered by OLC did
not reflect, in any transparent way, the logic of the executive analogy
to judicial review, on which the non-enforcement power had been
24
rested. Consequently, the 1994 limits have proven illusory. Presi22

23

24

See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op.
O.L.C., supra note 21, at 31–33 (“Where an act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution, the President is faced with the duty to execute conflicting ‘laws’ – a constitutional
provision and a contrary statutory requirement. The resolution of this conflict is clear:
the President must heed and execute the Constitution, the supreme law of our Nation.
. . . Thus, the Take Care Clause does not compel the President to execute unconstitutional statutes. An unconstitutional statute, as Chief Justice Marshall explained in his archetypal decision, is simply not a law at all . . . .”). But cf. The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 55–56, 58
(1980) (defending a more moderate position, and conceding that “[t]he available evidence concerning the intentions of the Framers lends no specific support” to nonenforcement, and that there is “relatively little direct evidence of what the Framers
thought” about a presidential power to decline to enforce “transparently” unconstitutional laws).
See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200
(1994) (“As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a particular provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute, notwithstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue. If, however, the President, exercising
his independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution and that it is probable that the Court would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to execute the statute.”); see also David Barron, Constitutionalism in the
Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61,
61–63 (2000) (describing the evolution in views at OLC, particularly with regard to the
Clinton Administration). According to Judge Pillard, the requirement that the President
enforce the law unless he believes the Supreme Court will concur in his judgment effectively embraces judicial supremacy. See Pillard, supra note 17, at 735 (“Thus, even though
the executive also has a ‘special role’ in the interpretation of the Constitution (and OLC
in particular is assigned that role as to action not yet taken), the OLC opinion adheres to
a judicial-supremacist reading of Marbury.”). Another view is that the requirement of judicial concurrence serves to measure the obviousness of the constitutional defect, functioning like a Thayerian doubtful case rule. See James Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140 (1893).
The executive-judicial analogy is not explicit in the 1993 or 1994 O.L.C. opinions, but it is
very much present. For example, the 1994 opinion bottoms the President’s nonenforcement authority on a reading of the Take Care Clause popularized by defenders of
the executive-judicial analogy. Compare Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C., supra note 23, at 200, with Issues Raised by Provisions Directing
Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C., supra note 22, at 32. On another
note, it is suggestive that restrictions on judicial review like those proposed for nonenforcement in the 1994 opinion—such as limiting judicial review to “defensive” uses or a
doubtful case rule—have also proved impossible to sustain. For a discussion of “defen-
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dent George W. Bush asserted the authority in signing statements “to
disobey more than 750 laws,” a pattern difficult to square with the
25
Tellingly, executive branch attorneys defended
1994 opinion.
Bush’s action by invoking Founding-era arguments for judicial re26
view. And just last term, in United States v. Windsor, Justice Antonin
Scalia’s defense of non-enforcement suggested no clear limitations
27
on the power. According to Scalia, a President who concluded that
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violated the Equal Protection Clause should have simply refused to enforce it. Yet Section 3
28
was a definitional provision; its effects spanned federal law. A nonenforcement power applied across the reach of Section 3 would be
broad, deep, and largely insensitive to considerations of institutional
29
competence and political context.

25

26
27

28

29

sive” judicial review, see Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Supremacy in the Nineteenth Century, in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 88–91 (Mark Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002); Michael J. Klarman, How Great were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111,
1121 (2001). For a discussion of the doubtful case rule, see Thayer, supra note 23, at 140.
See ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE, ABA REPORT 2, 14–18 (2006), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/200608231441
13.authcheckdam.pdf (listing laws); Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing
Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 323 (2006) (identifying 844 “sections challenged” by signing statement); Johnsen, supra note 8, at 410 (“Although the
Bush administration has not publicly replaced the 1994 nonenforcement guidelines, its
actions have demonstrated unambiguously that it does not believe the President’s nonenforcement authority is so limited.”).
Cf. Johnsen, supra note 8, at 410–11.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2702 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“He
could have equally chosen . . . neither to enforce nor to defend the statute he believed to
be unconstitutional . . . .”); accord Devins & Prakash, supra note 9, at 509 (presenting the
view that the President has neither a duty to enforce nor a duty to defend laws he thinks
are unconstitutional).
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (discussing the definitional aspect of § 3). In an earlier
case, Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Justice Scalia suggested that the President
had a defensive non-enforcement authority. See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Citing Easterbook’s article, Justice Scalia wrote that the President had a power to “resist legislative encroachment” by “disregard[ing] [laws] when they are unconstitutional.” Id. (citing Easterbrook, supra note 16,
at 920–924). Easterbrook’s article, however, defends non-enforcement by analogy to judicial review, and consequently does not limit non-enforcement to defensive uses. See
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919–20 (presenting this analogy).
In contrast, the 1994 OLC opinion emphasized the non-enforcement was a contextsensitive determination. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C., supra note 23, at 199–202 (discussing the “circumstances in which the
President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that he views as unconstitutional”). For examples of non-enforcement in the Obama Administration, see Delahunty &
Yoo, supra note 9, at 781–84. Consider, as well, efforts by state executive officers to justify
non-defense or non-enforcement of state law on the basis of an analogy to judicial review.
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As I show below, none of this comports with Founding-era history.
Somehow the argument for non-enforcement has garnered a reputa30
tion for resting on original meaning and practices. Too little effort
has been made to limn the boundaries of period concepts. Thus,
what is supported by historical evidence is the abstract proposition
that each of the branches of the federal government, or “depart31
ments,” enjoys a coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution.
32
“Coordinate” means equal. The departments are equals. As James
Madison put it in Federalist 49, “[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither
of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of
33
settling the boundaries between their respective powers.” In other
words, being an equal implies being autonomous—each department
gets to make its own determination of the nature and scope of its authority under the Constitution.
34
This abstract proposition is called “departmentalism.” Departmentalism was conceived in response to a difficulty that arose as the
Framers wrestled with the consequences of judicial review in a system
35
with separated powers and judicial independence. Their concern
was that the power of courts to interpret and enforce fundamental
law would make an independent judiciary superior to (and not coordinate with) the other departments, by giving courts ‘final say’ in determining the departments’ powers. Put simply, departmentalism is

30

31

32
33
34
35

See, e.g., Virginia’s New Attorney General Will Not Defend Gay-Marriage Ban, NPR MORNING ED.
(radio broadcast Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=265050444.
See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001,
1008–09 (2012) (“[O]ther scholars defend a strong, independent presidential authority
to make constitutional judgments without respect to other branches' views, a position of
en staked out on originalist turf.”). Huq’s “strong” departmentalism includes a nonenforcement power. I do not mean to suggest that Huq himself takes the view that nonenforcement can be defended on originalist grounds, or that he has misread any of the
relevant sources. For a defense of a duty of non-enforcement on originalist grounds, see
Prakash, supra note 9, at 1649–59.
See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 24, at 92; Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the
Founding, in IS THE SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 153, 161–62
(Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) (highlighting Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s view
that “all parts of America’s governments had the authority to interpret the fundamental
law of the Constitution”); Paulsen, supra note 15, at 228–40 (discussing the equality of the
three branches of the federal government since the Founding).
See Matthew Steilen, Collaborative Departmentalism, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 345, 355–60 (2013)
(discussing the idea of “coordinacy” in early America).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 273 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–08 (2004) (discussing what is known as the “departmental” theory).
See id.
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the idea that courts do not have the final say. The executive and the legislature have an authority to decide for themselves what the Constitu36
tion means. They need not acquiesce in a judicial interpretation—
any more than the judiciary is obligated to adopt their view when deciding a case. As Jefferson put it sometime later, “each of the three
departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty
under the constitution, without any regard to what the others may
37
have decided for themselves under a similar question.” It should be
easy to see, however, that departmentalism does not entail non38
enforcement. The two are very different. Departmentalism is an
abstract statement of the relative interpretative authority of the departments; non-enforcement is a specific presidential power. President Thomas Jefferson professed to give effect to his “free & independent judgment” of the Constitution’s meaning—but through “the
39
functions confided to [him].” What functions actually were confid40
ed to him was another matter entirely. One could not determine
41
that by inference from coordinacy alone.

36

37

38

39

40

41

This is the basic point defended by Edwin Meese in his famous (or infamous) Tulane
speech. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983–86
(1987) (“Each of the three coordinate branches of government created and empowered
by the Constitution—the executive and legislative no less than the judicial—has a duty to
interpret the Constitution in the performance of its official functions.”). Herbert
Wechsler made more or less the same point in The Courts and the Constitution. See Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965) (“Under
Marbury, the Court decides a case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience by all
within the purview of the rule that is declared.”).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 12 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135, 139 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra, at 259 ) (“I affirm that act to be no law, because in opposition to the
constitution; and I shall treat it as a nullity, wherever it comes in the way of my functions.”)
(emphasis added).
See Stephen M. Griffin, Executive Power in the U.S. Constitution: An Overview 17 (Tulane
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-3, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422927 (observing that “the relevance of departmentalism to
presidential non-enforcement is actually quite limited”).
The Paragraph Omitted from the Final Draft of Jefferson’s Message to Congress, December 8, 1801,
in 3 ALBERT JEREMIAH BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 605, 605–06 (1919); see also James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. II, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 151,
153 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906) (arguing that the power to interpret a treaty or determine
obligations to go to war “belongs to the department to which those functions belong”).
See Barron, supra note 23, at 91 (“[Jefferson] may be understood to be arguing only that
the President has the constitutional authority to exercise the pardon power to remit sentences, and that in the exercise of that constitutionally vested power, he is free to make a
judgment as to a law’s unconstitutionality.”).
See infra Part II.C.1.
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Jefferson did decide to “remit . . . execution” of the Sedition Act,
and this is sometimes adduced as an example of non-enforcement in
42
the modern sense. Even if it is—a proposition I doubt, but will as43
sume here for purposes of argument —those who seek to analogize
non-enforcement to judicial review face a significant problem of timing. The problem is obvious, but remarkably unappreciated. While
there was a relatively widespread discussion of judicial review in the
44
decade prior to Jefferson’s election, there was no discussion of presi45
None. This makes little sense if both
dential non-enforcement.
practices were thought to cure the same defects of government. Why
was there no discussion of presidential non-enforcement during the
Federalist period? What accounts for the discrepancy in timing?
To answer this question, I begin from a premise advanced by a
number of leading historical studies of judicial authority and judicial
46
review. According to Gordon Wood, Sylvia Snowiss, and Larry Kra42
43

44

45
46

See, e.g., SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION
AND WAR POWERS DEBATES 3–4 (1992).
Jefferson defended his conduct by citing his powers of pardon and control over federal
prosecutions. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), supra note 37, at 259 (“The President is to have the laws executed. He may order an offence then to be prosecuted. If he sees a prosecution put into a train which is not lawful,
he may order it to be discontinued and put into legal train.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), supra note 37, at 138 (“A legislature had
passed the sedition law. The federal courts had subjected certain individuals to its penalties of fine and imprisonment. On coming into office, I released these individuals by the
power of pardon committed to executive discretion . . . .”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Mrs. Adams (July 22, 1804), in 4 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22, 23 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829) (“I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law . . . .”); cf.
ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 33–35 (1971) (observing
that Jefferson never publicly proclaimed an authority to refuse to enforce laws he thought
unconstitutional).
This discussion took place in multiple forums, including the press and litigated cases.
William Treanor and Philip Hamburger have recently shown that judicial review was exercised, and often discussed, in many more cases than was traditionally appreciated. See
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 358–503 (2008) (showing widespread disussion of judicial review in the founding period); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457–58 (2005) (arguing that a much greater
number of statutes were invalidated than previously thought).
On the lack of evidence, see infra Part II.A (detailing the Framers’ overwhelming support
for presidential non-enforcement).
See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 107–08 (recognizing a distinction between ordinary law and
“popular constitutionalism”); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1–2 (1990) (similar); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 291–305 (2d ed. 1998) (similar). Sylvia Snowiss’s account of the
origins of judicial review has been particularly influential. See Treanor, supra note 44, at
461 (describing Snowiss’s account as “the leading historical study of early judicial review”). To be sure, Snowiss’s account is now somewhat dated, and has certainly come in
for its fair share of criticism, in part for insisting on an artificial reading of key sources.
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mer, the founding generation distinguished the fundamental law set
out in written constitutions from ordinary law, and believed fundamental law would ultimately be enforced by the people themselves
47
acting ‘out of doors,’ through petitions, voting, and protest. If this
is correct, as I shall assume it is, then we should think of the movement to establish judicial review in the 1780s as being centrally concerned with showing why violations of fundamental law should be determined and remedied in court, as well as outside it, as was the
traditional practice. The evidence examined here suggests that the
answer lies in the distinctive procedures utilized by courts of law.
Much more than we, the Framers had a special regard for courtroom proceedings, or what some in that period called “forensic litiga48
tion.” Forensic litigation, they thought, could give shape to a dispute in a way that made it possible for a judge or jury to resolve the
matter in a non-partisan fashion, according to the law of the commu49
nity. This was a valuable institutional asset in the decades after the
Revolution. It was during that period that state popular assemblies
became active law-making bodies—i.e., functional legislatures—
occupied largely by settling contests between constituent groups over
50
the goods generated by public policy. Courts were an anodyne for
this development. By curbing fits of legislative excess, courts could
promote the rule of the public’s reason—what that generation called

47

48
49
50

See Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 333–49 (1993) (critically discussing
Snowiss’s arguments); Gerald Leonard, Iredell Reclaimed: Farewell to Snowiss’s History of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 867, 867–73 (2006) (arguing that Snowiss misread Iredell). Nevertheless, Snowiss’s claims about fundamental law are quite close to those
made by Wood and Kramer. Moreover, the Snowiss study remains particularly important
for my purposes, given its influence on those who have advocated the analogy between
judicial and executive power. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 922 n.50 (citing
Snowiss); Kramer, supra note 11, at 33 n.114 (acknowledging Snowiss’s influence);
Paulsen, supra note 15, at 241 n.78 (citing Snowiss).
KRAMER, supra note 34, at 29–30 (explaining the idea of fundamental law and its operation); SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 1–2, 90–91 (highlighting the Founders’ view that revolution was the enforcement mechanism for fundamental law); WOOD, supra note 46, at
291–92 (explaining fundamental law’s historic English roots). For an important older
study that casts doubt on the separation of fundamental law and ordinary law, see Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) (suggesting a separaton between fundamental and
ordinary law).
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95–96 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984).
See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., WILLIAM NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 30–34 (2000).
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“public opinion”—rather than the “passion” or raw interests that an51
imated the assembly.
Yet courts could play this institutional role only if they conducted
themselves in the right way. Procedure thus became the core of a multistate reform movement aimed at reshaping state and local courts at
52
the turn of the nineteenth century. At the center of that movement,
I argue, were two key ideas, which reformers used both to describe
practice ideals and to justify proposed changes. First was the idea of a
case, which was the sort of dispute suited for resolution in a court of
law. Second was the idea of expounding the law, which was the form
legal explanation took in deciding a case. Philip Hamburger’s study
53
of judicial duty devotes attention to both ideas, but, as others have
54
noted, leaves the notion of expounding largely undeveloped. I try
to fill in this idea as it was used in the United States in the 1780s and
1790s. In this context, expounding the law often meant more than
simply making sense of it; it involved something like deducing an
outcome from a systematic formulation of the community’s basic le55
gal principles. While all departments had to make sense of the law
to exercise their functions, only courts expounded it, because ex56
pounding enabled courts to resolve cases non-politically. Sources
from this period often describe judicial review as a kind of by-product
of expounding, which occurred when a systematic account of poten57
tially relevant community law included the Constitution. Reform
thus brought an end to the pre-revolutionary American paradigm, in
which judicial “magistrates” exercised multiple governmental func-

51

52
53
54

55
56
57

See, e.g., James Kent, Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures (1794), in 2 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING IN THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-–1805, at 941, 941–42 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) (“[I]n this country we have found it expedient to establish certain rights, to be deemed paramount to the power of the ordinary Legislature, and
this precaution is considered in general as essential to perfect security, and to guard
against the occasional violence and momentary triumphs of party. . . . The Courts of Justice which are organized with peculiar advantages to exempt them from the . . . baneful
influence of Faction, and to secure at the same time, a steady, firm and impartial interpretation of the Law, are therefore the most proper power in the Government to keep
the Legislature within the limits of its duty, and to maintain the Authority of the Constitution.”); see also infra Part I.A.
See infra Parts III.A–B.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 536–48 (distinguishing a “case” as a form of judicial
authority and discussing the idea of “expounding”).
See Mary Sarah Bilder, Expounding the Law, 78 GEO. WASH. L.R. 1129, 1140–42 (2010) (reviewing Hamburger and noting the arguing that he gave light attention to the notion of
expounding).
See infra Part III.C.
This was the majority view, but it was not a universal one. See infra Parts III.C– D.
See infra Part III.C.
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tions and led the process of law-enforcement and even policy-making
58
at the local level. By the time of ratification, then, most would describe courts as specially tasked with deciding cases and expounding
the law. While thinking about executives was less developed, they
generally were not said to do either of these things. And since execu59
tives did not expound, they had no power of review. The justification for enforcing the Constitution in court thus did not extend to the
executive—at least with respect to its office of enforcing the law.
My aim in what follows is to substantiate these claims. My argument will have three parts. In Part I, I analyze a leading Founding-era
justification for judicial review, and show how it can be adapted to
support presidential non-enforcement. In Part II, I describe historical evidence that the Framers would have rejected the argument for
non-enforcement set forth in Part I. This evidence falls into two categories: first, the lack of almost any express support, in the period
under examination, for the proposition that the President could refuse to enforce the law; second, the large body of ‘negative evidence’
that implies the President was obligated to enforce the law. In Part
III, I turn back to the argument for judicial review, with an eye to
showing why the Framers regarded courts alone as authorized to refuse to enforce unconstitutional law. As explained above, my argument turns on an examination of the ideas of a “case” and “expounding” the law, which played a key role in justifying the court-reform
movements in the last decades of the eighteenth century.
I. THE NON-ENFORCEMENT ARGUMENT
I want to begin with judicial review, and with what has become,
perhaps, the dominant account of its origin. In a sentence, this account tells us that judicial review emerged in response to the politics
of debt and paper money that gripped state assemblies after the Revolutionary War. Proponents of review sought to slow down the legislative process in order to protect the rights of creditors and loyalists.
Below, I sketch these developments and then examine a period text
defending judicial review. The text is James Iredell’s well known essay, “To the Public.” My discussion of Iredell’s essay and its relation-

58

59

Reform took decades in some jurisdictions, stretching into the nineteenth century. See,
e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE IN EARLY
NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 3–17 (2009) (describing legislative interference with judicial
proceedings in a number of states).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 545 (showing that the executive’s office did not include
a power to explain the law).
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ship to the politics of the time will be familiar to many readers. To
make the comparison between judicial review and non-enforcement
60
as precise as possible, I lay out Iredell’s argument ‘formally.’ I call
the formal version of the argument the Standard Justification. This
formal argument is a creature of my own making and new to the literature, but the analysis is meant to track conventional wisdom, so
that we can figure out later where that wisdom goes wrong. By formalizing Iredell’s argument I am also able to show exactly how the
Standard Justification might be adapted to support a presidential
non-enforcement power, as a number of commentators have claimed.
To help us keep our various arguments straight, I call this adaptation
the Non-Enforcement Argument. Thus, the Standard Justification justifies judicial review; the Non-Enforcement Argument justifies presidential non-enforcement. As we will see, the Non-Enforcement Argument springs from the same political logic as judicial review, but
recruits the executive (rather than just the judiciary) to resist the
popular assembly.
A. State Politics and Judicial Review
The American Revolution was followed by a period of deep-felt
61
anxiety. Concern centered on the economy. At the national level,
the Confederation emerged from the war with a massive debt and few
62
fiscal tools to discharge it. At the state level, there was a widespread
perception that commercial trade was depressed. Markets had disappeared; Britain closed the lucrative ports of the West Indies to Ameri63
can ships, forcing exporting states to locate new overseas markets.
Inland markets dried up as customers struggled to repay wartime

60

61

62

63

Here, by “formally” I do not mean that I abbreviate Iredell’s argument by use of a formal
language, as in the study of formal logic. Rather, I rephrase Iredell’s key assertions in
natural language so that the argument is formally valid.
See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763–
1789, at 611–12 (2d ed. 2005) (detailing the various anxieites of Congress and the people
after the Revolution).
See Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128,
130–33 (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987) (detailing
the size of the national debt and the difficulties in repaying it). For a discussion of the
Confederation’s fiscal difficulties, see MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 61, at 616–19 (explaining
the Confederation’s struggles to repay interest and principle on its outstanding debts).
See MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 61, at 613 (describing the British exclusion of Americans
from the West Indies).
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debt.64 At the same time, states sought to discharge their own public
65
debt through taxation. Governments wanted to collect “specie,” or
hard money, but it was scarce, and a number of states resorted to
66
printing paper currency so taxes could be paid. Inflation followed.
It was perhaps natural that Americans would blame the Confederation Congress and the state assemblies for these events. They did.
What is remarkable, however, is the constitutional register in which
67
their discontent was voiced. Americans drew ready inferences about
their own character as a people. They lacked “virtue” and had suc68
cumbed to a “licentious” addiction to “luxury.” “Having won independence at great cost,” writes Jack Rakove, “Americans seemed un69
prepared or unable to manage their affairs wisely or peacefully.”
The people now held power in the state assemblies, but majority factions in the assembly used this power to pursue economic and social
policies that advanced their private interests at the expense of oth70
ers. Thus, assemblies dominated by merchant interests sought to
require full repayment of private debt in inflation-resistant specie, at
71
the expense of farmers unable to repay notes at face value. In some
72
states, and at other times, the opposite policy prevailed. Assemblies
also made quick work distributing the landholdings of loyalists, confiscating their property and creating ‘efficient’ mechanisms for quiet64

65

66

67
68
69
70
71
72

See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 248–49 (1991)
(explaining how overleveraged consumers and the shrinking of credit contributed to the
struggles of inland markets).
See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 29–30 (1996) (explaining that many states taxed their citizens to repay
debts).
Printing notes to be removed from circulation through taxation was known as “currency
theory.” See Riesman, supra note 62, at 130 (claiming that printing money was the only solution to the debt problem); see also MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 61, at 617 (explaining that
several states began printing money to repay their debts).
Cf. WOOD, supra note 46, at 393–96 (describing the 1780s as a period of deep discontent
and prevalent criticism of the Revolution).
See WOOD, supra note 46, at 403–04, 419–21.
RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 29.
See WOOD, supra note 64, at 229 (discussing the fact that early Americans were too involved in their own affairs to think about their neighbors).
NELSON, supra note 50, at 31.
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 92 (1975) (referencing “the act of
1782 that deprived judgment creditors of their common law right to obtain satisfaction
out of the proceeds of their debtors’ goods sold at auction” to demonstrate “the arbitrary
power of a majoritarian legislature . . . to change the law”); Edward S. Corwin, The Progress
of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 519 (1925) (discussing the “class of farmer-debtors”
that “now began to align itself with the demagogues in the state legislatures, in opposition
to the mercantile-creditor class”).
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ing title that dispensed with protective procedures traditionally avail73
able at common law. But most importantly, and most disquietingly,
this style of politics—the politics of self-interest—was inherently con74
tentious. In place of the pre-war “consensus style of government”
there was an openly hostile battle for state favor and public re75
sources.
The experience of state politics in the 1780s drove the develop76
ment of judicial review. According to the dominant account, the
pivot point was a revision in the understanding of separation of pow77
ers. As alienation from state assemblies grew, the American people
began to conceptualize themselves not as part of the government, present in a popular law-making body, but as standing outside government entirely. The state assembly, such as it was, and such as it had
conducted itself, was no longer the people’s presence within government. It became simply another form of governmental magistracy,

73

74

75

76

77

The seizure and distribution of real property is only one example of state laws targeting
loyalists. Other acts seized personal property, cancelled debts, and stripped loyalists of
basic civil and political rights. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
825, 835–38 (2006) (discussing “[s]tate [a]ntiloyalist [l]egislation”); see generally Alison
Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New York (Part I), 23 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 1 (1948); James
Westfall Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution (Part I), 3 ILL. L.
REV. 81 (1908); James Westfall Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution (Part II), 3 ILL. L. REV. 147, 151 (1908).
See RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 30 (noting that the “contentiousness of state politics in general” was “worrisome”); WOOD, supra note 46, at 399–403 (describing “party strife” in the
states as “bitter”).
The expression comes from NELSON, supra note 50, at 27; see also WOOD, supra note 63, at
245–47 (discussing the push for “interest-group politics”). Nelson argues that this development followed a transformation in the understanding of the authority of law: after the
Revolution, law was an instrument that could be used to advance one’s interests. See
NELSON, supra note 50, at 32–33; see also NELSON, supra note 72, at 3–5.
KRAMER, supra note 34, at 54 (discussing the role of state governments in the 1780s in the
development of judicial review); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 65–67 (2003) (describing the judiciary’s role in curbing
legislative overreaching); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 930; Sylvia Snowiss, The Marbury
of 1803 and the Modern Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 231, 233 (2003); Wood, supra note
31, at 156–57 (discussing that Americans in the 1780s began to have “second thoughts
about their earlier confidence in their popularly elected legislatures” and thus reevaluated “their former hostility to judicial power and discretion”).
The claims in this paragraph derive from Gordon Wood’s seminal study in The Creation of
the American Republic. WOOD, supra note 46, at 446–53 (discussing the “[r]evision of
[s]eparation of [p]owers”); see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF
THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 450–52 (2009) [hereinafter WOOD, EMPIRE] (arguing
that “separation of law from politics” was needed to popularize judicial review); Wood,
supra note 31, at 159 (discussing the tension between judges and legislatures). For a criticism of the separation of powers explanation, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins
of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 509 (2006).
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answerable to the sovereign people through elections. This shift in
understanding was evidenced in a period of constitutional reform at
the state level, where the people’s delegates sought to design the institutions of government in ways that would inhibit a politics of self78
interest and the concomitant risk to individual rights. Adjustments
were made throughout the system—to apportionment in the assembly, to its form and powers, to qualifications for membership in the
79
upper house, and to the term and powers of the governor. Some
proposed expanding government with a system of public schools to
80
promote virtue among the people themselves. But courts of law underwent perhaps the most striking change. They emerged as a sepa81
rate and independent branch of government: the judiciary.
As agents of the people, equal in status to the other great departments, the judiciary could play a role in safeguarding individual
82
Its role, to be sure,
rights and preserving constitutional limits.
83
would not be unique. The judiciary would not be the “appointed
84
arbiters” of the legislature’s constitutional boundaries. The primary
mechanisms for determining and enforcing constitutional limits
78

79
80

81

82

83

84

The same concern guided constitutional design at the national level. See RAKOVE, supra
note 65, at 48–55 (discussing the temptation of legislators to act in their own selfinterest).
See WOOD, supra note 46, at 433–46 (describing the new role for courts of law). Notably,
no state gave its governor an express power of non-enforcement. See infra Part II.A.
See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 88–89 (1990) (discussing Jefferson’s promotion
of education); DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785–
1954, at 14–15 (1987) (discussing Congress’s efforts to promote a republican government
through public edication). Outside government, the “public sphere” of voluntary societies and print media would filter and shape public opinion. See John L. Brooke, Ancient
Lodges and Self-Created Societies: Voluntary Association and the Public Sphere in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC: THE FEDERALIST ERA 277, 296–309 (Ronald
Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1996).
See REID, supra note 58, at 114; WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 407 (describing the rise
of the judiciary by the 1780s). For examples of state constitutions establishing independent judiciaries, see MASS. CONST. of 1780 ch. III; N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXXV; S.C.
CONST. of 1790 art. III; PA. CONST. of 1790 art. V.
See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 125
(1965); KRAMER, supra note 34, at 60 (describing courts’ duty as agents of the people not
to enforce unconstitutional laws); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS 174 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining the viewpoint that the judiciary was needed to
limit the power of the legislature).
See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 55 (noting that all three branches of government were
equal under the law); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 917 (“[J]udicial review is nothing
special.”).
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 GRIFFITH J.
MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, ONE OF THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 178 (1858).
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would be the structural features established to check the legislative
85
power. Yet courts would be duty-bound to contribute to this effort.
Now, just like members of the state assembly, judicial officers were
agents of the people, and as such were themselves bound by the limits
86
of the Constitution. A judiciary co-equal (or “co-ordinate,” as that
generation put it) with the legislature, whose principal was the people, should refuse to give effect to a legislative act that violated constitutional limits. So conceived, judicial review was an “extraordinary
political act” of resistance to a usurping popular assembly, not an ex87
ercise of “conventional legal responsibility.”
It is with these aims, according to our narrative, that judicial re88
view took its first, halting steps in state courts in the 1780s. The
leading state cases in this period are familiar: Commonwealth v.
89
90
91
Caton, Rutgers v. Waddington, Trevett v. Weeden, and Bayard v. Single92
93
ton are perhaps the best known. Though students of judicial review
have long known of the cases, there remains disagreement about the

85
86
87

88
89

90
91
92
93

See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 92–94.
Wood, supra note 31, at 159–60 (characterizing the judiciary as representatives of the
people).
SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 2; see also KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63 (“Judicial review, in other words, was not an act of ordinary legal interpretation.”). For a different approach, see
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 50–142 (1971) (arguing
that American practices were largely derived from English traditions); HAMBURGER, supra
note 44, at 4, 17–18.
See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63–64 (describing judges’ early rationales for judicial review).
8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 12 (Va. 1782) (holding the court can declare a state law unconstitutional
where the house of delegates would have pardon power on its own); See 2 THE LETTERS
AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734–1803, at 416–27 (David John Mays ed., 1967)
(outlining the views of the judges who decided Commonwealth v. Caton); William Michael
Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491,
529–38 (1994) (discussing Canton).
See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 392–
419 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964).
See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417–29 (1971)
(reprinting the case).
1 N.C. (Mart., 48) 5 (1787).
These are probably the most commonly discussed cases, but there are other important
early state authorities, including Holmes & Ketcham v. Walton and the Ten Pound Act Cases.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 407–35 (providing context on the two cases). The list
of precedents for judicial review has, naturally, been the subject of intense historical debate. For recent lists of state authorities, up through the early 1790s, see id. at 655–58
(listing state court decisions); Scott Douglas Graber, The Myth of Marbury v. Madison and
the Origins of Judicial Review, in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON, supra note 24, at 7–11;
Treanor, supra note 44, at 473–517 (“[I]n seven cases . . . judicial review was exercised to
prevent application of the statute.”). An older example is CHARLES GROVES HAINES, THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88–159 (1914).
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public’s reception of them.94 Popular constitutionalists would describe the reaction as an “outcry,” as courts took it upon themselves,
for the first time, to exercise powers long thought to be held by the
95
96
people themselves. The account may be overdrawn. Still, it is undisputed that several of the early cases of judicial review met with se97
vere criticism. Nor can the reaction be understood wholly as ‘sour
grapes,’ since, as we will see, opponents triggered a dialogue about
98
the power of judicial review itself.
B. The “Standard Justification” for Judicial Review
One of the best-known examples of this dialogue arose out of the
99
Bayard was a suit for ejectment
litigation in Bayard v. Singleton.
brought by Elizabeth Bayard and her husband against Spyers Singleton. The Bayards’ claim on the property in question derived from a
deed of transfer executed by Elizabeth’s father, Samuel Cornell.
Cornell was a loyalist and had fled for Great Britain at the start of the
war. Shortly after he deeded his estate to Elizabeth, the state confis100
cated it and then sold the property to Singleton. The constitutional
issue posed in Bayard concerned the summary process for quieting
title adopted by the state assembly during the pendency of the litigation. After Elizabeth Bayard and her husband first brought suit in
late 1784, Singleton secured passage of an act requiring courts to
dismiss suits against purchasers who filed an affidavit the the property
101
had been acquired from the commissioner of forfeited estates.
94

95

96
97

98
99
100
101

Compare KRAMER, supra note 34, at 65–69 (“[E]arly efforts to exercise judicial review drew
stinging rebukes.”), with HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463–75 (“[T]here is little surviving
evidence of public discussion, other than a few newspaper reports, which glowingly approved of the decision . . . .”).
KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63–65 (“Judges might be justified in acting as the people’s
proxy. . . .”); see also 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 950, 964, 966–68, 971–72 (1953) (describing public
reaction to Holmes, Rutgers, Trevett, and Bayard).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 407; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 936–39.
The outstanding example is Trevett v. Weeden. See CROSSKEY, supra note 95, at 968 (explaining that judges on Trevett v. Weeden faced legislative threats and lost their seats in
reelection).
See, e.g., Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 84, at 169.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463 (discussing how Iredell tried to influence the judges in Bayard).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 450 (providing the facts of Bayard v. Singleton).
Bayard v. Singleton, 1. N.C. (Mart. 48) 5, 5 (1787); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at
451–52 (“The act provided that purchars of confiscated estates and those claiming under
their title ‘shall be deemed not liable to answer any suit or suits in law or equity’ commenced by anyone described in the confiscation statutes ‘as inimical to the states’ . . . .”).
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When Singleton moved for dismissal on the grounds of the act, William Davie, representing the Bayards, argued “warmly” that the act
102
was “unconstitutional and therefore no law.” The court made some
103
brief remarks and took the matter under advisement. A year passed
with no decision. Finally, at May term 1787, the court reconvened
104
and held the summary process statute unconstitutional.
Nine months before the decision, in the summer of 1786, an
anonymous letter entitled “To the Public” appeared in the North Caro105
lina Gazette. The author was James Iredell, and it seems likely that
Iredell wrote the letter in an effort to persuade the North Carolina
Superior Court to resume the Bayard matter and find for the plain106
tiffs on constitutional grounds. As others have recognized, the letter contains one of the most important defenses of judicial review in
107
Iredell began by recalling the recent experience in
the period.
North Carolina of drafting a constitution. That process, he said, left
“no doubt, but that the power of the Assembly is limited and defined
108
The assembly was clearly subject to constituby the constitution.”
tional limits; the question was what remedies there were when the assembly exceeded those limits. Were the people confined to petitioning their government or to popular resistance?
Iredell argued no. There was a third remedy for unconstitutional
acts of the assembly. He wrote:
These two remedies being rejected [i.e., petition and resistance], it remains to be inquired whether the judicial power hath any authority to in102
103
104

105
106

107

108

HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 453 n.153 (citation omitted).
See Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart. 48) at 5–6.
See id. at 7. Nevertheless, at trial, the court determined that because Cornell was an alien
he could not hold lands in the state, and the jury returned a verdict for defendant Singleton.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463; see also James Iredell, To the Public, in 2 LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 84, at 145–49.
HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463 (“Iredell wrote for the public because he could not
speak before the judges.”). Hamburger shows that Iredell did not represent the Bayards,
as is often suggested. See, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 95, at 971—72 (stating that Iredell
was “of counsel for the plaintiff”). Instead, he was conflicted out because of involvement
in a related matter. The conflict, which had been artfully arranged by Singleton, angered
Iredell and his friends Archibald Maclain and William Hooper, who were interested in
protecting loyalists from having their property confiscated. See HAMBURGER, supra note
44, at 463 (“When Maclaine learned of how he and his friend had been ‘silenced,’ he was
furious . . . .”); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 73, at 829, 851 (supporting the idea that attorneys in Bayard and other early judicial review cases were targeting antiloyalist legislation).
See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 46, at 868 (supporting the idea that Iredell, and by association “To the Public,” was very influential in the area of judicial review); see also Corwin,
supra note 72, at 526.
Iredell, supra note 105, at 146.
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terfere in such a case [i.e., a case where the assembly violates the constitution]. The duty of that power, I conceive, in all cases, is to decide according to the laws of the State. It will not be denied, I suppose, that the
constitution is a law of the State, as well as an act of Assembly, with this difference only, that it is the fundamental law, and unalterable by the legislature, which derives all its power from it. One act of Assembly may repeal
another act of Assembly. For this reason, the latter act is to be obeyed,
and not the former. An act of Assembly cannot repeal the constitution,
or any part of it. For that reason, an act of Assembly, inconsistent with
the constitution, is void, and cannot be obeyed, without disobeying the
superior law to which we were previously and irrevocably bound. The
judges, therefore, must take care at their peril, that every act of Assembly
they presume to enforce is warranted by the constitution, since if it is not,
they act without lawful authority. This is not a usurped or a discretionary
power, but one inevitably resulting from the constitution of their office,
they being judges for the benefit of the whole people, not mere servants of the As109
sembly.

Iredell is impressively clear in this passage, but for my purposes, it
is important to lay out the argument formally. Iredell begins with
what we can call Premise 1, namely, the proposition that “the duty of
[the judicial] power . . . in all cases, is to decide according to the laws
of the State.” Premise 2 is the next sentence: “[T]he [c]onstitution is
a law of the State.” If we substitute Premise 2 into Premise 1, as the italicized language suggests, it gives us (what we might call) Conclusion
1—namely, that the duty of the judicial power in all cases is to decide
according to the constitution. But this is not yet judicial review. The
problem, of course, is that an act of the assembly is also a law of the
state, as Iredell acknowledges. If we substitute this proposition into
Premise 1, it gives us Conclusion 2—namely, that it is the duty of the
judicial power in all cases to decide according to an act of assembly.
Conclusion 1 and Conclusion 2 describe two different duties. Those
duties may coincide, but they may not. Where an act of assembly and
the constitution are “inconsistent,” it will be impossible to satisfy both
Conclusion 1 and Conclusion 2; the court will be unable to discharge
both duties. What is required, it would seem, is a judicial rule for
privileging either the constitution or the unconstitutional act. Iredell
proposes such a rule by drawing a simple comparison to legislative
repeal. An assembly can repeal any previous act it has passed. When
it does, he says, copying Blackstone, the “latter act” (in time) be-

109

Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at
148.
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comes the law of the state for purposes of deciding a case.110 Yet the
Assembly cannot repeal the constitution, since the constitution is
“fundamental law,” and thus the source of the Assembly’s power. An
act inconsistent with the constitution must be void—i.e., not a law at
111
all. Call this Premise 3. It follows, says Iredell, that for the court to
decide a case according to an unconstitutional law would be to violate
the judicial duty to decide in all cases according to the laws of the
state. This proposition, which we can call Conclusion 3 (abbreviated
“C”), is judicial review.
Paraphrasing where appropriate, this gives us the following argument.
112

The Standard Justification

P1. The duty of the judicial power in all cases is to decide according to
(and only to) the laws of the state.
P2. The constitution is a law of the state.
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of
the state.
C. If the judicial power decides according to an unconstitutional act of
the assembly, rather than the constitution, it does not decide according
to the laws of the state, and thus it violates its duty.

To understand this argument, one has to keep in mind that Premise 3 is not equivalent to judicial review. Premise 3 says that an unconstitutional act of assembly is void. But “void” does not mean “of
no effect in a court of law.” As Snowiss and others have shown, one
cannot assume in this period that a constitution can be enforced in
113
legal proceedings within a court of law. The constitution was fun-

110

111
112

113

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *53 (discussing the nature of law); see 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 741 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007)
(asserting that the later of two inconsistent laws “is the only existing law”).
For this usage of “not a law” or “no law at all,” see, as an example, Prakash, supra note 9,
at 1665.
This expression “Standard Justification” comes from Charles Hobson. See CHARLES F.
HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 60–61
(1996).
See, e.g., SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 42 (“The convention debates . . . indicate that in 1787
fundamental law was understood to bind morally and politically, not legally.”); Wood, supra note 31, at 161–65 (“The courts might on occasion set aside legislation that violated
fundamental law, but such an act could not be part of routine judicial business; it necessarily had to be an extraordinary expression of public authority, the kind of extreme and
remarkable action the people themselves would take if they could. This kind of judicial
review was, as it had been aptly described, a ‘subsitute for revolution.’”(citation omitted)).
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damental law; it regulated the government, not the people.114 Courts
promulgated and applied ordinary law, which regulated the people.
Thus Premise 3 is not sufficient for judicial review. Its role in the
Standard Justification is, rather, to show why courts should privilege
the constitution over an inconsistent act of the assembly. Other
premises have to get us into court in the first place. With this point
in mind, we can think of the propositions of the Standard Justification as playing four basic roles, here in order: (1) describe the judicial office; (2) show that the constitution naturally figures into that
office; (3) provide a reason to privilege the constitution; and (4) conclude that a court is duty-bound to give the constitution effect.
The most significant premise in Iredell’s argument is, therefore,
the first one: that there is a judicial duty to decide cases according to
the laws of the state. The burden of the argument really rests here,
and, indeed, Premises 2 and 3 were relatively well accepted at the
115
time “To the Public” was written. Yet Premise 1 is far from obvious,
and, after pausing to examine it, we may wonder whether Iredell has
simply begged the question. Why is it the duty of the judiciary, after
all, to decide cases according to all the laws of the state? Why consider the constitution, even if it is a law? The constitution is obviously
different in kind from ordinary law; and it is easy to describe a system
in which courts ignore fundamental law. A court might be obligated
merely to decide cases in conformance with those laws duly enacted by
the state legislature, regardless of whether the laws violate substantive

114

115

See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 29 (“Fundamental law was different from ordinary law,
or what we typically think of today as ordinary law, both in its conceptual underpinnings
and in actual operation. It was law created by the people to regulate and restrain the
government, as opposed to ordinary law, which is law enacted by the government and restrain the people.”); SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 90–91 (discussing the difference between
fundamental and orindary law).
For Premise 2, see HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 293 (highlighting that Americans believed “constitutions were laws”). In assessing Premise 2, it is important to understand
that it does not entail that a constitution is cognizable in a court of law. See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 49 (discussing Iredell’s view of the cognizability of constitutions in court).
In other words, to deny judicial review, one need not maintain that a constitution is purely
a social compact, and not a law; one can argue that it is a fundamental law, and that fundamental laws are not cognizable in court. For Premise 3, see Prakash, supra note 9, at
1658 (providing examples of early American leaders who espoused this view). See also
SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 49 (“The judicial duty to decide according to the laws of the
state meant that the judiciary was precluded from enforcing legislation that by violating
the constitution was void or not law.”).
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constitutional limitations.116 Or the constitution might function hor117
tatively, as it does in a number of regimes.
Premise 1, it would seem, is in need of its own justification. A
number of different justifications are possible, but I want to focus on
two suggested by the text of “To the Public” and present in other
leading period defenses of judicial review. The first justification is
based on the idea of constitutional agency. Roughly, constitutional
agency is the idea that judges are the agents of the people. Iredell
closes his argument in the passage above by gently admonishing
North Carolina judges that they hold their office “for the benefit of the
whole people.” They are not, he reminds them, “mere servants of the
118
Because judges are agents of the people, and not the
Assembly.”
assembly, they “must take care at their peril” to enforce only laws that
119
To do otherwise would
comply with their principal’s constitution.
be, in effect, to disobey the principal. As Iredell put the matter in a
subsequent letter to Richard Dobbs Spaight, then a delegate at the
federal convention in Philadelphia, “either . . . the fundamental unrepealable law must be obeyed, by the rejection of an act unwarranted by and inconsistent with it, or you must obey an act founded on an
120
Since one disobeys what
authority not given by the people . . . .”
one does not obey, Iredell’s implication is clear: judges who gave effect to unconstitutional laws “themselves would be lawbreakers, acting
121
without lawful authority.” To remain within the bounds of their authority, judges must decide cases in conformance with the constitution.

116

117

118

119
120
121

See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is by no
means clear, that to declare a law void that has been enacted according to the forms prescribed in the constitution, is not a usurpation of legislative power.”).
See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 18–
20 (1969) (“[A] variety of excellent purposes are felt to be served in other countries with
similar constitutional provisions without detracting from the positive law effect of all legislative acts.”); see also HAINES, supra note 93, at 201 (discussing opinions about the result in
Rutgers v. Waddington).
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at
148. See also supra Part I.A (discussing the separation of powers doctrine). Iredell’s whole
line of reasoning presupposes the shift in thinking Wood describes, in which the people
conceived of themselves as standing outside government entirely. Were the people understood as part of the government in the state assembly, it would follow from popular
sovereignty that the courts of law were servants of the assembly.
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at
148.
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at
173.
KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63 (internal quotations omitted).
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This concept of constitutional agency lay at the center of a cluster
of interrelated ideas, whose distinctions were not always made explicit. Thus, it was said that agency implied a duty: a duty not to act
122
without constitutional authority, or a duty to resist unlawful pow123
er, or perhaps a duty not to ‘aid and abet’ another in violating the
124
There were a number of suggestions. To be sure,
constitution.
none was entirely without difficulty. Where law imposes any kind of
duty, failure to satisfy that duty is a violation; and the conclusion that
a judge “violates” the constitution by giving effect to an unconstitu125
Another common sugtional law has seemed to some too strong.
gestion was that the legislature’s violation justified others in resisting
126
A judge could resist, even if he did not
the unconstitutional act.
have to. This, too, might be connected to judicial review. In his Lectures in Law, delivered in the early 1790s, James Wilson argued that
“whoever would be obliged to obey a constitutional law, is justified in
refusing to obey an unconstitutional act of the legislature—and that,
122

123

124

125

126

Several theories are possible here. An unconstitutional law might rob a court of jurisdiction. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 553 (2d ed. 1836) (quoting John Marshall as saying, “[i]f
they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, . . . [the judges]
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it
void.”). Alternatively, enforcing an unconstitutional law might violate a judge’s oath of
office. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, at 423.
See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY BERTLE ABINGDON, THOUGHTS ON THE LETTER OF EDMUND BURKE
TO THE SHERIFFS OF BRISTOL, ON THE AFFAIRS OF AMERICA 17 (1777), available at
http://archive.org/details/thoughtsonletter00abinuoft (“Obedience is due to the Laws,
when founded on the Constitution; but when they are subversive of the Constitution,
then disobedience instead of obedience is due.”); see also 1 GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 127
(noting the popularity of the Abingdon pamphlet in the states); KRAMER, supra note 34, at
98 (“[Courts] justified their refusal to enforce laws as a ‘political-legal’ act on behalf of
the people, a responsibility required by their position as the people’s faithful agents.”).
See Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 59 (Va. 1793) (Opinion of Tyler, J.) (“[C]an one
branch of the government call upon another to aid in the violation of this sacred letter?
The answer to these questions must be in the negative.”).
See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 330, 357 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“I grant,
however, that the state judiciary ought not to exercise the power [to deem a law unconstitutional], except in cases free from all doubt, because, as a writ of error to the supreme
court of the United States lies to correct an error only in favor of the constitutionality of
the state law, an error in deciding against it would be irremediable.”); Louise Weinberg,
Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1398 (2003) (“[Chief Justice] Marshall pointed out that
for judges to fail to enforce the Constitution, when they have adjuged legislslation to be
in violation of it, would be for them to violate the Constitution themselves. Although the
term, ‘violate,’ may express his point a shade too emphatically for our taste, there is no
escape from his point.” (internal quotations omitted)).
See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 111 (quoting Theophilius Parsons as saying “[a]n act
of usurpation is not obligatory, it is not law, and any man may be justified in his resistance.”)
(emphasis added).
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when a question, even of this delicate nature, occurs, every one who
127
is called to act, has a right to judge . . . .” The judiciary would thus
be justified in resisting the legislature by refusing to enforce the
128
This idea, too, was somewhat of an imperfect fit. To invoke
law.
Wilson’s reasoning, one must conceive of the judiciary as being
“obliged to obey” all legislative acts—not just those that expressly
129
Yet the nocommand courts or judicial officers to do something.
tion was a common one.
A second justification for Premise 1 focuses on the duty to apply
130
the law. The particular duty of the judicial power, says Iredell, is to
131
decide “cases” according to the laws of the state. This duty entails a
set of further tasks. The tasks are familiar—they are the workaday
norms of decision-making in courts of law. Thus, to decide a case according to the laws of the state, a judge must first determine what the
laws of the state are; and to determine what the laws of the state are,
the judge must make sense of how different laws that are potentially
relevant fit together. The constitution is one such law. It is, Iredell
tells us, “fundamental law.” It follows that the judge must determine
how ordinary acts of the assembly fit together with the Constitution.
If they are inconsistent, the judge must give effect to the constitution,
since it is “superior law.” In this way, reasons Iredell, judicial review
“is not a usurped or discretionary power, but one inevitably resulting
132
from the constitution of their office.” The judge’s office requires him to
133
consider the constitution, in addition to ordinary law.
127
128

129
130
131
132
133

1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 572.
See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63 (“In refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws, judges
were exercising the people’s authority to resist, providing a supplemental remedy for ultra vires legislative acts . . . .”); Treanor, supra note 44, at 534 (making a similar point); cf.
HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 276–77 (discussing judicial refusal to use stamped paper
during the 1765 Stamp Act controversy); HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 559–74 (discussing Cases of the Judges).
Alternatively, one could infer that judicial review is limited to acts that do expressly require the judiciary to do something. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 88–89.
See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 64 (discussing judges’ duties to enforce law); SNOWISS,
supra note 46, at 49 (discussing that the Constitution is subject to judicial application).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 464 (noting Iredell’s conception of judicial duty).
Hamburger’s treatment of “To the Public” focuses on this aspect of Iredell’s argument.
Iredell, supra note 84, at 148 (emphasis added).
See Treanor, supra note 44, at 523 (describing this argument made by Tucker in Commonwealth v. Caton). Even Sylvia Snowiss, who has contended that American judges of the late
eighteenth century lacked the authority to expound fundamental law, agrees that these
judges could “consider” the Constitution in the course of expounding ordinary law. See
SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 48–55 (observing that “[t]he judiciary could legitimately take
notice of the constitution”); Snowiss, supra note 76, at 236 (“The judiciary must resort to
or take notice of the constitution in order to fulfill its assigned responsibilty to expound
ordinary law . . . .”).
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If we want, we can think of these two justifications as supporting
two different ‘versions’ of the Standard Justification. One version is
based, ultimately, on the idea of constitutional agency, the other on a
duty to apply the law. Both ideas were widely employed in the peri134
od. And both ideas can be made to support an executive power of
non-enforcement.
C. From the Standard Justification to the Non-Enforcement Argument
Nothing in either version of the Standard Justification appears to
turn on the unique features of the judicial office. Take the first version, based on the idea of constitutional agency. If the judge is a constitutional agent of the people, then he ought to resist, or refuse to
“aid and abet,” legislative violations of the Constitution. In the very
135
least he is authorized to resist such violations. Yet the judge is not
distinguished from the executive insofar as he is a constitutional
agent of the people. The President is also the people’s agent; so if
agency itself implies a duty, or an authority, to resist another agent’s
unconstitutional action, then it implies such a duty in both the judi136
ciary and the executive.
We can make a similar argument using the second version of the
Standard Justification, based on the duty to apply the law. Adjudicating a case by the law of the land requires the judge to determine what
that law is, and that process requires ironing out conflicts of law. This
includes the Constitution, since the Constitution is law. But it is easy
to see that this does not distinguish the judiciary from the executive.
The executive also applies the law, in the sense that he enforces it or
137
Since he applies the law, he must interpret the law.
executes it.
134

135
136

137

See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 395–461 (examining the role of judicial duty to apply
the law in the justification of judicial review); KRAMER, supra note 34, at 57–72 (examining
the role of constitutional agency).
See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
See Paulsen, supra note 15, at 244–45, 252–55 (discussing the idea of constitutional interpreation and how it is affected by the separation of powers in the opinions of Marshall
and Wilson); cf. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two
Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 373–74 (1994)
(arguing that all “institutional officials need concern themselves with questions of constitutional interpretation by monitoring their own decisions and, just as important, by monitoring other institutional actors to ensure that they, too, comply with constitutional
norms”).
See Kramer, supra note 11, at 83 (“[J]udges, no less than any other citizen or government
official, were bound to take notice of the Constitution if and when it became relevant in
the ordinary course of business.”) (emphasis added); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 924–
25 (“[T]he President must be able to determine whether a federal statute is a valid one;
in other words, whether it conforms to the paramount law of the Constitution.”).
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Since the Constitution is law, he must interpret the Constitution; and
since the Constitution is supreme law, he must privilege the Constitu138
tion in his interpretation. It is worth noting that the Constitution’s
text provides an additional footing for this argument. The Take Care
Clause commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faith139
fully executed.” The Constitution is law, so the President must take
care it is executed; and it is supreme law, so he must take care to priv140
ilege it above inconsistent ordinary law. This is the power of nonenforcement.
We can highlight the parallel between the judiciary and the executive by modifying our formulation of Iredell’s argument in “To the
Public.” That formulation, recall, was the following:
P1. The duty of the judicial power in all cases is to decide according to
(and only to) the laws of the state.
P2. The Constitution is a law of the state.
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of
the state.
C. If the judicial power decides according to an unconstitutional act of
the assembly, rather than the Constitution, it does not decide according
to the laws of the state, and thus it violates its duty.

It takes relatively little imagination to see how the argument
would go in the case of the President.
The Non-Enforcement Argument
P1′.The duty of the executive power is to execute the laws of the state.
P2. The Constitution is a law of the state.
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of
the state.

138
139
140

See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919 (comparing how judges and the President must
treat the Constitution).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 9, at 798–801 (discussing [t]he President’s [d]uty to
[e]nforce the [l]aw”); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919 (discussing the implication of
the Take Care Clause on the President); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1631–33 (discussing the
potential limits of the Faithful Execution Clause on the President). But see Miller, supra
note 17, at 397 (arguing that giving the President power to easily strike down laws would
give the “United States . . . a king for president”). Similar arguments can be developed
from the Article II Oath Clause and the Article II Vesting Clause. See Lawson & Moore,
supra note 13, at 1281–82 (discussing the Vesting Clause); Paulsen, supra note 15, at 257–
62 (discussing the Oath Clause).
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C′. If the executive power executes an unconstitutional act of the assembly, rather than the Constitution, it does not execute the laws of the state,
and thus it violates its duty.

If the Standard Justification is valid, then the modified argument below it is also valid, since its formal validity does not turn on the substantive difference between the judiciary and the executive. Thus, if
the modified premise, P1′, is true, then the President has a power of
non-enforcement. I will assume that the modified premise is true.
This is what I call the “Non-Enforcement Argument.” There is
something to recommend it, as I have tried to show. Nevertheless, I
think the Framers almost certainly would have rejected the argument.
More precisely, I think they would have rejected it even though (1)
they accepted the power of each department to interpret the Constitution, and (2) they accepted judicial review (most of them, anyway).
But how could the Framers have held these three views consistently?
My aim in the next two Parts is to show how, beginning with the rejection of non-enforcement.
II. TWO PROBLEMS WITH THE NON-ENFORCEMENT ARGUMENT
There are two principal problems with the Non-Enforcement Argument. First, no one drew the conclusion. Prior to ratification,
there is only one known instance of an explicit defense of a presidential power of non-enforcement. Yet the premises of the argument
141
were widely accepted; and the parallel inference—from the Standard Justification to a putative power of judicial review—was wide142
spread, if not common. In the first decade after ratification, as the
143
Standard Justification achieved greater acceptance, defenses of
non-enforcement remain absent from the historical record. This
needs explaining. Whatever else they were, the Framers were ready
practitioners of the constitutional syllogism. They had reasons to defend non-enforcement. So if the Non-Enforcement Argument is
simply a corollary of the Standard Justification, we should expect the
144
Framers, or at least some of them, to have drawn its conclusion.
141
142

143

144

See supra Parts I.B–C.
Prakash, supra note 9, at 1659 (“It certainly is true that references to judicial review during the Constitution’s creation substantially outnumber references to a President’s duty
to disregard unconstitutional statutes.”).
See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 98 (“What achieved acceptance in the 1790s was the
theory of review formulated by men like James Iredell in the 1780s.”); Treanor, supra note
44, at 519 (“[J]udicial review early won surprisingly broad acceptance in Virginia.”).
I am not assuming that the Framers drew all conclusions logically implied by other views
they held. The point is that they had reason to conclude that executives had a non-
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Yet, second, a number of leading Framers actually advanced positions inconsistent with the conclusion of the Non-Enforcement Argument. Generally, thinking about the role of executives in constitutional enforcement remained relatively unfocused in the 1780s and
early 1790s. Yet where the course of argument would have made it
natural to cite a presidential power to decline to enforce the law on
constitutional grounds, discussants remained silent, or made concessions at odds with such a power. Even as the party conflict of the
1790s crystalized around questions of executive power, Federalists
and Republicans continued to express views of the President inconsistent with non-enforcement. This is particularly true of Republicans, who professed horror at the abuse of executive authority they
145
saw in the Adams administration.
Taken together, these points suggest that something is amiss with
the Non-Enforcement Argument. By extension, they also suggest a
problem with our formulation of Iredell’s Standard Justification for
judicial review. Indeed, when we take a closer look at the Standard
Justification with these points in mind, it becomes apparent that
something more is necessary—something that shows why it is appropriate to hear and determine questions of constitutional meaning in
the institutional setting of a court of law.
A. A Lack of Evidence
The delegates at Philadelphia who most influenced the federal
presidency were agreed that executive power under the state consti146
tutions had proven defective. With the exception of New York, the
first state constitutions had bound their chief magistrates to councils
and to the legislature itself, and deprived them of traditional royal
‘executive’ powers, like pardon and appointment. In some cases, the

145
146

enforcement power, and that these very reasons account for the development of judicial
review. See Corwin, supra note 72, at 521 (describing the veto and judicial review as the
two principal constitutional solutions to “the legislative vortex” of the 1780s).
LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 249–
50 (1978).
See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 22, 52–54 (1923) (“State experieces thus contributed, nothing
more strongly, to discredit the whole idea of the sovereign legislature . . . .”). The exception here is Roger Sherman of Connecticut, but Sherman’s influence on the ultimate
form of Article II is questionable. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787–1984, 10–11 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (quoting Madison
as stating that Sherman regarded the “Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the legislature into effect . . . .”(citation omitted));
THACH, supra, at 89 (explaining that the Convention rejected the “complete subordination of the executive” and Sherman’s conception of the Executive magistracy).
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state governor or president (as the office might be called) was essentially the presiding officer of an executive council, elected by and responsible to the popular assembly—which, in turn, proceeded to di147
These deficiencies were
vest him of power when it thought wise.
addressed in the wave of state constitutional reform described above,
148
in particular in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Yet, in a number of ways, these reforms did not rest on a substantial, fully republican conception of the office. That remained elusive, and would
through much of the Philadelphia Convention. While Madison focused on the design of a national legislature and its relationship to
the states, he confessed in the spring of 1787 to having few concrete
149
ideas about the form a national executive should take.
Few in the states associated the office of chief magistrate with the
150
protective function of constitutional exposition or interpretation.
151
Only two states granted their executives vetoes. In New York, where
the veto was used with some success in policing constitutional boundaries, it was lodged not in the state executive, but in a judicially af152
forced Council of Revision; and when New York’s Council wanted
to authoritatively pronounce on the meaning of the state’s Constitution, its veto message was composed in the style and tone of a judicial
153
opinion. Nor did the mimicry fully convince, given the procedural
147

148

149

150

151
152

153

See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 270–71 (2001);
THACH, supra note 146, at 28–29 (discussing the limitations on the power of state executives).
See WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 434–35 (“Reformers sought to center magisterial responsibility in the governors by making the executive councils more advisory than they
were in the early Revolutionary constitutions. They also sought to make governors less
dependent on legislature, especially in election.”).
See THACH, supra note 146, at 81 (“The truth is that Madison’s views on executive power
were extremely vague when he came to Philadelphia in 1787.”); THACH, supra note 146,
at 83 (quoting Letter of James Madison to George Washington, April 16, 1787, expressing
this uncertainty).
In the Philadelphia Convention, Governeur Morris described the executive as “the great
protector of the Mass of the people.” See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 52 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
Massachusetts is the other state that had a gubernatorial veto before 1787. See MASS.
CONST. of 1780 ch. I, § I, art. II.
See ADAMS, supra note 147, at 271; see also THACH, supra note 146, at 40–54 (comparing the
constitutional supremacy in New York through the council with other states and the tension created with the state legislature). South Carolina’s Constitution of 1776 also included a veto, but this constitution was never submitted to the voters for ratification. S.C.
CONST. OF 1776 art. VII.
See Jeff Roedel, Stoking the Doctrinal Furnace: Judicial Review and the New York Council of Revision, 69 N.Y. HIST. 261, 270 (1988) (articulating that when the Council of Revision vetoed
a law on constitutional grounds, it “clearly sounded like a court”); see also id. at 272 (“The
Council demonstrated its judicial character most clearly when its language carried a de-
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differences between the Council and a court. In Rutgers, Chief Judge
Duane would draw a distinction in Rutgers between a decision of the
154
Council and adjudication in a court of law on these grounds. In no
case did a state give its governor or president a power to refuse to enforce duly enacted law. As a general matter, state executives gave
force to valid judgments entered by state courts and did not claim a
power to expound the law themselves, although one can find isolated
155
During the Revolutionary War, in which Penncounterexamples.
sylvania Executive Council President John Dickinson refused to carry
out a warrant of execution issued by the state supreme court against
156
Aaron Doan on a bill of attainder. Apparently, the power claimed
by President Dickinson did not set an example. As for Dickinson
himself, his comments in Philadelphia on the proposed national ex157
ecutive bear no visible traces of the Doan confrontation.

154

155
156

157

liberative tone. . . . In its deliberative character, the Council offered commentary on the
law . . . . Particularly significant, then, are Council vetoes that rested on the superior law
of the state constitution. There the Council adopted a judicial tenor of language and
analysis that clearly foreshadowed judicial review.”); cf. STIMSON, supra note 80, at 116
(arguing that the Council of Revision was not a precedent for judicial review).
See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note90, at 416 (“[S]urely the
respect, which we owe to this honorable Council, ought not to carry us to such lengths; it
is not to be supposed that their assent or objection to a bill, can have the force of an adjudication: for what, in such a case, would be the fate of a law that prevailed against their
sentiments? Besides in the hurry of a session, and especially flagrento bello, they have
neither leisure nor means to weigh the extent and consequences of a law, whose provisions are general, at least not with that accuracy and solemnity, which must be necessary
to render their reasons incontrovertible, and their opinions absolute.”).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 544 (“Among those who accepted the force of judgments were the executive officers of the states.”).
See Respublica v. Doan, 1 Dall. 86, 93 (Pa. 1784) (holding that the execution of Doan was
legal and upholding the warrant for execution); see also G. S. Rowe, Outlawry in Pennsylvania, 1782–1788 and the Achievement of an Independent State Judiciary, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
227, 230–33 (1976) (illustrating the Supreme Executive Council’s refusal to execute the
warrant for Doan); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILLS OF RIGHTS 77–78 (2001); cf.
The Constitutionalist, No. 11, THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL, Dec. 31, 1783, at 1 (describing the
refusal by the Georgia governor to give effect to a resolution by the state legislature reversing an act of attainder and banishment).
See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 85–87
(noting Dickinson’s remarks at the Federal Convention of 1787); see also, e.g., id. at 108–
09 (“[Y]ou propose to give the Executive a share in Legislation—why not the Judicial—
There is a Difference—the Judges must interpret the Laws they ought not to be Legislators. The Executive is merely ministerial . . . .”); Rufus King, Notes in Federal Convention
of 1787 (unpublished manuscript) available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
king.asp (“Dickinson opposed—you shd. separate the Departments—you have given the
Executive a share in Legislation; and it is asked why not give a share to the judicial power.
Because the Judges are to interpret the Laws, and therefore shd. have no share in making
them—not so with the executive whose causing the Laws to be executed is a ministerial
office only.”).
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At the national level, there is little support for the view that anyone, prior to 1789, thought the Constitution conferred a presidential
158
Only one explicit endorsement is
power of non-enforcement.
known. It came from James Wilson in the second week of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. The convention had gotten off to a
rocky start. Following a heated dispute over rules of procedure, delegates turned to an examination of Article I, in hope, said Thomas
159
McKean, that “a spirit of conciliation and coolness may prevail.” As
Pauline Maier has shown, what actually did prevail was “pandemonium,” punctuated by lengthy orations that did little to persuade oppo160
nents. The chief concerns about Article I voiced by those in opposition to ratification were real. On November 28, John Smilie
pointed to the absence of any bill of rights; McKean and Wilson responded that no bill of rights was necessary because Congress was
161
limited to enumerated powers. After a dispute over whether Virginia’s Constitution contained a bill of rights (Wilson erroneously
claimed it did not), Robert Whitehill made an important point in rejoinder: “If indeed the Constitution itself so well defined the powers
of the government that no mistake could arise . . . then we might be
162
But, he
satisfied without an explicit reservation of those rights.”
said, the powers were not well defined; they were “unlimited” and
163
“undefined.” In fact, observed John Smilie, the language of Article
I, section 8, was so broad that it would support a “complete system of
164
government” and thereby effect a consolidation of the states.
Consolidation became the leading issue over the next few days.
Delegates returned to it repeatedly. On December 1, after several
failed attempts to quiet the concern, Wilson again took up the is165
His strategy that day proved well-conceived. He began by
sue.
158
159
160

161
162
163
164

165

The most extensive discussion of this point can be found in MAY, supra note 17, at 867.
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 380 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 2001).
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at
106–11 (2010) (discussing debates that “stretched out over twenty-two increasingly tense
and exhausting days”).
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 384–88 (reprinting these statements).
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 393.
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 428.
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 408; see MAIER, supra note 160, at 110 (providing a report by a Pennsylvania newspaper that characterized the federal government as a “consolidation”).
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 445–46.
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denying the premise of the argument. The states did not possess sovereign power, he argued, and thus could not be deprived of it by consolidation. The people were sovereign, and the people could choose
to distribute authority among different governments as they thought
166
Under the proposed Constitution, the people
most conducive.
would distribute only a portion of the legislative power to the national government. The national legislature, in turn, would be kept to
these limits by a variety of devices, including “a division of power in
the legislative body itself,” “the PEOPLE themselves,” and—most important for our purposes—by “the interference of those officers, who
167
will be introduced into the executive and judicial departments.”
Wilson then elaborated:
[I]t is possible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity, may
transgress the bounds assigned to it . . . but when it comes to be discussed
before the judges—when they consider its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the Constitution, it is their duty to
pronounce it void. And [independent] judges . . . will behave with intrepidity and refuse to the act the sanction of judicial authority. In the same
manner, the President of the United States could shield himself and re168
fuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution.

Non-enforcement would thus preserve a measure of legislative authority for the states.
It is clear that Wilson is endorsing the non-enforcement power.
He is not referring to the qualified veto, since he describes the President as refusing to carry into effect “an act,” rather than a bill, and he
169
addresses the veto power expressly a short time later. Nor is he referring to the pardon or to the President’s prosecutorial discretion,
since he says nothing of remitting or dispensing with the prosecution
170
Wilson’s language does leave the scope of nonof a crime.
enforcement somewhat unclear. He describes the President as using
the power to “shield himself,” which could mean he thought nonenforcement was limited to preventing other departments from
166

167
168
169

170

2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 448 ([M]y position is that the sovereignty resides with the people . . . .”); see
MAIER, supra note 160, at 109 (highlighting Wilson’s view that the people are the sovereign).
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISOTRY OF THE RATITIFCATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 450.
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 450–451.
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
159, at 452–53 (describing the process of how the President may exercise the veto power).
See Wilson’s discussion of the pardon in Lectures on Law. 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON, supra note 110, at 879–84.
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usurping executive authority.171 In contrast, some have suggested that
Wilson’s language reflects the idea, common at the time, that an officer who gave effect to an unconstitutional law would himself violate
172
the Constitution. Of course, as we have seen, there were other versions of the Standard Justification, also in circulation, that carried no
173
Wilson himself advanced such a version several
such implication.
174
Moreover, Wilson’s language at
years later in his Lectures on Law.
the convention suggests a contrast between the judicial duty to pronounce the law void and the President’s authority to do so (“the President . . . could shield himself”)—implying that the President would
not violate his constitutional duty by executing an unconstitutional
law. Still, there would be little point, in the context of a discussion
about consolidation, to adduce a non-enforcement power limited to
interbranch defense, for such a power would be of little use in preventing the national legislature from encroaching on the states. The
scope of a non-enforcement/anti-consolidation power would have to
be broader than presidential self-defense, whether or not the President violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitutional
law.
175
Wilson’s endorsement is clear, but it was also isolated. It was a
brief remark in the midst of what was supposed to be a discussion of
the merits of Article I. Apparently, the remark fell on deaf ears. As
far as we know, it drew no response from the vocal opposition led by
Smilie, Whitehill, and William Findley. Wilson’s principal ally,
McKean, did not pick up on the point. There was no response in the
gallery, or in the press. Perhaps his audience missed the comment
entirely. They could be forgiven; Wilson was prone to long lectures
at the convention, and it is unclear how many delegates paid atten171

172
173

174

175

As has been often noted, a number of delegates at the Philadelphia Convention described judicial review as a defensive power. Wilson was among them. See 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73 (noting that Wilson viewed
the judiciary would strike down laws in order to defend constitutional rights).
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 15, at 253 (interpreting Wilson’s statement this way).
See supra Part I.B. Notably, John Smilie advanced a contrary view at the convention. He
argued that federal judges would refuse to hold a law invalid out of a fear that Congress
would impeach them for “disobeying a law.” In the case of non-enforcement, Smilie’s
view implies that the President would expose himself to liability, not shield himself, by refusing to enforce an unconstitutional law. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 159, at 466.
See 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 572 (“[W]hoever would be
obliged to obey a constitutional law, is justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act
of the legislature . . . .” (emphasis added)).
In the memorable malaprop of the ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements, it
was a “vagrant remark.” Prakash, supra note 9, at 1659 n.182 (citing ABA TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE).
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tion to the details.176 Wilson himself did not return to the point, although the issues that led him to broach it on December 1 did reap177
pear. He brought up judicial review again on December 7, and his
178
No mention was made of
comments were reported in the press.
presidential non-enforcement. He thus gave the matter a grand total
of one sentence in the convention. Nor did Wilson offer a defense of
179
non-enforcement in his ambitious and systematic Lectures on Law.
180
There he adopted the Standard Justification for judicial review, but
focused his discussion of presidential authority almost entirely on the
181
pardon power. Courts, said Wilson, were the “noble guard against
legislative despotism,” before the “great and last resort” of the peo182
ple.
While Wilson’s is the only known explicit endorsement of nonenforcement prior to ratification, there were a number of near misses. In the Massachusetts convention, the eminent Theophilius Parsons argued that if Congress were to enact a law that infringed individual rights, “the act would be a nullity, and could not be
183
Parsons’s comment is obviously equivocal as between
enforced.”
184
judicial review and presidential non-enforcement. Before the convention, delegate William Symmes had expressed anxiety that the
President’s obligation under the Take Care Clause might be insuffi-

176

177
178
179
180

181

182
183
184

See MAIER, supra note 160, at 114 (describing a speech delivered by Wilson and remarking, “[i]ts printed version remains powerful, but how closely did his fellow delegates listen
to it?”).
See MAIER, supra note 160, at 111–20 (describing the chaotic nature of the remainder of
the convention).
See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICANTION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 159, at 517, 524–25 (providing the comments by Wilson and the newspaper reports).
See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 99 (“Wilson wanted nothing less than to produce a complete philosophy of American law . . . .”).
See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 76 (quoting Wilson when he asserted that the judicial
branch should act as a check against the legislative department’s constitutional violations).
See 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 879–84 (discussing the pardon power). Wilson suggests that the “executive” can “prevent[]” legislative excess, and
that he has a “right to judge” whether an act of the legislature is constitutional. The
point is that Wilson does not argue that this “right to judge” implies a presidential power
of non-enforcement. 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 572.
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 743, 203.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 162.
Unfortunately, nothing about the context—a discussion of whether the Constitution
should have a bill of rights—shows whether Parsons had presidential non-enforcement in
mind. Some have read Parsons to support jury review. See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V.
THE SUPREME COURT 55, 177 (1969) (noting “[Parsons] stated that if in consequence of
resistance the government brought a criminal prosecution, a jury of [his] ‘own fellow citizens w[ould] pronounce him innocent’”) (citation omitted).
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cient to prevent him from ignoring congressional directives as to how
185
federal law should be enforced. Symmes, an anti-federalist, did not
think the executive should have such a power. Apparently his concern was answered, or forgotten, because he did not raise it at the
186
convention.
Also suggestive are Madison’s comments in October 1788, shortly
after the Constitution had taken effect. In his “Observations on the
Draught of a Constitution for Virginia,” Madison observed that
courts, “by refusing or not refusing to execute a law,” had been able
“to stamp it with its final character,” a result that made the judicial
department “paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never
187
intended, and can never be proper.” The language clearly suggests
doubts about judicial review in a constitutional system that made
courts independent of the legislature. Yet the point does not support
non-enforcement. Were the President to have a power of nonenforcement, it would, by Madison’s reasoning, fall to the President to
“stamp [the law] with its final character,” making him superior to the
legislature—a result also inconsistent with departmental coordinacy
188
and republicanism. A more republican solution to Madison’s concern was described by the anti-federalist Brutus. Six months before
“Observations,” in the spring of 1788, Brutus had observed precisely
the same problem, arguing that it arose because the national legisla189
ture could not hear appeals from the Supreme Court. Publius, of
190
Much later, in the midst of the controcourse, rejected the idea.
versy over the Virginia Resolution, Madison conceded that “the judicial department is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the
Constitution, to decide in the last resort . . . in relation to the authori191
ties of the other departments.”
185
186
187
188
189

190
191

See MAY, supra note 17, at 27 (noting Symmes’ concern).
See id. (“These fears were apparently put to rest.”).
5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 39, at 284, 294 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1904).
See infra notes 237–51 and accompanying text.
See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 295,
306–07 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003) (expressing concern over the Supreme Court’s power).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (addressing Brutus’s argument).
See James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 17 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 311 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977). Madison argued that the Virginia Resolution had not usurped judicial power because it had merely “express[ed an] opinion, unaccompanied with any
other effect than what [it] may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection.” Id. at 259.
In contrast, he said, “[t]he expositions of the judiciary . . . are carried into immediate effect [and] enforce[] the general will.” Id. This reflects the distinction between merely
interpreting the Constitution and refusing to enforce an unconstitutional law. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 983–84
(1993) (observing that “Madison firmly believed in an active interpretive role for both the
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To be sure, there is no need to insist on a delicate reading of Madison’s language in “Observations.” The point does not depend on
“Observations,” or any other statement in the rather tangled body of
192
commentary Madison left us on this topic. We may assume that a
number of endorsements of non-enforcement escaped the historical
record, and that there are others preserved somewhere, but presently
unknown. The existence of these endorsements does not change the
analysis. In one study, Sai Prakash and John Yoo found a total of 109
discussions of judicial review of federal law during the ratification
process, either in a convention or in pamphlets or essays published
193
during the pendency of a convention. It is impossible that a comparable number of discussions of presidential non-enforcement have
194
escaped notice. There was simply no sustained, public discussion of
such a power, and a fortiori no such defense of it.

192

193
194

executive and legislative branches,” but distinguished departmental expressions of opinion about constitutional meaning from “the enforceable ‘expositions of the judiciary’”
(quoting James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 17 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at
348)); see also infra notes 423–430 and accompanying text.
On the difficulty of reconciling Madison’s various claims about constitutional enforcement, see KRAMER, supra note 34, at 146; see also BERGER, supra note 184, at 70–71 (“Undeniably Madison was inconsistent over the years . . . .”). There are other snippets from
Madison’s writings that could be adduced to support non-enforcement, but the result is
largely the same. Madison argued in “Observations” that where a Constitution provides
for the submission of bills to the executive and the judiciary prior to enactment, and a law
so submitted is enacted over their objection, “[i]t sd. not be allowed the Judges or [the]
Executive to pronounce a law thus enacted, unconstitul. & invalid.” 5 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 39, at 294. The remark suggests that Madison at least contemplated the idea of presidential non-enforcement. Yet since our system has executive
consultation, created by the Presentment Clause, the remark also implies that Madison
saw no place for the power under the actual Constitution. Indeed, in a letter written four
years later, Madison said, “[y]ou know already that the President has exerted his power of
checking the unconstitutional career of Congress. The judges have also called the attention of the public to Legislative fallibility, by pronouncing a law providing for Invalid Pensioners unconstitutional and void[.]” Letter from James Madison to Gen. Henry Lee
(Apr. 15, 1792), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 554 (1865).
“[H]is power of checking” must refer to the President’s veto, since no acts of nonenforcement had then taken place.
Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 975 (providing a table reporting these discussions); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1659 & n.186 (referencing Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 161).
I assume here that there is not some specific reason to think that the historical record is
skewed, that is, that evidence of non-enforcement was not uniquely suppressed or unavailable. In other words, I am treating the extant, published record as representative of
the entire range of commentary, including unpreserved statements. If that is correct,
then we should assume that a number of discussions of judicial review were also lost or
remain unknown, and we would need to compare missing discussions of nonenforcement with the extant and missing discussions of judicial review. This would make
the Prakash & Yoo figure too low.
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The pattern of evidence after ratification confirms this view. In
the first decade of government under the Constitution there is no
known explicit defense of a presidential power to refuse to enforce
the law on constitutional grounds. Neither Presidents George Washington nor John Adams refused to enforce a duly enacted law on
grounds that he believed it unconstitutional, and neither made a
195
claim to enjoy such a power. Sai Prakash has observed that Washington described the obligation to obey “constitutional laws,” which
Prakash reads as impliedly endorsing a presidential duty of non196
enforcement. Washington, however, never identified the phrase as
carrying such freight, and he never connected the idea to the presidential office—this during a period that saw repeated discussion of a
judicial duty to apply only “constitutional laws.” The point suffers
from a more general defect that, unfortunately, affects much of Prakash’s analysis, which is premised on the proposition that the founding generation widely agreed that an unconstitutional law was void
197
and thus “no law at all.” One cannot reason from the premise that
an unconstitutional law is void to the conclusion that the President
had a power to refuse to enforce it; the basic lesson of Wood, Snowiss,
and Kramer’s works is that officers had to justify the practice of determining and enforcing constitutional violations within their office,
since fundamental law was designed to regulate them and was tradi-

195

196

197

Prakash, supra note 9, at 1662 (“Washington never actually refused to enforce a statute on
the grounds that it was unconstitutional. . . . [T]here is no instance of President John Adams refusing to enforce a statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.”). It is likely that President Washington and President Adams impounded funds appropriated by
Congress, but their doing so is not best described as non-enforcement, since it was “largely attributable to the fact that, unlike today, appropriations bills ‘were quite general in
their terms and, by obvious . . . intent, left to the President . . . the [power] for determining . . . in what particular manner the funds would be spent.’” Nile Stanton, History and
Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1974) (citation
omitted).
See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1660–61 (discussing various remarks of Washington when he
used the term “constitutional”). Even if Prakash is correct to connect Washington’s
phrase to the presidential office, the deontic status seems wrong. How could nonenforcement be a duty if constitutionality only created an obligation to follow the law?
See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1616–17, 1658–59 (“At the founding, such laws were seen as
null and void, ab initio. Because unconstitutional laws were nullities, they supplied no
law for the President to enforce. Necessarily, he could have no power or duty to enforce
them. Under the original Constitution, the President had no more power or duty to execute unconstitutional laws than he had to execute the laws of the states or other nations.”). Prakash has reiterated this analysis in his recent work with Neil Devins attacking
presidential duties to enforce and defend unconstitutional laws. See Devins & Prakash,
supra note 9, at 522, 533 (“Because unconstitutional laws are void and hence not actual
laws, the Clause does not oblige the President to enforce or defend them.”).
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tionally enforced through popular mechanisms.198 Prakash also suggests that Washington never endorsed a presidential power to refuse
to enforce unconstitutional law because, as the first President, he had
199
an opportunity to veto all the bills he thought unconstitutional.
Since Congress never overrode Washington’s veto, the President never had need of a non-enforcement power. Yet this hardly means that
non-enforcement was never relevant to the President’s decision calculus. Washington had reason to broach the topic when Jefferson, then
his Secretary of State, advised him that the President could express
200
Inhis constitutional objection to the Bank Bill through a veto.
deed, any constitutional objection to a bill directing action in the executive department should have raised the issue. In sorting through
their options, Washington’s advisors had reason to consider the pos201
Nonsibility of a veto override and to plan accordingly.
enforcement would have been an alternative. For these reasons, it is
difficult to take seriously the speculation that Washington, and Adams after him, “likely would have refused to enforce” a law enacted
202
The fact of the matter is that neither
over a constitutional veto.
President did, and neither expressed the view that he had such a
power.
In 1801, President Thomas Jefferson ended prosecutions under
the Sedition Act and pardoned those convicted. If we date nonenforcement to these acts, it is at least fifteen years younger than judicial review. If we date the defense of non-enforcement to Jeffer198
199

200

201
202

See, e.g., Hulsebosch, supra note 73, at 825; Wood, supra note 31, at 160–63.
See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1662 (explaining “why Washington never engaged in Executive Disregard”). Prakash also points to President Washington’s refusal to honor a request from the House of Representatives for communications regarding the negotiation
of the Jay Treaty, id. at 1661–62, but on this question, a one-house “resolution” is not
analogous to a bill, due to the lack of a veto. The existence of the limited veto for unconstitutional bills is the best structural argument against non-enforcement. Again, the point
is not that the President would not act on the basis of his understanding of the Constitution; it is that the President specifically would not refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional.
See Secretary of State Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 15, 1791),
in PAULSEN, CALABRESI ET AL., supra note 18, at 62 (“The negative of the President [the
veto] is the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the invasions of the legislature.” (insertion by editors)); MAY, supra note 17, at 37 (discussing Jefferson’s endorsement of the veto when potentially being applied to the Bank Bill). The Bank Bill
directed the United States to receive notes issued by the bank “in all payments to the
United States.” An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States § 10, 3 Stat.
191, 196 (1791). The President could have directed the secretary of the treasury to refuse
to accept the notes as payment.
See Harry C. Thomson, The First Presidential Vetoes, 8 PRES. STUDS. Q. 27, 30–31 (1978) (discussing veto of reapportionment act and attempted override).
Prakash, supra note 9, at 1662.
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son’s defense of his acts in contemporaneous writings and subse203
quent letters, it postdates the defense of judicial review by at least
204
fifteen years. This demands an explanation.
B. Negative evidence
Not only is there a lack of evidence that Framers drew the conclusion of the Non-Enforcement Argument, there is evidence that they
rejected its conclusion. Christopher May advanced this argument in
his study of the suspension power and non-enforcement. Suspension
205
was a royal prerogative to temporarily abrogate a statute. May analogized suspension to non-enforcement, and then argued that the
widespread American rejection of suspension implied a rejection of
206
non-enforcement. Obviously, the force of May’s argument depends
on the force of the analogy between suspension and non207
enforcement—and that analogy has been challenged. In the course
of developing his argument, May observed that on several occasions
Framers spoke as if judicial review were the only institutional protec208
This point has force
tion against laws violating individual rights.
whether or not non-enforcement functionally duplicates, or even approximates, the prerogative of suspension. Thus, May pointed to Alexander Hamilton’s language in Federalist 78 that a Constitution’s exceptions to the legislative power “can be preserved in practice no other
way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must
be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitu209
Apparently, Hamilton assumed that the President did
tion void.”
not have a non-enforcement power, since such a power could also be
used to keep Congress within its constitutional limits.
203
204
205
206

207

208
209

See supra note 43.
Christopher May, who opposes non-enforcement, dates its first assertion to 1860. See
MAY, supra note 17, at 127.
See MAY, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing royal perogatives in relation to statutes in England).
MAY, supra note 17, at 37. Interestingly, May adopted the same “deductive” or “Euclidean” strategy as Michael Paulsen. See Paulsen, supra note 15, at 226 (describing his approach as “Euclidean”). But he defended a logically contrary view. Paulsen argued that if
judicial review was justified, then non-enforcement was as well; and judicial review was justified. May argued that if the suspension prerogative was rejected, then non-enforcement
was rejected as well; and suspension was rejected. The strategy is indicative of the lack of
direct evidence we have on the issue of non-enforcement. No one was talking about it.
See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, Book Review: Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 419, 423–24 (1999) (finding flaws in May’s
argument).
MAY, supra note 17, at 14, 25.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Hamilton may have seen a greater need for judicial enforcement
210
of the Constitution than did most of his peers. But the point about
‘negative evidence’ does not depend on Hamilton’s idiosyncrasy.
The argument that courts of law were the only institution that could,
or would, protect the people from legislative abuses was in fact widespread. Examples are easy to adduce. They lie at the surface of the
historical record, both before and after ratification. Most of these
comments assume that the President lacks a non-enforcement power,
but none implies that judicial review is the only means of enforcing
the Constitution, or that judges are supreme in determining its
meaning.
Thus, for example, the idea that courts alone could protect the
people from legislative excess drove delegates to the federal convention to reject the council of revision. Like the New York body on
which it was based, the council proposed in Philadelphia as part of
Madison’s Virginia Plan comprised the President and several federal
judges, who would together exercise a qualified negative on federal
211
Almost at once, delegates objected to the
and state legislation.
proposal on the grounds that it might undercut judicial review, by bi212
asing judges in favor of laws they had previously approved. According to Rufus King, whose state had granted the veto to the governor
alone, “the Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should
come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its
213
The emphasis on judicial review drew its own objecformation.”
tions from John Mercer and John Dickinson. After listening to Mercer argue that judges should not enjoy an authority to declare unconstitutional law void, Dickinson said he was “strongly impressed,” and
“thought no such power ought to exist.” Yet, “at the same time,”
214
Dickinson said, he was “at a loss what expedient to substitute.”
Madison surely felt exasperated. He had suggested another “expedi-

210
211
212

213
214

See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 81 (addressing the idea that Hamilton “stak[ed] out” an
“extreme position”); see also STIMSON, supra note 80, at 119.
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 21 (Resolution
8). On the relationship to New York, see Roedel, supra note 153, at 261–62.
See RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 262 (“The opponents of the council of revision were more
inclined to emphasize the separation of powers . . . .”); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 75 (providing Caleb Strong’s opinion as
to the proper role of the judiciary); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 150, at 79 (providing the objections of Nathaniel Gorham); id. at 80
(providing the objection of John Rutledge).
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 98.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 299.
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ent”—the Council of Revision!—only to have Dickinson reject it.215
Something was driving leading delegates towards a view of constitutional enforcement that involved adjudication in a court of law, regardless of whether they thought such a practice fully consistent with
republicanism. Hence Dickinson’s confusion.
A similar logic was at work in ratifying conventions. At the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, where the federal judiciary was
extensively discussed, both Federalists and Anti-federalists attributed
to courts alone the power to check legislative violations of the Consti216
The clearest example is a welltution, but for different reasons.
known speech by the young John Marshall, then holding a position
on Richmond’s hustings court, in which he defended Article III
217
The day beagainst attacks by George Mason and Patrick Henry.
fore, Mason had argued that federal courts would supplant state
courts, on the grounds that the jurisdiction of federal courts extended to all cases arising under federal law, and federal law was to be su218
Indeed, given that Congress could enact laws
perior to state law.
concerning “every object of private property,” federal courts would,
219
in effect, “destroy the State Governments.” Marshall met the argument at what he thought was its obvious point of weakness. “Has the
Government of the United States power to make laws on every sub220
It was clear
ject? . . . Can they go beyond the delegated powers?”
that the Constitution conferred no such authority on Congress. If, as
Henry had suggested, Congress nevertheless did “make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by
215

216
217

218
219
220

See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 510–11 (describing Dickinson’s view); see also 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 108–09 (“Dickerson
[sic]—agt. it—you must separate the Leg. Jud. & Ex.—but you propose to give the Executive a share in Legislation—why not the Judicial—There is a Difference—the Judges must
interpret the Laws they ought not to be legislators. The Executive is merely ministerial . . . .”). In “Letters of Fabius,” Dickinson apparently came around to judicial review,
but the text is ambiguous and must be read against Dickinson’s statements in the convention. See BERGER, supra note 184, at 64–65 (explaining how Dickinson passively voted for
judicial review); see also PAMPHLETS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787–1788, at 184 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1888) (reprinting Dickinson’s statement that “the president, and the federal independent judges, [would be] so much concerned in the execution of the laws, and in the
determination of their constitutionality”).
On the discussion of the judiciary at the Virginia convention, see MAIER, supra note 160,
at 286–87; Bilder, supra note 77, at 551.
See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1430–39
(John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 DHRC] (reprinting Marshall’s speech); see also NELSON, supra note 50, at 43.
10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1401–02.
10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1402.
10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1431.
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the Judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to
221
guard . . . . They would declare it void.” Federal jurisdiction to adjudicate such cases was, said Marshall, “necessary.” He explained:
What is the service or purpose of a Judiciary, but to execute the laws in a
peaceable orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or availing yourselves of force? . . . To what quarter will you look for
protection from an infringement of the Constitution, if you will not give
the power to the Judiciary? There is no other body that affords such a protec222
tion.

Marshall’s point does not deny that the people themselves interpret
and enforce the Constitution. He assumes the opposite—that the Constitution might be enforced by the people themselves, acting ‘out of
doors.’ Marshall’s concern was with the violence and disorder that
223
popular enforcement tended to create.
Marshall made no mention of the President, and, indeed, it would
have made little sense for him to do so. Mason had suggested that
the federal courts would shield federal executive officers, who, he predicted, would be free to abuse the people of Virginia without legal
224
An appeal to the executive authority would have
consequence.
played right into Mason’s hands. Just before the convention had taken up the federal judiciary, it had discussed Article II, where “Henry,
Mason, [James] Monroe, and [William] Grayson raised one objection
after another” to the President, who, they argued, “had too much
225
And although the federal judiciary might dominate state
power.”
governments, Henry thought it plainly overmatched by its coordinate
departments in the national government. It could not serve as a constitutional check, he said, as the Virginia state judiciary had against
226
A presidential power of nonthe excesses of the state assembly.

221
222
223

224
225

226

10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1431.
10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1432 (emphasis added).
In this respect, Marshall anticipates the concern with mobbing and protecting property
rights that came to characterize the Federalist party in the second half of the 1790s. See
KRAMER, supra note 34, at 109–11 (describing growing concerns with violence amongst
the Federalists); NELSON, supra note 50, at 40.
10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1404 (providing an example of the potential for abuse).
MAIER, supra note 160, at 286; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 67(Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the executive department); cf. RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 273 (describing the Antifederalist fear that “ambition or desperation would drive individual presidents to attempt
to set themselves up literally as kings”).
10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1219 (“The Honorable Gentleman [Edmund Pendleton]
did our Judiciary honour in saying, that they had firmness to counteract the Legislature
in some cases. Yes, Sir, our Judges opposed the acts of the Legislature. . . . Are you sure
that your Federal Judiciary will act thus? . . . Where are your land-marks in this Government? I will be bold to say you cannot find any in it. I take it as the highest encomium
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enforcement without an executive council would have worsened the
imbalance. There was thus no reason for a federalist to defend a
227
non-enforcement power at the Virginia convention. A sensible del228
egate, like Marshall, argued precisely the opposite.
The pattern of evidence after ratification buttresses this conclusion, just as it did above. Thus, following presentment by the First
Congress of a bill to fix the seat of government in Washington D.C.,
“Junius Americanus” published a letter in The Daily Advertiser, despair229
ing, for over four columns, about the bill’s unconstitutionality. As
Junius viewed the matter, the Constitution committed to Congress
alone the determination of when and where to meet, which the bill to
fix the seat of government would violate when signed by the Presi230
dent. Junius was unmoved by the suggestion that once enacted, the
231
law would be “inoperative” because “repugnant.” “[T]his is however a mistaken idea,” he said, “for it will have an operation, unless formally annulled by the judiciary, and it is impossible the construction of it
232
can ever go before the federal courts.” Junius returned to the point
repeatedly, and in language that evidenced a detailed view of the
scope of the president’s interpretative authority. Thus,
[e]very law does not undergo the revision of the judiciary; this will certainly not; the President of the United States can alone arrest its progress.
Having his sanction, the public will consider every part of the bill as valid,
because they know he would not approve any bill which contained a syl-

227

228

229

230

231
232

on this country [i.e., Virginia], that acts of the Legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable
to be opposed by the Judiciary.”).
That there was no reason for a federalist to defend non-enforcement does not mean federalists acted strategically. To take Marshall as an example, it is difficult to imagine—and
there is no evidence to suggest—that Marshall really believed non-enforcement was desireable and permitted by the draft Constitution, but concealed the belief in order to rebut Mason.
For other examples, see 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1197 (discussing of judicial review
by Edmund Pendleton); id. at 1327 (reprinting of George Nicholas’s views on judicial review). Similar descriptions of the judiciary as the only institution capable of protecting
the people from legislative violation of the Constitution, without mention of presidential
non-enforcement, occurred in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts. See Bilder, supra note 77, at 551–52 & nn.262–71(discussing these states).
Letter of Junius Americanus, 6 THE DAILY ADVERTISER, July 13, 1790. See the analysis of
the bill in David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 849 (1994). On Junius’s letter, see CHARLES
WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 105 (1925).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 4–5 (prescribing the meeting of Congress). The one exception
is the President’s power to determine adjournment when the houses disagree. See id. at
art. II, § 3.
Letter of Junius Americanus, supra note 229.
Letter of Junius Americanus, supra note 229 (emphasis added). Junius does not explain
why he thinks the matter could not become a case or controversy.
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lable that was unconstitutional; the clause will then be deemed binding,
233
because every part of the bill must have its operation.

According to Junius, the President is the only one positioned to
arrest the progress of the “law”—but only using the veto. For, reasons
Junius, if the President does provide “his sanction,” then every part of
the “bill” will be considered “valid,” and thus “must have its operation.” Had Junius thought there was a power of non-enforcement, it
should have come as some comfort, enabling the President to sign
the bill and refuse to enforce the provision fixing a time and place of
meeting.
The same set of assumptions animated constitutional argument
within Congress. In the First Congress, for example, both proponents and opponents of the Bank of the United States assumed that
the Supreme Court would adjudicate any question about the bank’s
234
constitutionality. Madison wanted to avoid such an outcome; Elias
Boudinot, in contrast, took comfort in the idea that “if, from inattention, want of precision, or any other defect, he should do wrong,
there was a power in the Government which could constitutionally
235
Boudinot, of
prevent the operation of such a wrong measure.”
course, was not referring to the President, but to “the Judiciary of the
United States, who might adjudge [the Bank law] to be contrary to
236
the Constitution, and therefore void.”
The point was not confined to those who would later become
Federalists. Indeed, as the Jeffersonian Republican party emerged in
the mid-1790s, distrust of executive authority and of executive influence on the judiciary became a central pillar in their adaptation of
237
English oppositional thought. Consider the famous attack on judi233
234
235

236
237

Letter of Junius Americanus, supra note 229.
WARREN, supra note 229, at 106.
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1927 (1791). Boudinot’s comment has had a long life. Wilson referenced it in Lectures on Law, as did Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution, and
Charles Warren in Congress, the Constitution, and the Court. See 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 541–42 (describing the ability of a nation to ensure citizens do right); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 472 n.3 (1833) (referencing Boudinot’s comment in a footnote); WARREN, supra
note 229, at 107–08 (quoting Boudinot).
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1927 (1791).
See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY
52–63, 247–50 (1978) (describing the Republican focus, while in opposition to the Adams
administration, on the danger of “patronage,” “corruption,” and “executive influence”);
VILE, supra note 82, at 171 (similar). This worry was not confined to influence on the legislature through “placement.” Republicans also objected to the service of Chief Justice
Jay and Chief Justice Ellsworth as special ambassadors in the conflicts with Britain and
France. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 74–75, 89–95, 118–19 (1995) (noting
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cial review in the Sixth Congress, by then-Senator Charles Pinckney.
Introducing his proposal to prohibit plural office-holding by federal
judges, Pinckney described the judicial power “either to execute [the
laws] or not, as they think proper,” as “the dangerous right . . . a right
in my judgment as unfounded and as dangerous as any that was ever
238
Just to bring the point home,
attempted in a free government.”
Pinckney then asked his audience to imagine the implications for executive power. “What might be the consequences,” he announced, “if
the President could at any time get rid of obnoxious laws by persuading or influencing the Judges to decide that they were unconstitu239
Of course, nontional, and ought not to be executed?”
enforcement would obviate any need for stooping to persuasion.
Pinckney, apparently, could not imagine such a thing, for it would
have made nonsense of his point.
Even after the Republican party took control of the presidency
and the Congress, during the period in which Jefferson is commonly
thought to have refused to enforce the Sedition Act, Republicans in
Congress never mentioned the President in response to repeated assertions that only courts could protect the people from legislative excess. Examples of such claims by Federalists in the debate over repeal
of the Judiciary Act are too numerous to discuss individually. To take
a pedestrian example from the debate in the Senate, Aaron Ogden
asked his fellow senators, “[s]uppose the Legislature should pass bills
of attainder, or an unconstitutional tax, where can an oppressed citizen find protection but in a court of justice firmly denying to carry
240
Ogden’s point assumes
into execution an unconstitutional law?”
another department cannot provide similar protection. The argu241
ment was thought strong enough to become a Federalist refrain.

238
239
240
241

some of these oppositions); STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE
OF EARLY JUDGES 152–53 (1997) (noting wariness among “[s]ome members of Congress”
with regards to sending Chief Judge Ellsworth “on a diplomatic mission”).
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 101 (1800).
Id.
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 175 (1802).
See, e.g., id. at 56 (statement of Uriah Tracy) (“What security is there to an individual
[from an ex post facto law]? None in the world but by an appeal to the Judiciary . . . .”);
id. at 83 (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (“Suppose, in the omnipotence of your Legislative authority, you trench upon the rights of your fellow citizens . . . . If the judiciary department preserve its vigor, it will stop you short. Instead of a resort to arms, there will be
a happier appeal to argument.”); id. at 529–30 (statement of Archibald Henderson) (“In
vain may he hold out the Constitution and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of
such undefined signification, and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told that
the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of their authority . . . .”);
id. at 574 (statement of John Stanley) (“Should, unhappily, a Legislature be found
who . . . should transgress the bounds prescribed, what is the security of the citi-
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Some developed it to considerable lengths. In the House, for example, James Bayard offered a particularly colorful version, which illustrates, very clearly, basic assumptions about the President’s role in
constitutional enforcement. Bayard said,
[l]et me now ask if the power to decide upon the validity of our laws resides with the people? Gentlemen cannot deny this right to the people.
I admit that they possess it. But if, at the same time, it does not belong to
the courts of the United States, where does it lead the people? It leads
them to the gallows. Let us supposed that Congress . . . pass an unconstitutional law. . . . The people [subject to the law] contest the validity of
the law. They forcibly resist its execution. They are brought by the Executive
authority before the courts upon charges of treason. The law is unconstitutional, the people have done right, but the court are [sic] bound by the law,
and obliged to pronounce upon them the sentence which it inflicts. Deny to the courts of the United States the power of judging upon the con242
stitutionality of our laws, and it is vain to talk of it existing elsewhere.

Far from protecting individuals, Bayard’s “Executive authority” prosecutes them for treason!
Only one Republican sought to challenge Bayard’s view of the executive. In written remarks later added to the House record, Representative Jonathan Bacon argued that “every officer and . . . every citizen” had an “inherent and . . . indispensible duty” “to judge for
themselves of the constitutionality of every statute on which they are
243
called to act in their respective spheres.” Bacon supported his posi244
If one thinks of
tion with a version of the Standard Justification.
the law as directing or “calling on” the President to enforce it, then
245
The apBacon’s position implies a power of non-enforcement.
pearance of this view is significant. But the real explanans is why the
point was made only once during the debate over repeal, and never on

242
243
244
245

zen? . . . The Judiciary are our security.”); id. at 690 (statement of Benjamin Huger) (“I
hesitate not in saying that, between an independent Judiciary, constituting a tribunal
which can control the unconstitutional attempts of the other two branches of the Government . . . between such a tribunal and the bayonet there remains no resource or alternative.”); id. at 842 (statement of John Dennis) (arguing that the judiciary was created
“for [the] purpose” “of giving efficacy to these declarations” against ex post facto laws);
id. at 884 (statement of Seth Hastings) (“[I]f the Judiciary power has no Constitutional
check upon the acts and doings of the Legislature, Congress may pass an ex post facto
law . . . .”); id. at 927–28 (statement of Samuel Dana) (“If any unconstitutional act is
passed, what must be done for relief against it, according to the plan of the gentlemen
who advocate the bill on the table? . . . Must persons be subjected to the operation of an
unconstitutional act until the period of elections comes round . . . ?”).
Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
Id. at 982.
See id. at 982–83 (providing a continuation of Bacon’s argument).
See supra Part I.B.

526

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:2

the floor.246 Republicans could avail themselves of a number of different responses to Bayard. They could challenge the assumption
that federal courts would actually provide a remedy for legislative violations of constitutional rights, and describe the courts’ political conduct during the Sedition Act controversy. Naturally, some Republi247
They could argue that, whether or not the
cans made this point.
courts were fully independent of legislative control, judges would
continue to perform judicial review out of duty; some made this ar248
And
gument as well, drawing on experience in state government.
they could argue that a proper republican remedy for legislative excess was the corrective applied by the people themselves during elec249
In
tion—precisely what had occurred in Jefferson’s ‘revolution.’
the end, responses like these crowded out Bacon’s view. It seems likely that, having nurtured such a profound distrust of executive authority during their decade in opposition, Republicans found it difficult
suddenly to pivot and argue that the President possessed a rather
broad authority to refuse to enforce the law. The received Republican view in 1802 was, instead, to distrust the executive, and to assume
a politically neutral judiciary would protect individuals from both leg246

247
248

249

Senator John Breckinridge’s well-known defense of Congress’s supremacy in determining
the boundaries of legislative power, 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 179 (1802), does not support
non-enforcement, but implies an obligation to give effect to Congress’s interpretation of
the Constitution. See infra note 435.
See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1802) (statement of John Randolph) (speaking negatively about the judiciary as compared to the legislature).
See, e.g., id. at 698 (statement of then-state Legislator Israel Smith) (“Whether the judge
holds his office at the will of the President, or for one year, or during good behaviour, it
is equally his duty to decide a law void, which directly infringes the Constitution.”); id. at
973 (statement of then-state Legislator Joseph Varnum) (“[S]ir, notwithstanding [in New
Hampshire] the entire dependence on the Legislature for the existence of the courts of
common pleas, I cannot imagine that the independence of the judges has ever been affected by it. There is an honorable gentleman from that State now on this floor, a judge
of one of those courts, who, with his associates, had the independence . . . to declare an
act of the Legislature unconstitutional.”). Varnum was likely referring to Abiel Foster, a
representative from New Hampshire who served as a judge on the Court of Common
Pleas for Rockingham County from 1784–1788. See REID, supra note 58, at 29–30;
FOSTER, Abiel (1735–1806), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
1774–PRESENT,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000297
(providing biographical information). Notably, Foster had no legal training. See JOHN
PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW
HAMPSHIRE 24 (2004) [hereinafter REID, CONTROLLING] (labeling Foster as a “lay
judge”).
See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 531 (1802) (statement of Robert Williams) (“Are we then to
be told that there is more safety in confiding this important power [i.e., the power to interpret the Constitution] to the last department, so far removed from the people, than in
departments flowing directly from the people, responsible to and returning at short intervals into the mass of the people?”).
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islative and executive excess.250 This left them unable to rebut the
Federalist assumption that the President would be exposed to the
same partisan forces that produced the legislature’s violation of the
251
Constitution in the first place.
C. A Closer Look at the Standard Justification
When one adds the evidence that Framers rejected a nonenforcement power to the lack of any sustained, public defense of
that power, it suggests that something is amiss with the NonEnforcement Argument. No one accepted it. This conclusion also
affects the Standard Justification of judicial review. Since NonEnforcement and our formulation of the Standard Justification stand
or fall together, if something is amiss with Non-Enforcement, then
something is amiss with the Standard Justification. But what is amiss,
and what can it tell us about non-enforcement and judicial review?
1. Constitutional Agency
Recall that there are two versions of the Standard Justification:
one premised on the idea that judges are the constitutional agents of
the people, and one premised on the nature of the duty to apply the
law. Begin with the version premised on constitutional agency. As
Iredell wrote in “To the Public,” judges hold their office “for the benefit

250

251

See Powell, supra note 191, at 1004 (observing that “a central Republican theme in the
1790s was opposition to the Federalist ideal of a strong executive”); see also 11 ANNALS OF
CONG. 73 (1802) (Speech of David Stone) (“The objects of courts of law, as I understand
them, are, to settle questions of right between suitors; to enforce obedience to the laws,
and to protect the citizens against oppressive use of power in the Executive offices.”). It
was the Federalists who supported a broader executive authority, as even Jefferson recognized. In a letter to John Dickinson written just after the 1800 election, Jefferson wrote,
“I consider the pure federalist as a republican who would prefer a somewhat stronger executive; and the republican as one willing to trust the legislature as a broader representation
of the people, and a safer deposit of power for many reasons.” Letter to John Dickinson
(July 23, 1801), in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 37, at 280, 281 (emphasis added).
These forces would align the President with the Congress that, for example, passed a bill
of attainder. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 689 (1802) (statement of Benjamin Huger) (“From
an ex post facto law, from a suspension of the habeas corpus in time of peace, from a bill of
attainder, or from any other act of violence, however unconstitutional, on the part of the Executive and Legislature, where are we to look up for relief?”) (emphasis added). Representative Huger’s example perfectly reverses an example Judge Frank Easterbrook adduced (200 years later) in support of non-enforcement—revealing how disparate
Easterbrook’s own assumptions are from those that guided those in the repeal debate.
See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 922–24 (using a bill of attainder as an example and exploring how it should be treated by the different branches of government).
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of the whole people,” and are “not mere servants of the Assembly.”252 Being
an agent of the people implied a duty to comply with their Constitution. Since giving effect to an unconstitutional law meant serving the
assembly instead of obeying the Constitution, it followed that a judge
253
must consider the Constitution when deciding a case. He could not
close his eyes to it.
Even if we suppose that agency implies a duty to comply with the
Constitution, it does not follow that by giving effect to an unconstitutional law, a judge disobeys the Constitution. We can see this by considering the implications of a simple separation of governmental
functions. Suppose, for example, that the people give one agent or
group of agents the power to enforce the law. We need not assume
that the delegation is to a single person, or to persons within only
one governmental “branch”—it just needs to be to a delegation that
excludes someone. Other agents lack this power. The agents without
enforcement power are, by assumption, unauthorized to make their
own determinations of how the law should be enforced. They must
accept the decisions of the agents given enforcement authority. This
254
does not make the non-enforcing agents subordinate; the non-enforcers
have their own powers, and, as Madison put it, a “will of [their]
own”—that is, an authority to determine how best to exercise those
255
powers and what limits the Constitution places on them. It follows,
then, that merely being a constitutional agent cannot immunize one
from being subject to the decisions of another agent, including decisions that reflect a view of the Constitution’s meaning. Indeed, judges could be such agents. The powers delegated to judges might not
include the authority to consider the Constitution and determine its
meaning. That authority might have been given to some other agent;
or it might have been given to no agent, and remain with the people
256
themselves. To know whether judges in fact have the authority to
consider the Constitution in the course of adjudicating cases, we
need to know something more about the powers they were delegated.
Only then can we conclude whether a judge who fails to consider the
Constitution ‘disobeys’ it.

252
253
254
255
256

Iredell, supra note 105, at 148.
See supra Part I.B.
See Harrison, supra note 12, at 362–63, 380 (noting that one branch of government can
“accept another’s determination” without being subordinate to it).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (observing that powers can recur back to the
people, the “original authority”).

Nov. 2014 JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NON-ENFORCEMENT AT THE FOUNDING

529

This argument, premised on the separation of powers, would have
been familiar to the Framers as students of English oppositional poli257
Indeed, it is a recognizable variant of an argument Iredell
tics.
himself made at the end of “To the Public.” In response to the criticism that he had implied a power of judicial review not only in North
Carolina’s Superior Courts of Law and Equity, but also in the “county
courts,” whose justices of the peace probably lacked legal training,
258
The county courts, he reasoned,
Iredell responded, “I admit it.”
“exercise . . . judicial power,” and thus enjoyed its concomitant, judi259
cial review. Appeals would lie, in any case, from the county courts
to the superior courts. Yet Iredell balked at extending this power to
refuse to enforce the law beyond the courts. He continued:
The objection, however, urged by some persons, that sheriffs and other
ministerial officers must exercise their judgment too, does not apply. For
if the power of judging rests with the courts, their decision is final as to the
subject matter. Did ever a sheriff refuse to hang a man, because he
260
thought he was unjustly convicted of murder?

Ministerial officers are not empowered, said Iredell, to judge
whether those court orders comply with the Constitution. This is be261
cause “the power of judging rests with the courts.” Sheriffs were not given the power of judging, and in this respect they were subject to the
262
decisions of those who were. Judges on the state’s superior courts,
257

258

259
260
261
262

See VILE, supra note 82, at 43–44 (discussing the Herle-Ferne debate); VILE, supra note 82,
at 75 (“In the first half of the eighteenth century the theory of mixed government was in
the ascendency again . . . . But it was no longer the undifferentiated theory of mixed government that had preceded the Civil War. The ideas behind separation of powers were
added to it so that each element of the mixed government might wield an independent
and co-ordinate authority that gave it the ability to check the exercise of power by the
other branches.”).
Iredell, supra note 105, at 149. For a discussion of justices of the peace in royal North
Carolina during the period immediately preceding the Revolution, see SCOTT DOUGLAS
GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–
1787, at 198 (2011).
Iredell, supra note 105, at 149; see also GERBER, supra note 258, at 196 (discussing the division of common law courts in North Carolina).
Iredell, supra note 105, at 149.
Iredell, supra note 105, at 149.
Iredell’s argument applies by its terms to ministerial officers, but its implications extend
beyond them. Iredell’s premise is that “the power of judging rests with the courts.” Iredell, supra note 105, at 149. It does not lie elsewhere, as the provision in state’s 1776
Constitution separating powers confirms. See N.C. CONST. OF 1776 art. IV (providing for
the separation of powers). Since the power of judging lies with the courts, and not elsewhere, it does not lie with any officer who is not “with the courts,” whatever his rank. Indeed, Iredell may have been thinking of North Carolina colonial Governor Richard Everard, who in 1729 had refused to execute a sentence of death entered on a jury verdict in
the colony’s General Court. The effect, widely known to North Carolinians in the 1730s,
was to undermine the courts and create “chaos.” See 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON
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at whom Iredell’s essay was aimed, were likely to be concerned about
263
the scope of any duty to consider the Constitution. If the duty were
one that an officer had by virtue of holding an office (any office),
then it would be a duty all officers had; but for all officers to be constantly duty-bound to act only on their own view of the Constitution
could be thought to invite disorder. North Carolina had been forced
to dispatch the self-governing ‘Regulators’ with an army of several
264
Iredell’s response to this
thousand men only fifteen years earlier.
concern was to distinguish kinds of constitutional agents according to
the powers of their office. Those with an office requiring application
of the law were duty-bound to consider the Constitution when doing
so. For the rest, merely being the people’s agents carried no such requirement.
Other forms of the constitutional agency argument fare no better.
As noted above, disputants tended to merge the idea that constitutional agency implied a duty of obedience with other, related ideas
265
about constitutional enforcement. Thus, judicial review was sometimes likened to popular disobedience of an unconstitutional law, jus266
tifying judges in refusing to enforce the law. Yet the same problem
presents itself. One can assume, as Iredell does in “To the Public,”
that the people enforce the Constitution on the basis of their under267
standing of its limits. The idea is plainly compatible with the existence of different constitutional offices. An officer whom (let us suppose) the Constitution obligates to implement the interpretations of
another may be justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act as
an act of popular resistance. However, this authority does not flow from
his office, and, consequently, the officer’s use of the powers of his office to advance his own views is open to challenge. As Philip Hamburger has shown, and as I discuss below, by the 1790s there was significant concern about judges’ use of written “resolutions” to express

263
264
265
266
267

LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA 96–97 (2012) (discussing King v. Smith, N.C. Gen. Ct. 1729, in
2 Colonial and State Records of North Carolina 829 (1886)).
See Iredell, supra note 105, at 149 (observing that the “liberty of appeal . . . rests . . . with
the superior courts”).
See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1003, 1026–28 (2010).
See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 53–54 (discussing the fact that violence or “civil unrest”
often ensued when the public did not like a particular law).
See Iredell, supra note 105, at 147 (noting that resistance of the people is one option to
quell a violation of the Constitution by the Assembly). Iredell resembles Wilson in this
respect. 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 421 (arguing that law
should be simple and easy to understand).
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constitutional protest.268 What required justification was the practice
of enforcing the Constitution within a court of law. One could accept
that popular disobedience was occasionally justified, but maintain
that judges were constrained by the commands of the assembly in
discharging their official duties. Just as above, the office of the judge
might not extend to constitutional disobedience.
2. The Duty to Apply the Law
In effect, we are pushed towards the second version of the NonEnforcement argument, premised on the nature of the duty to apply
the law. If the Standard Justification is going to succeed, it is this idea
that must do the work. Indeed, the leading defenses of judicial review in the ratification period make consistent use of the notion of
the duty to apply the law and its connection to the judicial office. For
example, Iredell writes that a judge’s consideration of the Constitution, and his decision to privilege it above ordinary law, “is not a
usurped or discretionary power, but one inevitably resulting from the con269
Similarly, in Federalist 78, Hamilton asserts
stitution of [his] office.”
that it “belongs” to the judicial office to “ascertain [the Constitution’s] meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceed270
ing from the legislative body.” In the influential case of Kamper v.
Hawkins, which I discuss in detail below, Judge St. George Tucker
wrote that the Constitution must be “resorted to” anytime it is necessary “to expound what the law is,” and that such “exposition . . . is the
271
duty and office of the judiciary to make.”
The key question is whether this duty also attaches to the executive office. While the President does apply the law, doing so does not
bring him within the ambit of the Standard Justification. This is because the Standard Justification does not turn merely on the application of general rules to specific situations. As we will see, a number of
the leading defenses of judicial review reflect this point. Consider
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. As others have
noted, Marshall’s defense of judicial review in Marbury replicates the
logic of the Standard Justification, which was, by the 1790s, widely ac268

269
270
271

See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 561 (explaining that the judges adopted a resolution);
infra notes 335–66 and accompanying text. There was also concern about federal judges
exploiting their status and authority toward the political goals of the administration. See
infra notes 452–61 and accompanying text.
Iredell, supra note 105, at 148 (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (Va. 1793) (Opinion of Tucker, J.) (emphasis added).
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cepted, even by Republicans.272 Marshall begins his defense with the
assertion that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judi273
This is Premise 1 of the
cial department to say what the law is.”
Standard Justification, namely, a characterization of the judicial office
that supports consideration of the Constitution in the course of adjudication. The next sentence in the opinion justifies this characterization. “Those who apply the rule to particular cases,” says Marshall,
274
“must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” “Cases” is not
a throwaway term in this sentence. It does not mean “instances,” “situations” or “occasions.” Rather, as David Engdahl and Charles Hobson have argued, Marshall uses “case” in its legal sense, which embodies a vision of the form that a dispute takes within a court of law, and
275
the norms that govern the litigation of such a dispute. In particular, says Marshall, litigation of a dispute necessitates expounding the
law (“those who apply the law to particular cases must of necessity expound”); and it is expounding the law that, in turn, requires the court
276
to consider the Constitution.
If this is correct, then it drives a wedge between the Standard Justification and the Non-Enforcement Argument. Consider, again, our
formulation of the Non-Enforcement Argument:
P1′. The duty of the executive power is to execute the laws of the state.
P2. The Constitution is a law of the state.
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of
the state.
C′. If the executive power executes an unconstitutional act of the assembly, rather than the Constitution, it does not execute the laws of the
state, and thus it violates its duty.

272

273
274
275

276

See, e.g., HOBSON, supra note 11, at 55 (noting that in Marbury, “Marshall was merely restating widely accepted principles and beliefs”); SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 109 (arguing
that Marshall did not make unique arguments in Marbury). On the Republican acceptance of judicial review in 1803, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 16, 20 (2001); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 66 (1971); WARREN,
supra note 229, at 122–27; Corwin, supra note 146, at 570; Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES
13 (Michael Dorf ed., 2004); James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 227
(1992).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Id.
See HOBSON, supra note 11, at 52 (highlighting Marshall’s focus on the word “case” and
applying it in Marbury); David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of Judicial
Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 310, 318, 325, 330 (1992) (discussing Marshall’s conception of
“case”).
See BERGER, supra note 184, at 50–63 (discussing what was meant by “expound”).
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The problem is with P1′. The duty of the executive power is to
execute the laws of the state. The Constitution is a law, but it is a fundamental law. Because it is fundamental, one must justify the President’s consideration of the Constitution in the course of satisfying his
official duty to execute the law; one cannot simply assume that fundamental law may be enforced by the procedures and institutions
277
Support for presidential consideraused to enforce ordinary law.
tion of the Constitution had rested on a parallel to the judicial duty
to apply the law. However, on closer inspection, the judicial office is
concerned with applying the law to “cases,” which requires “expounding” the law. In this way, the idea of a “case” and “expounding” the
law figure essentially in the Standard Justification, but not in the NonEnforcement Argument.
I conclude that if there is a nonenforcement power, it must rest on some other basis for considering
the Constitution in the course of satisfying the duty to execute the
law.
Does this make the President into an overgrown version of Iredell’s ministerial sheriff? No. The President is not an inferior officer
278
He leads a coordinate department; he enjoys
or an “errand boy.”
279
The
an authority to (independently) interpret the Constitution.
President may give effect to his view of the Constitution in specific
ways, but a list of these ways is not open-ended. It includes the power
to issue vetoes, grant pardons, propose legislation, and to do other
280
things as well, depending on the state of constitutional politics. But
the Non-Enforcement Argument can provide no support for adding
to this list the power to execute the law, such as the Take Care Clause
281
From the perand (perhaps) the Article II Vesting Clause grant.
spective of the founding era, at least, the President’s executive power

277
278
279
280

281

See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 1–2 (highlighting the differences between fundamental and
ordinary law).
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., The Ambivalence of Executive Power, in The Presidency, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 315–16 (1981).
See Steilen, supra note 32, at 355–60 (defining “coordinacy” and exploring its implications
for presidential authority).
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 907–11 (describing the various core powers the
President possesses); Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
527, 544–53 (2009) (examining “the nature of limitations on the President’s powers”).
On the relationship between constitutional politics and executive interpretative authority,
see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 1–
27 (2007).
On the Vesting Clause as a source of presidential interpretative power, see Lawson &
Moore, supra note 13, at 1281–82. On the Take Care Clause as a source of power, see
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919–22.
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and his obligation to see that the law is faithfully executed extend only to ordinary law. The executive duty of the presidency is a ministerial duty—but the same is not true of the President’s other powers and
duties.
III. RECONSTRUCTING THE STANDARD JUSTIFICATION
The Standard Justification cannot be adapted to support a power
of non-enforcement because the argument turns on the judicial duty
to expound the law. Judges expound the law to decide a case, which
the President does not do. In the final Part of this Article I fill out
these assertions by examining the ideas of a “case” and “expounding”
the law. The effort is preliminary and not exhaustive. My aim is to
essay an explanation of how the Framers could have believed that the
President had a power to interpret the Constitution, but not a power
to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws.
The key to the story I tell is the court itself. Traditionally, American jurisdictions distributed the adjudicatory function relatively widely. Judges shared interpretative power (to the extent they had it at
all) with juries and with popular assemblies, through which the peo282
ple gave effect to their understanding of the law. This distribution
changed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, shifting away
from popular assemblies and towards actors embedded within a court
283
of law, primarily judges. Of course, these shifts occurred at different times in different states, depending on the politics of the place.
In most jurisdictions, however, courts better approximated widely
282

283

On the interpretive powers of American juries, see NELSON, supra note 72, at 20–34; REID,
CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 108–25 (discussing how the judges interacted with juries); STIMSON, supra note 80, at 48–49, 59–60; Nelson, supra note 264, at 1003. For recent discussions of assembly adjudication, see REID, supra note 58, at 9–10, 62–70 (discussing the case of New Hampshire, among other states); Christine A. Desan, The
Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1463–75 (1998) (discussing “[a]djudication as an [e]lement of
[g]overnance”). An older discussion can be found in Corwin, supra note 146, at 556 &
n.53.
As this point suggests, the “judge v. jury” template adopted by many historical studies of
interpretative authority is inadequate and in some cases quite distortive. After the Revolution, the jury’s primary antagonist was not the judge, but the popular assembly, which
eventually allocated the jury’s interpretative authority to the judge to increase predictability and protect business interests. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 72, at 8 (noting how the
jury system was negatively affected by “business entrepeneurs”). In other cases, judges
and juries cooperated to enhance their collective interpretative authority; thus, New
Hampshire judges of the “common sense” school (mostly untrained laymen) sought to
promote and protect jural decision-making in order to insulate regional courts from the
controls of precedent and appellate review. See, e.g., REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248,
at 24–26 (showing how New Hampshire judges worked with juries).
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held ideals about the role of reason in government than did the pop284
ular assemblies, which were driven by local politics. In the eyes of
reformers, courts of law were an attractive place to locate fundamental political decisions, and, in this sense, it is forum that best explains
the legalization of constitutional dispute. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that ideas we later came to hold about judges—for example,
about the importance of their ‘independence’ from the legislature—
were a product, in large part, of shared convictions about proper
285
We can examine those convictions
proceedings in a court of law.
through a close analysis of the ideas of a “case” and “expounding.” A
“case” was a dispute shaped by the process of “forensic litigation” in a
court of law. Deciding a case required the court to “expound” the
law, in the sense that the court was supposed to show how its judgment was rooted in the law of the community, as opposed to the interests of judge or jury. Expounding the law, in turn, might require
the court to engage in judicial review. It was thus the demands of the
forum that distinguished the interpretative powers of the judiciary
from those of the executive. The President did not decide cases or
expound the law.
A. The Idea of a “Case”
I want to begin by examining the idea of a “case.” By the 1790s,
and probably earlier, “case” was regularly used to describe legal pro286
A “case” was a dispute that had assumed a form that
ceedings.
284

285

286

See Kent, supra note 51, at 941–42; WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 190–91 (describing
the use of instructions in state assemblies). Disappointment with adjudication by popular
assemblies also drove the development of due process doctrine. Some of the early judicial review cases can be read as due process cases, where the animating idea is separation
legislative and judicial functions. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1704–06, 1709–13
(2012).
See G. Alan Tarr, Contesting the Judicial Power in the States, 35 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 643,
660–61 (2012) (“Judicial independence and arguments in its favor are premised on a picture of judges engaged in the resolution of controversies.”). Keep in mind that judges in
most American jurisdictions were not independent at the time the federal Constitution
was ratified. See GERBER, supra note 258, at 327 (noting that of the original colonies, “only
Virginia and North Carolina completely constiutionalized the idea of judicial independence in the federal conception of the judicial instutition prior to the Federal Constitution
of 1787”).
See JAY, supra note 237, at 62–63; see also 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
110, at 703 (“The judicial authority consists in applying, according to the principles of
right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the
manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties interested in them.”)
(emphasis added). But see HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 536–37 (arguing that “case” had
a wider meaning in the 1780s).
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made it properly resolvable within a court of law. It was a dispute
“judicially determined,” as it was sometimes put, rather than “extra287
judicially.” As Marshall described the idea in a speech given in 1800
on the floor of the House,
[a] case in law or equity was a term well understood, and of limited signification. It was a controversy between parties which had taken shape for
judicial decision. If the judicial power extended to every question under
the Constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision . . . . [T]he other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary. . . . By extending the judicial power to all cases
in law and equity, the Constitution had never been understood, to confer
on that department, any political power whatever. To come within this
description, a question must assume a legal form, for forensic litigation,
and judicial decision. There must be parties to come into court, who can
be reached by its process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of
288
ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit.

The key distinction in the passage is between a “case” and a “question.” A “question” would appear to be any reasonably unsettled
289
290
proposition in the law. A “case,” in contrast, is a kind of dispute.
287

288
289

290

JAY, supra note 237, at 151–52 (discussing New York Governor John Jay’s request for an
advisory opinion from state judges and their refusal); see Bloch, supra note 19, at 594 &
n.107 (discussing the Invalid Pension Act cases); Letter from the Justices of the Supreme
Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in JAY, supra note 237, at 179, 179–
80 (“The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments
of Government—their being in certain Respects checks on each other—and our being
Judges of a court in the last Resort—are Considerations which afford strong arguments
against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to . . . .”).
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 537 (“[W]hereas in law a ‘cause,’ ‘case,’ or ‘controversy’
ordinarily referred to a particular dispute, a ‘question’ usually alluded to a more abstract
disagreement, which rose above a particular legal dispute and thus might just as well be
debated by a philosopher or a politician.”).
At times in his lengthy address, Marshall uses “case” in its loose sense of particular circumstance. See, e.g., 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95 (“This Mr.
Marshall said led to his second proposition, which was—That the case was a case for executive and not judicial decision.”) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, I follow David Engdahl
and Charles Hobson in identifying “case” as the relevant term, and not “case in law,”
which Marshall also used in his 1800 speech. See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 52 (noting
Marshal’s view that judicial power extends only to “cases,” not to all “questions” arising
under the Constitution); see also Engdahl, supra note 275, at 311 n.103, 318, 325–26 (similar); JAY, supra note 237, at 62 (“[I]n that period [i.e., the late 1780s], ‘controversy’ commonly was used interchangeably with the word ‘case’ in reference to litigation.”). Samuel
Johnson’s 1768 dictionary identifies both legal and non-legal meanings for “case,” but no
entry for “case in law.” See SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 757
(3d ed. 1768) (defining “case”). “Case in law” could be understood as a legal case at
law—i.e., subject to the common law or the law of the state. A key question is whether
one can, without begging the question, interpret “case” in Marbury as referring to a dispute in court, rather than simply “particular circumstances.” Engdahl has argued that
one can, based in part on other occurrences of “case” in Marbury. See Engdahl, supra note
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It is distinguished by the “shape” it has taken, namely, a shape that
makes “judicial decision” possible. So what makes it possible to resolve a dispute by judicial decision? At the very least, the court must
be able to enter a valid judgment, which means, says Marshall, that
the parties to the dispute must be “reached by [the court’s] process,
and bound by its power,” and the court must have jurisdiction to
291
make an “ultimate decision” about the rights at issue. But, in addition, Marshall argues that the dispute “must assume a legal form, for
292
forensic litigation, and judicial decision.” In other words, it must be
suited for resolution in a court of law, using the procedures and tools
employed in that forum to resolve disputes.
This definition of “case” played a crucial role in Marshall’s defense of President Adams against charges that the President had
293
The term thus perfectly captures the
usurped judicial authority.
distinction between executive and judicial interpretative authority.
Adams had received a diplomatic request to extradite a man, Thomas
294
Nash, accused of participating in a mutiny aboard a British ship.
After considering the request, he transmitted his own “advice and request” to the federal judge with jurisdiction over the matter, asking
the judge to deliver Nash to the British government. The judge held
a habeas hearing, in which Nash desperately claimed to be an American by the name of Jonathan Robbins. Nevertheless, the judge complied with the request to hand over Nash/Robbins, whom the British
promptly had transported to Jamaica, court-martialed and hanged.
295
They introduced a resolution
House Republicans were outraged.
censuring Adams for answering “questions” about the meaning of
federal law, a federal treaty and the Constitution—authority they be-

291
292
293

294
295

275, at 325–26 (noting that this distinction of “case” had been both featured in public
debate and emphasized by Marshall himself).
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96.
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96.
See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 367, 369–70
(1999) (detailing Marshall’s defense of Adams and Judge Bee against Republican led
constitutional attacks and the role the word “case” played); Engdahl, supra note 275, at
304–14 (describing how Marshall rose to the occasion to protect Adams’ interests and
made the distinction between “cases” and “questions”).
Engdahl, supra note 275, at 308.
Republicans tended to credit Nash’s claim to be an American citizen, which Dellinger
and Powell suggest had some merit. See Dellinger & Powell, supra note 293, at 369 n.11 (
“Robbins's daim of United States citizenship, despite its suspicious timing, may well have
been correct.” (citing Larry D. Cress, The Jonathan Robbins Incident: Extradition and the Separation of Powers in the Adams Administration, 111 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 99
(1975)). Republicans were undoubtedly primed to take offense by what they perceived to
be the Adams administration’s pro-British leanings. See Engdahl, supra note 275, at 307–
09.
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lieved was reserved under Article III for the federal courts—and for
interfering “in a case where those courts had already assumed and
296
exercised jurisdiction.” In response, Marshall argued that the Constitution did not actually give federal courts jurisdiction over all such
297
“questions,” as the resolution maintained, but only over “cases.” To
claim an exclusive authority over questions arising under federal law,
treaties, and the Constitution would lead the judiciary to usurp executive authority. “A variety of legal questions must present themselves
in the performance of every part of Executive duty,” Marshall observed, “but these questions are not therefore to be decided in
298
court.” The questions in this case were “questions of law, but they
were questions of political law,” while the grant of jurisdiction to the
federal courts “had never been understood, to confer on that de299
partment, any political power whatever.”
Marshall’s defense shared much in common with an earlier defense of presidential authority against similar charges of usurpation,
300
which he cited in his speech. Writing in 1793 as “Pacificus,” Alexander Hamilton had defended President Washington’s authority to
proclaim the United States a neutral in the war between Britain and
France, and, as he had stated, “under no obligations of Treaty, to be301
come an associate” of one warring power or the other. In response
to the objection that such a determination should have been made by
the “Judiciary Department,” Pacificus maintained that “the province
of that Department is to decide litigations in particular cases,” and that
while it could interpret treaties, it should do so “only in litigated cases; that is, where contending parties bring before it a specific contro-

296
297
298
299

300
301

10 ANNALS OF CONG. 533 (1800).
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95 (emphasis added).
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 103.
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 103 (emphasis added). Walter
Dellinger and Jeff Powell rightly emphasize the idea of “political law” in Marshall’s defense, which casts an important light on the first two issues in Marbury, written by Marshall
only three years later. See Dellinger & Powell, supra note 293, at 371, 373–74 (presenting
Marshall’s argument “that our constitutional system gives the political branches exclusive,
de jure authority to answer some questions of law”).
See 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 103–04.
Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS
DEBATES OF 1793–1794, at 9 (Morton Frisch ed., 2007); see also; CASTO, supra note 237, at
73; JAY, supra note 237, at 156; George Washington, The Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr.
22, 1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, supra, at 1.
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versy.”302 The judicial department had “no concern with pronouncing
303
upon . . . external political relations.”
At bottom, then, what made a dispute resolvable by judicial decision was that it was non-political. “Cases” were non-political. It was
also a point of foundational importance for Marshall; Charles Hobson has argued that “the separation of law and politics was perhaps
304
the fundamental proposition underlying Marshall’s jurisprudence.”
The question is what made a case non-political. How did a mere dispute become non-political, and thus a full-blooded case? The answer
lies in the process of “forensic litigation” that characterized procedure in courts of law. It was forensic litigation that “shape[d]” and
305
“form[ed]” a dispute into one that could be resolved in a nonpolitical way. It did this, ideally, by limiting the discretion of the
judge. Litigation replaced unbounded or even prudential political
discretion with legal discretion, and it was the exercise of legal discre306
tion that distinguished “judicial decision.” As Hobson summarizes
the idea, “[a]s long as [judicial] creativity was perceived to operate
within the confines of legal discretion, judges were not ‘legisla307
tors.’” Litigation could do this because it was, in the common law
302
303

304
305
306

307

Hamilton, supra note 301 (emphases added).
Hamilton, supra note 301 (emphases added). Subsequently, in one of the Virginia debt
cases, John Jay took the view that courts were incompetent to judge a treaty void for nonperformance. See JAY, supra note 237, at 164. Jay wrote,
[o]n comparing the principles which govern and decide the necessary validity of a
treaty, with those on which its voluntary validity depends, we cannot but perceive
that the former are of a judicial, and the latter are of a political nature. That diversity
naturally leads to an opinion that the former are referable to the judiciary, and the
latter to those departments which are charged with the political interests of the
state.
Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1062 (C.C.D. Va. n.d.) (No. 7,507) (emphasis added); see
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 260 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“These are considerations of policy, . . . certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a
Court of Justice.”).
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 52; see also NELSON, supra note 50, at 59–60.
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96.
See Kent, supra note 51, at 942 (“[T]he interpretation or construction of the Constitution
is as much a JUDICIAL act, and requires the exercise of the same LEGAL DISCRETION,
as the interpretation or construction of a law.”). H. Jefferson Powell examined the history of the expression “legal discretion” in some detail in his important article, “The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law.” See Powell, supra note 191, at 1006 (“‘Discretion’ in the judicial context thus had little to do with choice; it was, rather, the court’s
skillful exercise of judgment in discerning and applying correctly the rules of law.”); id. at
1007 (“[L]egal discretion and politics were usually differentiated sharply.”); cf.
HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 135–36 (describing Coke’s distinction between the discretion of the individual man and the discretion of the law).
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 35. For the development of this idea on the national level in
the early nineteenth century, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 135–55 (Oxford U. Press 1991) (1988).
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tradition, an oral practice of “deliberative reasoning and argument in
308
Using the tools of
an interlocutory, indeed forensic, context.”
rhetoric, grammar, and logic, in open disputation in a public forum,
the parties and the judge could shape the dispute into one that a
judge or jury could resolve neutrally, according to recognized com309
munity standards. What emerged in this process, Marshall said later, was “human reason applied by courts, not capriciously, but in a
regular train of decisions, to human affairs, according to the circumstances of the nation, the necessity of the times, and the general state
310
of things.”
These ideas were linked to movements for institutional reform in
the 1780s and 1790s, particularly those aimed at state court systems.
Virginia is an outstanding example, and events in that state shed light
311
Formally,
on why the idea of a “case” was significant to Marshall.
after 1776 Virginia had a three-tiered system of courts, with its “Court
of Appeals” serving as a court of last resort, the “General Court” as a
central court of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and county courts
312
headed by justices of the peace at the bottom. But, in reality, Virginia had an extremely decentralized court system, since the county
308

309

310
311

312

Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONW.
L.J. 1, 7 (2003); see also Alan Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edward
Coke and the Elizabethian Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 50 (1997) (“[B]oth
Coke and Fraunce shared the belief that the truest understanding of an issue is that
reached by disputation and discussion . . . .”).
See MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760–1850, at 58–
64 (1991) (discussing early “espistemological approach[es] to legal reasoning”); Boyer,
supra note 308, at 50–60 (discussing early ideas that “the wisdom of the group will be
fuller and more trustworthy than the opinion of any one lawyer or orator”); Postema, supra note 308, at 7–10 (discussing the “form and structure of legal reasoning”). Note that
Lobban, Postema, and Boyer are all describing generally Cokean views of the common
law, whereas Marshall was much more of a Blackstonian deductivist.
Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (emphasis added).
On reform efforts in Virginia, see F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE
LAW: VIRGINIA’S PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783–1828, at 12–33 (1994); A.G.
ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL
CULTURE, 1680–1810, at 161–202 (1981). Similar reform efforts occurred in New Hampshire, but about a decade later. See REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 119 (placing
this reform in the early 1800s); REID, supra note 58, at 24–70 (discussing judicial reform
in New Hampshire).There were reform and counter-reform movements in Pennsylvania
and Georgia as well. See WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 425–431 (discussing the debates
about “the role of law and the judiciary in American life . . . in the states”); REID, supra
note 58, at 7–23 (highlighting that the events that occurred in New Hampshire were also
occurring in other states).
See GERBER, supra note 258, at 60 (discussing the roles of each of the types of judges who
served in these courts); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 193 (3d
Am. ed. 1801) (discussing Virginia’s court structure). In addition, coordinate to the
General Court were a Court of Admiralty and a Court of Chancery.
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courts handled nearly all litigation, as well as a wide variety of admin313
Indeed, Virginia justices of the peace had long
istrative matters.
controlled almost every important issue of county policy—including
tax levies, licensing, agricultural inspections, and road mainte314
Nor did the system admit of any ready controls. Appeals
nance.
from the county courts to the General Court were possible, but might
315
Justices of the peace were formally aptake “six or seven” years.
pointed by the governor, but in reality had long been permitted to
nominate their own successors, which they used to perpetuate the in316
The result was a kind of
fluence of their families and associates.
‘country’ aristocracy. Unsurprisingly, this aristocracy conducted their
courts in a homespun and sometimes inquisitorial manner. While
William Nelson has argued that early royal Virginia quickly adopted
317
the common law in order to encourage private investment, trained
lawyers that came to Virginia before the turn of the eighteenth century complained loudly about the lack of sophistication and procedural informality at all levels of Virginia courts, but especially the
318
county courts. Justices were untrained in the common law, mixed
law and politics, and were essentially unchecked by any republican
authority.
In the 1780s, as reform efforts struggled along, Marshall practiced
law before the Virginia General Court and the Court of Appeals, as
well as the state’s Court of Chancery. It was in practicing before the
central courts that Marshall developed the approach to litigation for
319
Almost invariably, Marshall’s
which he later became well-known.
strategy was to identify relevant high-level principles, and then deduce from those principles the proper result in the instant case—a

313
314

315
316
317
318

319

See MILLER, supra note 311, at 24–25 (discussing the many roles of the justices of the
peace).
See James A. Henretta, Magistrates, Common Law Lawyers, Legislators: The Three Legal System
of British America, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 555, 560 (Michael
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (discussing that most of the power in early
Virginia was held by the justices of the peace).
ROEBER, supra note 311, at 196 (quoting VA. INDEP. CHRONICLE (Mar. 28, 1787)).
See Henretta, supra note 314, at 560 (“The county courts had become self-perpetuating
oligarchies of justices . . . .”).
See 1 NELSON, supra note 262, at 36–37 (discussing the adoption of common law in Virginia).
See ROEBER, supra note 311, at 57–60 nn.37–45 (providing support for this conception of
the Virginia courts); Henretta, supra note 314, at 571 (noting the absence of professional
lawyers in Virginia).
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 30–33, 42–43 (discussing “Marshall’s common law litigation”);
see NELSON, supra note 50, at 43.
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distinctively Blackstonian version of forensics.320 What made the approach so forceful was the impression of ‘logical’ or ‘geometric’ certainty that Marshall was able to convey, which suggested a severe con321
Reform proposals
straint on the discretion of the judge or jury.
that would create intermediate assize or district courts, staffed by central court judges, promised to encourage the growth of these litigation methods, and perhaps even bring trained lawyers and common
322
This would enhance the relaw procedures to the county courts.
publican legitimacy of those courts, by reinforcing “an emerging distinction between ‘legislative will’ and ‘justice’ . . . [which] became the
foundation of a conception of judicial independence and discretion
that was consistent with the republican belief in the sovereignty of the
323
people.”
The movement for reform of Virginia’s courts was also connected
to developments in the state’s assembly. Like the popular assemblies
of several other states, described above, the Virginia General Assembly in the 1780s was riven by party disputes, divided in its case along
324
‘country’ and reform lines. Justices of the peace, sitting as a significant voting bloc in the Virginia House of Delegates, worked to protect the interests of indebted rural planters against the interests of
325
The
merchants and creditors in the state’s population centers.
country party pushed through measures to prevent the efficient collection of debt and derailed proposals that would have made it possible for British and American creditors to collect even principal in a
326
The party supported its measures in the familiar
timely fashion.
320
321
322
323

324

325

326

See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 32–33 (discussing Marshall’s tactics); LOBBAN, supra note
309, at 57–61 (describing Blackstone’s methodology).
See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 32–33 (arguing that in litigating cases, Marshall “followed
the straight and narrow path of logic, presenting his case like a geometric proof”).
See, e.g., ROEBER, supra note 311, at 197 (discussing the possibility that “a more professional court system” would be the result of reform in Virginia).
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 39; see also ROEBER, supra note 311, at 166–69 (discussing Jefferson’s impact on judicial reform in Virginia); WHITE, supra note 307, at 129 (“American
judges were conceded to be the expositors of common law rules, but since the rules
themselves needed to retain their consonance with fundamental principle, exposition was
not the same as lawmaking.”).
See ROEBER, supra note 311, at 33–61, 178–79. For the effect of party politics in other state
assemblies, see supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. See generally WOOD, supra note
46, at 191 (noting a rift between eighteenth century American politicians and their constituents regarding matters of public policy).
See, e.g., Henretta, supra note 314, at 589 (“Roughly half the members of the House of
Burgesses sat as justices in their home counties and opposed proposals that would limit
their legal authority or replace them with elected aldermen.”); see also HOBSON, supra
note 112, at 38; MILLER, supra note 311, at 12–16.
One example of impeding collection is Virginia’s practice of assuming private debts. See
Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1067 (C.C.D.Va. 1793) (No. 7,507) (“Here it becomes
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language of the English opposition, ably deployed by Patrick Henry—
less government meant less corruption—but to the eyes of reformers,
like Marshall and Madison, the “laws were passed merely to satisfy the
327
interest of a majority.” Court reform at the state level was thus crucial not only because it could grease the skids for debt-collection policies reformers thought vital, but because it promised to create an institution for collective decision-making that would give effect to
“human reason,” rather than the passion and self-interest that
328
In the terminology of the period, courts
gripped the assembly.
could play a decisive role in ensuring the rule of “public opinion”—
that is, “the reason[] of the public,” rather than the passion of a bare
329
The key to securing a government founded on public
majority.
opinion was to encourage both the communication of ideas and their
evaluation in open forums suited to subjecting the organic sentiment
330
of the people to the scrutiny of reason. While this may have been a

327
328

329

330

necessary to inquire . . . [w]hether the payment into the loan-office, and the receipt and
discharge thereupon given by Virginia to the debtor, is a lawful impediment . . . [.]”); JAY,
supra note 237, at 162–65 (“Private debtors in the various states owed staggering sums to
British Creditors . . . . Virginians, who topped the list, owed almost half of the overall debt
due to British creditors. . . . One [Virginia] statute provided that the debt obligations
would be discharged to the extent payment that was made to the Virginia treasury . . . .”).
MILLER, supra note 311, at 13, 15–16.
Again, there is a striking parallel to draw between judicial review and the development of
due process doctrine according to Chapman and McConnell. As Chapman and
McConnell tell it, the idea that due process prohibited legislative adjudication grew out of
a sense that the legislative process was incapable of providing the kinds of pre-deprivation
protections that existed in courts of law. See, e.g., Chapman & McConnell, supra note 284,
at 1712, 1716, 1729–32 (“To say that due process cannot be ‘referred to an act of legislature’ is not to say that due process principles do not apply, but that the legislature is institutionally incapable of satisfying them. Hamilton specifically rejected the argument that
whatever the legislature does is by definition consistent with ‘the law of the land.’”). The
many sources quoted and described by John Reid show that Chapman and McConnell
underestimate the degree to which state assemblies continued to exercise adjudicatory
authority well into the 1800s, at least in New Hampshire, but probably in other states as
well. See, e.g., REID, supra note 58, at 7–11, 61–70 (providing historical evidence on this
point).
The quoted language is, of course, from Federalist 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James
Madison), supra note 32, at 276. See also KRAMER, supra note 34, at 114 (“[P]ublic opinion
would work to secure rather than undermine republican government only if and for so
long as the public was guided by reason . . . . [J]udicial review . . . add[ed] another voice
capable of forcing further public deliberation when it came to constitutional matters.”);
Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison and the French Enlightenment: The Authority of Public Opinion,
59 WM. & MARY Q. 925, 948 (2002) (describing the notion of “public opinion”).
See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 114 (“[P]ublic opinion would work to secure rather
than undermine republican government only if and for so long as the public was guided
by reason.”); Sheehan, supra note 329, at 937−38 (“The proponents of a politics of public
opinion agreed on the vital importance of the enlightened members of society to the
formation of a public voice grounded in reason.”). Wood has argued that the leadership
role provided by gentlemen in the process of forming public opinion was essentially gone
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traditional function of popular assemblies, it was not one well served
331
by assemblies in the 1780s. Yet it was a purpose that (properly reformed) courts of law could serve—and that they naturally should
serve, in light of the process of litigation. Because forensic litigation
forced the parties publicly to test their claims against one another,
before a neutral decision-maker, according to community standards,
it would be difficult for party politics to control the outcome of a
332
case. In this sense, courts of law could discipline legislative will by
channeling that will within boundaries set by the reason of the politi333
cal community.
B. Kamper v. Hawkins and Judicial Resolutions
For courts to play such a role, American judges would have to
change some of their ways. In particular, if the authority of the judge

331

332

333

by 1800, and that the more horizontal, democratic practices that became dominant were
premised on the idea that a collision of ideas would result in the emergence of truth. See
Gordon S. Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution, in LEADERSHIP IN
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 63, 82 (1974) (arguing that public opinion “became the resolving force not only of political truth but of all truth”). This notion of a “collision of
ideas” fit naturally with the classical account of litigation in common law courts as “deliberative reasoning and argument in an interlocutory, and indeed forensic, context.”
Postema, supra note 308, at 7; see supra note 308 and accompanying text.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 48–51. For this function of
the popular assembly, see Sheehan, supra note 329, at 939 (“Turgot . . . promoted the establishment of a multilayered system of deliberative assemblies and institutional devices
and checks that were intended to transform individual wills and preferences into a common reason.”). Until the middle of the eighteenth century, most colonial assemblies in
America had conducted themselves like courts.
See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE,
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 54 (1943) (“Not only did the colonial assemblies perform various judicial functions, but most of them also, by their
equipment and methods of procedure, as well as by specific statements, proclaimed
themselves to be courts.”); Alison G. Olson, Eighteenth-Century Colonial Legislatures and
Their Constituents, 79 J. AM. HIST. 543, 559 (1992) (stating that, as state assemblies concentrated more on legislation, they “began divesting themselves of judicial functions”).
Justice Paterson described the contrast between proceedings in a court of law and those
in an assembly in his charge in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
The case involved a dispute over title that the Pennsylvania Assembly had quieted by legislative act. Paterson argued that the “proofs and allegations” presented to a jury in title
proceedings in a “court of law” were preservative of individual rights; in the Assembly, in
contrast, “[t]he proprietor stands afar off, a solitary and unprotected member of the
community, and is [stripped] of his property, without his consent, without a hearing,
[and] without notice . . . .” Id. at 315.
This is what distinguishes “public opinion” theory from mixed government theory. In
mixed government theory, the departments of government contend with each other politically, and in so doing limit government; in the theory of “public opinion,” in contrast,
governmental power is not limited by contending political forces, but by reason, given effect by appropriate institutional design. See Sheehan, supra note 329, at 931 (discussing
Madison’s theory of public opinion).

Nov. 2014 JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NON-ENFORCEMENT AT THE FOUNDING

545

was attached to the case, then it threw into doubt the legitimacy with
which the judge acted outside legal proceedings, as he often did in the
decades prior to the Revolution. Consequently, as the justification
for judicial review matured in the 1790s, the idea of the “case” began
to figure more prominently. Kamper v. Hawkins illustrates this proposition. Kamper was the “best known and most influential” discussion
334
of judicial review in the years before Marbury. The leading opinions
in Kamper, written by Judge Spencer Roane and Judge St. George
Tucker, defend judicial review in terms familiar from “To the Pub335
lic.” Yet the most important issue in the case was not judicial review.
Instead, it was what judicial acts were legally authoritative.
The case in Kamper arose out of a 1792 act of the Virginia General
Assembly altering the state’s system of district courts, which the re336
District
form party had eventually succeeded in pushing through.
courts were then staffed on the model of a circuit system, by judges
337
The act of 1792 gave
sitting on the state’s central General Court.
these judges an authority to stay proceedings by the issuance of an injunction, apparently in an effort to “decentralize chancery jurisdic338
The arrangement raised a number of constitutional question.”
tions. Among these, the most important was the status of the district
courts relative to the Assembly. As Judge Tucker put it, the district
courts were “legislative,” in the sense that the Assembly had created
them; yet they would exercise powers under the 1792 reform that the
state Constitution had impliedly given to courts independent of the

334
335
336

337

338

KRAMER, supra note 34, at 100.
See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 53 (presenting Tucker’s arguments); HOBSON, supra note
112, at 65.
See GERBER, supra note 258, at 65. The district courts were intermediate courts, which
Madison and other reformers had finally succeeded in creating in the late 1780s. See infra
note 341.
See 13 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at
430 (1823) (reprinting the laws of Virginia relating to judges in the general court).
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 45; see HENING, supra note 337, at 432–33 (providing a law
relating to “[t]he district courts in term time”). Virginia law granted jurisdiction over
causes in chancery to the high court of chancery, which was staffed by judges in chancery.
HENING, supra note 337, at 406 (providing a law relating ot the jurisdiction of this court).
The 1776 Constitution made judges in chancery independent of the assembly. See
VIRGINIA CONST. OF 1776 (“The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Departments, shall be
separate and distinct . . . .”).
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Assembly.339 Such an arrangement threatened to undermine the
340
state’s commitment to the separation of powers.
Arguably, the judges had a precedent they could use to invalidate
the questionable provisions in the 1792 act. The act of 1788 creating
the district courts had originally staffed them using judges commis341
sioned to sit on the state’s Court of Appeals. This arrangement significantly increased the workload of Court of Appeals judges, who
viewed it as an end-run around judicial salary protections in the
342
In April 1788, several months before the disstate’s Constitution.
trict court term was to begin, Court of Appeals judges refused to appoint district court clerks, preventing the district courts from operat343
ing. They defended their action in a “Respectful Remonstrance of
the Court of Appeals,” which argued that the 1788 act was an uncon344
stitutional diminution of salary. Along the way, the “Remonstrance”
observed that the state Constitution “seems to require” judges of the
different constitutional courts to be distinct persons—a principle that
345
the 1792 district court act arguably violated. The judges closed with
an appeal to the Assembly for reform—and, failing that, to the people themselves, “whose servants both [the judges and legislators]
346
are.”
The Kamper court was thus possessed of a friendly precedent. Yet
there was disagreement on the bench as to whether “Remonstrance”

339
340

341

342
343
344
345

346

See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 21 (1793) (discussing the jurisdiction and
powers of the district courts).
See VIRGINIA CONST. OF 1776. Virginia was unique in this regard. See GERBER, supra note
258, at 61 (“A number of states declared in their respective bills of rights that the separation of powers was a right guaranteed to the people. However, none phrased that right
with as much concern for the independence of the judiciary as did Virginia.”).
See GERBER, supra note 258, at 64 (“[T]he District Court Act of January 1788 . . . required
existing court of appeals judges to sit on newly established district courts without additional compensation.”); ROEBER, supra note 311, at 193–201 (discussing Madison’s role in
court reform).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 560. See generally Cases of the Judges of the Court of
Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (Va. 1788).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 562.
Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 141.
Id. at 144. The argument was that General Court judges were made into judges in chancery by the act’s grant of injunctive power. See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 22–23 (“This
is a motion for an injunction, adjourned from the District Court of Dumfries on the constitutionality of the eleventh section of the district court law, which gives the district court
in term time, or a judge thereof in vacation, the same power of granting injunctions to
stay proceedings on any judgment obtained *23 in a district court, and of proceeding to
the dissolution or final hearing of suits commencing by injunction, under the same rules
and regulations as are now prescribed to the high court of chancery.”)
Cases of the Judges, 8 Va.(4 Call) at 146.
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was a proper legal authority at all, since it had not decided a case.347
As Judge James Henry put it, “the question did not then come before
the court in a judicial manner,” but had been “taken up as a general
348
proposition.” “Remonstrance” was, wrote Henry, not an opinion in
“an adjudged case, to be considered as a binding precedent,” but instead “an appeal to the people,” which “looked like a dissolution of
349
the government.” To Henry’s eye, “Remonstrance” was not an exercise of proper judicial authority, but an act of resistance producing
a sort of governmental shutdown. The “Remonstrance” judges had
acted out of a duty to prevent violations of the state Constitution, but
350
this ‘political’ duty differed from the duty of the judicial office.
Henry’s caution on this point might be explained by the state assembly’s reaction to “Remonstrance,” which was to strip the Court of Ap351
peals of jurisdiction and to staff an entirely new high court. Judge
Henry had sat on the Court of Appeals in 1788 and signed the “Remonstrance;” after the assembly stripped the court of its jurisdiction,
he accepted a commission on the General Court, whose judges now
had no power to hear appeals. The experience likely encouraged a
distinction between freestanding ‘resolutions’ and judicial review in
352
the context of a case.

347

348
349
350
351

352

See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 559–60 (“In expounding law in resolutions rather than
cases . . . the judges of the Court of Appeals stepped outside the realm in which they
could expect authority or even independence . . . .”); see also Treanor, supra note 44, at
513 (“The Cases of the Judges were not actual cases.”).
Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 50.
Id. at 50, 108.
HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 561. But see GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 129 (treating “Remonstrance” as an authority for judges to determine constitutionality).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 570–71 (“[A]lthough the Assembly left the old Court of
Appeals undisturbed, it established a new Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction to hear the
cases depending in the old Court of Appeals and all future appeals.”). William Treanor
points out that technically the Court of Appeals judges resigned, and insisted that they
had done so freely. See Treanor, supra note 44, at 514.
Judge Tyler also sat on both the “Remonstrance” and Kamper courts. While Tyler did not
take up the precedential value of the “Remonstrance” expressly, he did write,
I will not in an extra-judicial manner assume the right to negative a law . . . but if
by any legal means I have jurisdiction of a cause, in which it is made a question
how far the law be a violation of the constitution, and therefore of no obligation, I
shall not shrink from a comparison of the two, and pronounce sentence as my
mind may receive conviction.—To be made an agent, therefore, for the purpose
of violating the Constitution, I cannot consent to.—As a citizen, I should complain of
it; as a public servant, filling an office in the one of the great departments of government, I
should be a traitor to my country to do it.”
Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 61 (emphasis added).
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Others on the Kamper court, however, disagreed with Judge Henry
353
and thought the “Remonstrance” a binding legal precedent. Judge
Tucker observed that “decisions of the supreme court of appeals in
this commonwealth . . . are to be resorted to by all other courts, as
354
He then
expounding, in their truest sense, the laws of the land.”
turned to “the authority of a previous decision of that court, on a similar question”—i.e., the “Remonstrance”—and described it as the
355
outcome of something like litigation in a court of law. He quoted
court records, which read, “[o]n consideration of a late act of assembly, . . . after several conferences, and upon mature deliberation, the
court do adjudge that clerks of the said [district] courts ought not now
356
to be appointed.” Tucker observed that the Court of Appeals could
hardly have avoided the issue, since the 1788 act obligated the judges
to hire clerks, thereby forcing them to consider the constitutional is357
The judges “found themselves obliged to desues the act raised.
cide, whatever temporary inconveniencies [sic] might arise, and in
that decision to declare, that the constitution and the act were in op358
position . . . .” Such a declaration did not pass beyond conventional
judicial powers, since, as the Court of Appeals itself had explained,
“when they [i.e., the judiciary] decide between an act of the people,
and an act of the legislature, they are within the line of their duty,
359
declaring what the law is, and not making a new law.” Thus, while
Tucker could not plausibly argue that the “Remonstrance” had actually decided a case, he could argue that the process resembled adjudication enough to make the “Remonstrance” an authoritative expression of the law.
Tucker’s notion of judicial duty—the duty to expound the law in
the course of adjudication—then became the centerpiece of his and
Judge Roane’s famous defenses of judicial review. Their defenses are
thus best understood as describing institutional contours for that
power. Tucker begins with the principal objection to locating this
power in courts: the assumption that the Constitution is “a rule to
the legislature only, and not to the judiciary, or the executive; . . . [and
360
thus] neither the executive nor the judiciary can resort to it.” This
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360

HOBSON, supra note 112, at 45 (arguing that the Kamper decision was similar to Marbury v.
Madison due to the court’s constitutional scrunity and refusal of additional jurisdiction).
Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 93.
Id.
Id. at 94–95.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 107.
Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 77 (Va. 1793) (emphasis added).
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view, he says, is a concomitant of the English system, in which the
Constitution is determined by usage alone, making acts of Parliament
361
constitutive of fundamental law. English courts of law thus have no
choice, Tucker says, but to “receive whatever exposition of [the Consti362
American
tution] the legislature might think proper to make.”
courts of law, in contrast, need not accept the legislature’s view.
Since American constitutions are written, they govern judges “on eve363
ry occasion, where it becomes necessary to expound what the law is.”
To expound the law, judges have to examine the Constitution, since
364
Indeed, observes
the Constitution is “the first law of the land.”
Tucker, under the Virginia Constitution’s provision for separation of
powers, “the duty of expounding must be exclusively vested in the ju365
diciary.” Tucker thus appears to believe that both the judiciary and
the executive can “resort” to the Constitution, but only judges “ex366
pound” it. Roane makes a similar argument.
The idea of a “case” thus figured centrally in the version of the
Standard Justification presented by Tucker and Roane. In contrast,
the principles of popular disobedience play at best a subordinate
role. Had popular disobedience sufficed to support judicial review,
the “Remonstrance” could have stood on its own feet; instead, Tucker
had to refashion it as an adjudicated case, somewhat unconvincingly,
to show that the judges who issued it had remained within their “line
of duty.” In this sense, American practices in the last decade of the
eighteenth century came more into line with the English notions of
judicial duty that Philip Hamburger has described. But this was the
product of institutional reform and politics, not simply an inher367
itance of English ideas. By intrinsically connecting review to the ad361
362
363
364
365

366

367

Id. at 78.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). For the written character of American constitutions as crucial, see
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 65.
Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 78.
Id. at 79 (emphasis added). Notably, Tucker had advanced the same position in 1782,
during his argument in the Case of the Prisoners. See Treanor, supra note 44, at 522–23,
554–55 (“Echoing his argument in the Case of the Prisoners, Tucker in Kamper appealed to
‘the text of the Constitution, and the spirit of our government.’ He noted that the legislature had repealed statutes that were ‘contrary to the true spirit of the Constitution.’”).
See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 38–39 (Opinion of Roane, J.) (“It is the province of the
judiciary to expound the laws, and to adjudge cases which may be brought before
them . . . . In expounding laws, the judiciary considers every law which relates to the subject: would you have them to shut their eyes against that law which is of the highest authority of any . . . ?”).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 283 (“As in England, so in each American state, a constitution made with the authority of the people was part of the law of the land, and the
judges had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land, including the Constitu-
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judication of a case, Tucker effectively narrowed the judicial office.
Outside the confines of a case, the judge acted only as a citizen—not
as a ‘magistrate,’ or officer of the government, the role he had played
before the Revolution and in the first decade after. In effect, then,
the forum was shaping the office; the American court of law was creating the American judge.
C. “Expounding” the Law, and its Variants
By the turn of the century it was widely understood that the core
function of a court of law was to decide cases. Deciding cases required courts to “expound” the law. As Marshall put it in Marbury,
those who apply a legal rule to cases, “must of necessity expound and
368
interpret that rule.” What did it mean, in the late eighteenth century, to “expound” a legal rule?
To “expound” a rule was not merely to state it or describe it. As
Philip Hamburger has shown, judges in the English tradition had an
369
authority to explain the law, and this idea, which retained currency
through the eighteenth century, was sometimes expressed with “expound.” Samuel Johnson’s 1768 and 1792 English dictionaries define
“expound” as meaning “[t]o explain; to clear; to interpret,” and “to

368
369

tion. Much was different after 1776, but these basics and what they required of judges
remained largely the same.”). Hamburger does acknowledge changes in the practices of
American judges, see id. at 536–74, but it is unclear how those developments should be
understood in light of his basic thesis that judicial review emerges out of “the common
law ideals of law and judicial duty . . . taken together . . . .” Id. at 17. The office of the early American judge was not a strictly judicial office; it was the office of a magistrate, and in
acting, the American judicial magistrate drew on his political authority and his position as
a community leader. See supra note 314; NELSON, supra note 50, at 12–14. In my view,
when reformers sought to position courts of law as checks on popular assemblies in the
mid-1780s, the English common-law ideals Hamburger describes—which the elite understood and accepted, even if those ideals did not describe the actual practices of courts—
served as a convenient vocabulary for pressing their case.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 219–20 (“At common law, when judges explained their
judgments, they reasoned or exercised judgment with the authority of their office.”).
The Middle English term from which “expound” derived could connote a sort of public
explanation of meaning. See Expôunen Definitions 1 and 2, MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(2001), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/m/mec/med-idx?type=id&id=
MED14979; Expounen Definitions 1 and 2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 317 (2013), available at http://oed.com/view/Entry/66731?redirectedFrom=expounen&. The English
term came by way of the French “espundre”; the Anglo-Norman Dictionary defines
“espundre” as meaning “to explain, interpret,” “to mean, signify,” and “to fulfil [sic].”
Espundre Definition, ANGLO-NORMAN DICTIONARY (2007), available at http://www.anglonorman.net/gate/index.shtml?session=SAB119369T1391560465. The Latin form “exponere,” from which the French derived, had a similar meaning. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra.
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examine, to lay open.”370 Late-eighteenth century American legal
sources confirm this usage, in some cases by interchanging “explain”
with “expound.” In the notes that lawyer St. George Tucker prepared
in 1782 for his argument in Commonwealth v. Caton, he asserts that it is
“uncontrovertible . . . that the power properly belonging to the Judiciary Department, is, to explain the Laws of the Land as they apply to
371
Eleven years later, now on the bench, Judge
particular cases.”
Tucker reasoned in Kamper that the Constitution should be resorted
to “on every occasion, where it becomes necessary to expound what the
law is,” and that “the duty of expounding must be exclusively vested
372
in the judiciary.” Other prominent jurists interchanged the terms,
373
or interchanged “explain” with terms like “construe” or “construct.”
Overall, usage was somewhat uneven; but there was, nevertheless, a
substantive difference between explaining and merely restating a
rule, or simply defining its terms. A court explaining the law might
equitably reject an expression’s plain meaning in favor of one suited
374
to the intent of the legislature or the purpose of a legal instrument.
370

371
372
373

374

See JOHNSON, supra note 290, at (defining “interpret”); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792). The 1792 dictionary defines “interpret” as
meaning “to explain; to translate; to decipher; to give a solution of,” which is largely the
same as the 1768 definition.
Treanor, supra note 44, at 522 (emphasis added).
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78–79 (Va. 1793) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 237 (Va. 1792) (“It is the business of
the legislators to make the laws; and of the judges to expound them. Having made the
law, the legislature have no authority afterwards to explain its operation upon things already done under it.”). “Explain” might also be used interchangeably with “construe” or
“construct.” See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798) (Chase, J.) (“I am under a
necessity to give a construction, or explanation of the words, ‘ex post facto law,’ because they
have not any certain meaning attached to them.”); “Brutus” (Jan. 31, 1788), in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 189, at
293, 294–295 (“The cases arising under the Constitution must include such, as bring into
question its meaning, and will require an explanation of the nature and extent of the
powers of the different departments under it. . . . This article vests the courts with authority . . . to explain [the Constitution] according to the rules laid down for construing a
law.”). In a later period, John Reid quotes Daniel Webster as describing law as “composed
of received rules and received explanations.” REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 39.
See, e.g., Cole v. Clayburn, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 262, 264 (1794) (argument of attorney Duval)
(arguing that a will could “with propriety receive a different exposition. It is not unusual,
in the construction of wills, and even of deeds, to enlarge, or limit the meaning of particular words, so as to fit them to the subject on which they are meant to operate, and to
avoid contradiction or absurdity”); ”Brutus” (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 373, at 295 (“By
[the grant of equity jurisdiction], they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.”).
Philip Hamburger has argued that expounding in this sense was limited to equitable rules
of interpretation. See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 336–57 (“They [judges] could sometimes avoid minor injustices and inconvenience through mechanisms such as equity and
equitable interpretation, [but] they could not hold a government act unlawful for being
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Pressed to its limits, explaining was clearly a creative act. As the authors of an open letter criticizing the decision in Rutgers v. Waddington fumed, rather than “speak the plain and obvious meaning of the
375
law,” a court could “explain it to mean any thing or nothing.” Simi376
lar criticisms were directed at judicial “construction.” In this sense,
“expounding” or “construing” or “constructing” the law was not
377
merely restating it or defining its key terms.
Yet expounding the law was also not changing the law. It was consistent with obeying the law. “A Constitution,” said Madison in a late
378
letter, “is to be expounded and obeyed, not controlled or varied.”
Delegates at the federal convention repeatedly insisted that “the
power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding
the laws,” a basic principle in Montesquieu’s version of separation of
379
powers. Outside the convention, as well, reformers argued that the
powers to expound and to make law should be placed in different
380
If expounding and its variants were thought to be creative
hands.

375
376
377

378

379

380

unjust, not useful, or otherwise unreasonable.”). This is consistent with Blackstone, but I
doubt the practice can be cabined in this way. Whatever the black letter law, the lines
separating equitable and common law doctrines of interpretation were historically porous. See Boyer, supra note 308, at 71–79 (discussing Coke’s views). Unsurprisingly, then,
it is often unclear whether a court is invoking an equitable or common law doctrine of interpretation. See, e.g., Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (S.C. Com. Pls. Gen. Sess.
1789); 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 424–28 (citing the argument of J. M. Varnum in
Trevett v. Weeden).
Melaneton Smith et al., To the People of New York. N.Y. PACKET AND AM. ADVERTISER, Nov. 4,
1784, at 1.
See, e.g., “Brutus” (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 373, at 300.
In this respect, there are obvious similarities between the usage of “expound” and “construct” in the late eighteenth century, and the interpretation-construction distinction so
popular today. See Larry B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010) (claiming that “the difference between interpretation and construction is real and fundamental”). However, the modern thesis that it is a “political
task” to construct a text, rather than merely interpret it, see KEITH WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 6 (1999), does not appear to be supported by the lateeighteenth century sources examined here.
Letter from James Madison to Charles Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 ELLIOT, supra note
122, at 615, 615. See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 448 (1793) (Iredell, J.)
(“[T]he distinct boundaries of law and Legislation may be confounded, in a manner that
would make Courts arbitrary, and in effect makers of a new law, instead of being (as certainly they alone ought to be) expositors of an existing one.”).
5 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 345 (statement of Caleb Strong); see also id. at 345 (statement
of Elbridge Gerry) (arguing that the proposed Council of Revision “was making the expositors of the laws the legislators, which ought never to be done”). On the origin of this
principle in Montesquieu, see GWYN, supra note 82, at 105.
See, e.g., REID, supra note 58, at 32 (“[W]e think it our duty solemnly to protest
against . . . the dangerous precedent of one person holding the aforesaid offices, being at
the same time a Legislator in New-Hampshire, and Judge of the Federal Court . . . where
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acts, then, their creativity operated within certain limits, set by the
norms of the explanatory process. That process involved fitting a legal rule into a more comprehensive body of law. “In expounding the
laws,” said Judge Roane in Kamper, “the judiciary considers every law
381
which relates to the subject.” In this respect, Roane was mimicking
Blackstone, who observed at the outset of the Commentaries that the
“academical expounder of the laws . . . should consider his course as
a general map of the law, marking out the shape of the country, its
connections and boundaries, its greater divisions and principal cit382
ies[.]” The seventeenth century common law had aimed merely at
local coherence between the present case and earlier decisions, as determined by the judge in deliberation with the parties; but American
courts under the influence of Blackstone and then Mansfield became
383
They sought to formulate the
more ambitious and ‘scientific.’
“principles” behind decisions, and then forced those principles into a
kind of system or overarching theory (sometimes organized around a
“keyword”), from which an outcome in the present case could be de384
duced. As Brutus described it, “the court must and will assume certain principles, from which they will reason, in forming their deci385
Ten years later, in 1798, Jesse Root was even more
sions.”
deductive; he argued that the “principles” and “precepts” of the

381
382
383

384

385

as Judge he may explain and interpret laws which as Legislator he assisted to make . . . .”
(quoting Jeremiah Smith, Osbourne’s Spy, Jan. 13, 1790)).
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1. Va. Cas.) 20, 38 (Va. 1793).
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *26.
On the classical common law, see LOBBAN, supra note 309, at 57–58; GERALD J. POSTEMA,
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 31–37 (1986). On American jurisprudence,
see HOBSON, supra note 112, at 34–35; WHITE, supra note 307, at 79, 81–82; Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the Common Law in the
Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1058–59 (2002). On the institutionalist tradition in which Blackstone wrote, see JOHN LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER ET AL.,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 839 (2009).
See Hulsebosch, supra note 383, at 1051 (“Keywords, signifying abstract principles, became
the benchmarks of legal reasoning.”); S.F.C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone’s Achievement,
1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 1, 9 (1981) (referencing “abstract principles”); Powell, supra
note 191, at 965 (“Taylor instead described the Federal Constitution as designed to embody the ‘master principles and comprehensive truths’ of political morality and thereby
“to give them practical effect.”) (citation omitted); Treanor, supra note 44, at 526 (describing Justice Paterson’s charge in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, which focused on “first
principles”).
“Brutus” (Feb. 7, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 189, at 298, 299; accord 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 159, at 451 (statement of James
Wilson) (“When [an unconstitutional law] comes to be discussed before the judges—
when they consider its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of
the Constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it void.”) (emphasis added).
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common law “enable[] us, to explain the laws, construe contracts and
agreements, to distinguish injuries, . . . to determine their degree and
386
the reparation in damages which justice requires.” In this context,
the rather modest observation that authorities were inconsistent, or
mutually “repugnant,” became a matter of central importance, because it served to measure the degree to which legal rules could be
387
regarded as part of the same system. Ultimately this is what distinguished “expounding” the law from making it. Expounding was not
stipulating additional law, but explaining how a judgment followed
from (and thus was part of) existing law, which itself enjoyed republi388
can legitimacy.
Expounding the law thus occupied a middle ground between re389
stating the law and making it. It was neither, but instead a sui generis form of creative-deductive explanation. The appearance of this
idea complicates, to some extent, our understanding of the transformation in the American common law at the turn of the nineteenth
century. According to the leading account of that transformation, associated principally with Morton Horwitz and William Nelson, American courts turned away from a static private-law regime that enforced
shared community values, towards an instrumental conception of law
390
that was flexible and relatively tolerant of self-interested conduct.
386
387

388

389

390

1 JESSE ROOT, The Origin of Government and Laws in Connecticut, in REPORTS OF CASES
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS x (1798).
See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 141 (“[I]t seems nearly inevitable that the power to expound statutes would be manipulated to encompass constitutional repugnancy. The
precedents for judicial interpretation of legislative intent were many of them old and well
pedigreed and so much a part of the accepted common law technique of adjudication as
to minimize political objection.”); cf. Bilder, supra note 77, at 512–13, 541–55 (relating
repugnancy to judicial review).
See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 96 (Va. 1793) (“[W]hen they [i.e., the judiciary] decide between an act of the people, and an act of the legislature, they are within
the line of their duty, declaring what the law is, and not making a new law.”); see also
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 39 (discussing the need for judges to explain the laws via judicial discretion); Chapman & McConnell, supra note 284, at 1748–49 (discussing Kent’s
opinion in Dash v. Van Kleeck which was based on “legal principle[s]”); cf. WHITE, supra
note 309, at 79 (noting that American legal commentators in the first decades of the
nineteenth century “set out . . . to establish themselves as professional guardians of republican principles, persons whose special knowledge of ‘legal science’ enabled them to recast law in conformity with the assumptions of republican government”).
See Bilder, supra note 54, at 1141–42 (“To expound law suggests interpretation from a
particular source—interpretation the way judges do it or the way a judicial tradition understands it.”).
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 7–9, 22–
27 (1992) (discussing “[t]he [s]tructure of [c]lassical [l]egal [t]hought”); NELSON, supra
note 72, at 36–37, 143–44, 163–64 (discussing the changes in law); Hulsebosch, supra note
383, at 1051–1052 (“[Nelson and Horwitz] characterize law before that time as static and
communal rather than uncreative.”).
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Under the former regime, we are told, judges were bound by a strict
doctrine of precedent, and their task was merely to discover preexisting law; by the turn of the century, a new ideology had emerged in
391
Exwhich judges could openly describe themselves as making law.
pounding, however, fits into neither of these categories; it was neither
discovering the law nor making it. Expounding was creative, but
without amounting to an expression of will. It was creative reason. A
republican judge could not persuade litigants to comply with the
court’s judgment by making public law—his office did not extend so
far. He had to show litigants how that judgment was rooted in their
392
law, including their fundamental law, in order to give it traction.
The proposition that expounding the law means explaining it
makes sense of much of what the Framers said on the topic. First, it
makes sense of why the Framers “almost invariably” related expound393
ing to judicial review. As Elbridge Gerry put it, “exposition of the
394
laws . . . involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality.”
The point came up repeatedly at the Philadelphia Convention, as
delegates tried to sort through their views on the proposed Council
395
The only delegate to deny the connection was John
of Revision.
396
Mercer, who likely rejected judicial review altogether. Outside the
convention, as well, the connection between expounding the law and
397
judicial review was drawn, again and again—by Brutus, by Hamilton
391

392

393
394
395

396

397

See, e.g., HORWITZ supra note 390, at 9, 23 (discussing judges’ responses to the “public
purpose” doctrine); NELSON, supra note 72, at 19–20, 171–72 (discussing the changing
role of judges).
In this sense, expounding the law was part of a larger judicial project of serving as the
community’s “republican schoolmaster.” See generally Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as
Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127. I discuss Lerner’s important essay further
below. See infra Part III.D.
Corwin, supra note 146, at 561; see also BERGER, supra note 184, at 55–56 (referencing
Corwin).
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 97.
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73 (discussing Wilson’s argument); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 150, at 78 (presenting the arguments of George Mason); cf. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 76 (presenting the argument of Luther
Martin) (“As to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in
their proper official character.”).
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 298 (documenting the statement of John Mercer disapproving of “the Judges as expositors of the Constitution”); see BERGER, supra note 184, at 63 (describing Mercer as against judicial review).
See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
See “Brutus” (Feb. 7, 1788), supra note 385, at 299 (“[T]he courts are vested with the supreme and uncontrollable power, to determine, in all cases that come before them, what
the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law, which, in their judgment,
opposes the constitution . . . .”).
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in Federalist 78,398 and later by Judge Roane in Kamper,399 among many
others. In Hamilton’s hands it took on a highly ‘positive’ character;
expounding the law became the task of “interpreting conflicting stat400
But this point,
utes,” a label that was, perhaps, easier to swallow.
which is often made, should not obscure Hamilton’s description of
what a court of law actually does when it interprets a statute. Hamilton says that the court must determine whether the statute can be
made to cohere with “the laws,” meaning all laws, including the Constitution (“fundamental law”), which the court does by describing the
401
Hamilton’s ‘interpreting’ judge thus does much
statute’s “sense.”
402
He locates the
more than give meaning to the words of a statute.
statute within a state’s comprehensive body of law, which forces him
to determine whether there is “an irreconcilable variance” between
403
Only then can he adjudge the
the statute and the Constitution.
lawful outcome in the case. It is this process that, as Gerry put it, “involve[s]” a power of determining whether the statute is constitution404
al.
Second, this account of expounding the law explains why most
Framers associated exposition with courts of law alone, and, in particular, with judges. Here the evidence is considerable, as others have
405
noted. There were three powers of government, said the Address of
the 1781 New Hampshire constitutional convention: “The legislative,
or power of making laws—The judicial, or power of expounding and
applying them to each particular case—And the executive, to carry
398

399

400
401
402

403
404
405

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is far more rational to suppose, that
the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature . . . to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”).
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 38 (Va. 1793) (“It is the province of the judiciary to expound the laws . . . . It may say . . . that an act of assembly has not changed the
Constitution, though its words are expressly to that effect . . . .”).
See, e.g., SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 77–78 (discussing Hamilton’s arguments in Federalist
No. 78).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
As Dean Alfange has argued, drawing on Judge Gibson’s influential dissent in Eakin v.
Raub, simply as applying a legal rule to a case need not involve the Constitution at all.
Alfange, supra note 46, at 424–25 (citing Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pa. 1825)
(Gibson, J., dissenting)); cf. 1 GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 111 (“The effect of the declarations that nothing repugnant to the constitution [was] in the law hitherto observed or the
common law, as the case might be, was to require the courts to make what amounted to
political decisions.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 97.
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Background of Marbury v. Madison, in ARGUING
MARBURY V. MADISON 47, 51 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (“There is no dispute, however,
that judges’ primary role was as expositors of the common law. On this, even Coke and
Blackstone agreed.”).
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them into effect.”406 The idea became commonplace in the late
1780s. As described above, a principal objection in Philadelphia to
the Council of Revision was that it might interfere with a judge’s determination of constitutionality in his capacity as an “expositor[] of
407
the Law[].” Others agreed, but nothing similar was said of the Pres408
In the years that followed, leading jurists repeatedly exident.
pressed the view that it was the role of the judiciary to expound the
law. The idea appeared in Pendleton: “It is the business of the legis409
In
lators to make the laws; and of the judges to expound them.”
Roane: “It is the province of the judiciary to expound the laws, and
410
In
to adjudge cases which may be brought before them . . . .”
Tucker: “This exposition it is the duty and office of the judiciary to
411
make.” And in Iredell: courts “alone ought to be[] expositors of an
412
existing [law].” Variations on the theme included a judicial duty to
“declare the law” or to “construe” it, although the term “declare”
might also be used to express older ideas about the judicial discovery
413
of law. The ideas were not limited to Federalists or to supporters of
406
407
408

409

410
411
412
413

An Address of the Convention for Framing a New Constitution of Government for the
State of New-Hampshire 7 (1781).
See supra notes 211–15, 396–97. The quoted language comes from 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73 (statement of James Wilson).
E.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 98 (statement of Rufus King relating to judges); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 150, at 75 (statement of Calen Strong)(“The Judges in exercising the
function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken, in framing the
laws.”); id. at 79 (statement of Nathanial Ghorum) (“Judges ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no prepossessions with regard to them.”); BERGER, supra note 184, at 61
(“Charles Pinckney ‘opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative business . . . .’”) (citation omitted); accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It
is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws.”). King again expressed the view that judges were expositors during
the debate over Jay’s appointment to head a delegation to England. “[T]he judge in this
business on their [the North Carolina senators’] opinion should a new Treaty be made
will become a legislator, and on his return will assume the judicial Chair, and be the Expositor and Judge of his own legislation.” CASTO, supra note 237, at 89.
Turner v. Turner’s Ex’r, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 237 (Va. 1792) (opinion of Pendleton, J.); see
also Kennon v. McRoberts & Wife, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 96, 99 (Va. Ct. App. 1792) (Opinion of
Pendleton, J.) (Judges “disclaim all legislative power to change the law, and only assume
our proper province of declaring what the law is . . . .”).
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 38 (Va. 1793).
Id. at 78.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 448 (1793) (Opinion of Iredell, J.).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (Va. 1782) (Opinion of Wythe, J.)
(“[T]he tribunals, who hold neither [the power of the purse nor the sword], are called
upon to declare the law impartially between them.”); Address of Melancton Smith’s Committee
DOCUMENTS AND
(1784) in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
COMMENTARY, supra note 90, at 314 (“The design of courts of justice in our government,
from the very nature of their institution, is to declare laws, not to alter them.”); Henry
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judicial review.414 In a 1788 letter to James Madison opposing judicial
review, Alexander White wrote, “[t]he duty of the judges, men holding office for life and exempt from legislative punishment, was to ex415
pound the laws.”
If one thinks of expounding as a kind of deductive explanation,
then the logic that gripped this generation of commentators is not
hard to understand. Judges heard cases; cases were disputes presented forensically; these disputes were supposed to be resolved neutrally,
i.e., without bias or favoritism; expounding the law was a means for
the judge to do so, and to publicly demonstrate the fact. By expounding the law, the court could show that its resolution of the case
followed from the law of the community, rather than political prejudice, passion or whim. Courts of law were suited to expounding be416
cause of the nature of forensic litigation, discussed above; and
judges were suited to expounding because, said Oliver Ellsworth, they
417
At least,
had “a systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws.”
they were supposed to. That was the aim of reformers in Philadelphia, Virginia, New Hampshire, and elsewhere, who hoped to place
trained lawyers on the bench, presiding over courts conducted ac418
In a sense, “excording to (adapted) common law procedures.
pounding” the law was a descriptive claim that embedded within it a
series of normative claims—about the way proceedings in a court of

414

415

416
417
418

Lee, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 136, 138–39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“It is their
province [i.e., the federal courts’ province], and their duty to construe the constitution
and the laws, and it cannot be doubted, but that they will perform this duty faithfully and
truthfully.”).
See Powell, supra note 191, at 981 (“[T]here was general agreement, over a broad range of
political and constitutional opinion, about the special responsibility of the judiciary in
constitutional interpretation.”).
Letter from Alexander White to James Madison (Aug. 16, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON DIGITAL EDITION 232 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., 2010); cf. REID, CONTROLLING, supra
note 248, at 117 (“[A] jury legally enpanelled is a tribunal independent of the Court, as
the Court is of the Jury—each independent in their own department . . . it is the duty of
the Court to sum up the evidence, and expound the law to the Jury—that after the Jury
return their verdict, the Court have no right to set it aside . . . .” (citation omitted)).
See supra notes 305–10 and accompanying text.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73–74.
See REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 95–130 (describing the reform movement in
New Hampshire and the counter-reform movement based on “common sense jurisprudence”); REID, supra note 58, at 122–34 (discussing New Hampshire Judge Jeremiah
Smith). For Virginia, see supra notes 311–32 and accompanying text (detailing the extensive reform efforts in Virginia). On the expectations of national reformers, see JAY, supra
note 237, at 60–61 (discussing the reforms considered by the Founders in Philadelphia).
However, to the extent that Stewart Jay describes the expectations of those at Philadelphia as growing out of the settled practices of American courts, I disagree with the analysis.
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law ought to be conducted, about the role of judges and juries in these proceedings, and about the institutional function of courts within
government—each associated with its own movement for reform.
The actual practices of American courts were, at least in some states,
419
distant from reformer ideals. In jurisdictions like New Hampshire,
those opposed to reform drew on deep feelings of antiprofessionalism to support what John Reid has called a “common
420
sense jurisprudence,” in which the jury largely determined the law.
To the extent that jurors were regularly expected to make substantive
judgments about the law—say, because they had received different
charges from the different judges sitting in a case—juries could be
421
said to share in the power of expounding the law. This role only at422
rophied with time.
Even among reformers, expounding the law was not universally
associated with judges or courts of law. At Philadelphia, Madison repeatedly used the term to describe the interpretative activity of the
President and the national legislature. For example, he observed that
judicial independence was important to prevent judges from being
“tempted to cultivate the Legislature . . . and thus render the Legisla423
ture the virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws.” Madison then drew a comparison between the executive and the judiciary:
“The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in
others. The former expounded & applied them for certain purposes,
424
In Madison’s mind, all three departas the latter did for others.”
419

420
421

422

423
424

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 51–59 (3d ed. 2005); Tarr, supra
note 285, at 652–61. In some cases, reformers would pronounce an independent and
strong federal judiciary necessary to protect liberty, while accepting a dependent and
weak judiciary at home. See REID, supra note 58, at 62, 111, 115–20 (describing the lack of
judicial independence in New Hampshire despite reform efforts at the federal level).
See REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 18–32, 108–10 (discussing “[j]urisprudence of
[c]ommon [s]ense”).
By another view—the view held by many reformers—juries were not applying legal rules
at all, but deciding cases on an ad hoc basis, according to “passion” or “prejudice.” See
REID, supra note 58, at 24 (preseting the argument that juries followed “their passions and
prejudices”); REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 32 (arguing that juries decided cases
based on impulses).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 419, at 19 (discussing how justice evolved over time); HORWITZ,
supra note 390, at 28–29 (discussing the changing relationships between judges and juries). This may be because the power of the jury to determine the law was regarded by
some as a centerpiece of republican government; John Adams is the obvious example
here. See, e.g., STIMSON, supra note 80, at 78–84.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 32.
Id.; see also id. at 342 (“Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend
the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether
it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the
Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.”). As
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ments expounded the law. This view reappeared in Federalist 44,
where Madison assured his audience that Congress’s ability to extend
its power beyond constitutional limits would depend “[i]n the first instance . . . on the executive and judicial departments, which are to
425
expound and give effect to the legislative acts.” As a member of the
First Congress, during the debate on the President’s removal power,
Madison argued that “an exposition of the Constitution may come
with as much propriety from the Legislature, as any other department
of the Government,” at least as “it relates to a doubtful part of the
426
Constitution.”
It is clear that Madison did not associate expounding with courts
427
alone. He was in the minority in this regard. Still, it should be noted that there is some support for the view that Madison did recognize
the distinctive role courts played in explaining law, as opposed to its
“exposition,” which was a matter committed, in Madison’s usage, to
each of the coordinate departments. As early as the Virginia ratifying
convention, for example, Madison observed that it was “a misfortune
that, in organizing any government, the explication of its authority
should be left to any of its coordinate branches. . . . There is a new
428
policy of submitting it to the judiciary of the United States.” Much
later, he connected this explanatory role to the nature of proceedings
in a court of law. Madison observed that it was in “the judicial department” that constitutional questions generally found “their ultimate discussion and operative decision,” noting that “the public deference to and confidence in the judgment of the body are peculiarly
inspired by the qualities in its members; by the gravity and deliberation of their proceedings; and by the advantage their plurality gives
429
them” over the other departments. Arguably, late in his life Madison connected judicial review to judicial explanation of the law, just
as his peers had. By that date, the movements to standardize legal
procedure, to professionalize the judiciary and the bar, and to devel-

425
426

427
428
429

Philip Hamburger has noted, in this speech Madison uses “case” to mean something
broader than action or litigation. HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 541–43 (discussing Madison’s attempt to qualify the meaning of “cases”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (Alexander Hamilton).
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 461 (1834); see WARREN, supra note 229, at 99–102 (discussing early
constitutional debates); Corwin, supra note 146, at 563–64 (discussing Madison’s arguments). The view was not confined to Madison. See Powell, supra note 191, at 975–76
(presenting the view of Fisher Ames).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 548–52 (discussing “theoretical explanations for judicial
authority).
3 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 532.
Letter From James Madison (1834), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF MADISON:
FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 349–50 (1867).
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op a body of ‘scientific’ American legal literature had firmly taken
430
root.
D. “Expounding” During the Repeal Act Debate
The proposition that courts decided cases by expounding the law
proved to be both a persistent one and a fragile ideal. It played a
leading role in the debate over repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.
Discussants on both sides of the aisle used the idea both to defend
the newly created circuit courts from legislative dissolution and to
criticize the political conduct of federal judges, especially their extrajudicial activity.
There is little question that most of the congressmen who spoke
on the subject of judicial power during the Repeal Act debate
thought it was the role of the judiciary to expound the law. Federalists broached the issue as they tried to describe, in lurid detail, the
implications of what they regarded as a Republican effort to undermine judicial independence. As Jonathan Mason put it, the federal
judiciary had been made independent because it was their duty “to
431
And it was this duty, said Mason,
expound and apply the laws.”
which implied a power of judicial review: “[T]he duties which they
have to perform, call upon them to expound not only the laws, but
the Constitution also; in which is involved the power of checking the
432
Legislature.” Thus the basic elements of the discussion at Philadelphia were reproduced. For the most part, Republicans were willing
433
to grant these assumptions, but, at times, they insisted on making
express the understanding that expounding and judicial review were
limited to the adjudication of cases. Thus, Robert Wright of Maryland
admitted . . . that judges ought to be the guardians of the Constitution,
so far as questions were constitutionally submitted to them . . . [but] he
had not supposed the judges were intended to decide questions not judicially submitted to them, or to lead the public mind in Legislative or Ex434
ecutive questions.

430
431
432

433
434

See REID, supra note 58, at 162 (discussing the rise of professional lawyers); WHITE, supra
note 307, at 154–56 (discussing the development of law in the early nineteeth century).
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 82 (1802).
Id.; see also id. at 180–81 (reprinting the statement of Gouverneur Morris); id. at 574 (reprinting the statement of John Stanley); id. at 788–89 (reprinting the statement of Roger
Griswold).
See WARREN, supra note 229, at 126 (discussing the Republican position); Engdahl, supra
note 275, at 320 (discussing the common Republican view).
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 115 (1802).

562

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:2

A few Republicans pressed further; Jefferson’s close ally in the Senate, John Breckinridge, argued for something like legislative suprem435
acy in determining the extent of congressional power, and in the
House, John Randolph delivered a characteristically sardonic defense
of what might be called Virginia-style ‘common-sense jurisprudence,’
436
along with a legislative power to expound the law.
Yet if most Republicans agreed that it was the role of courts to expound the law, including fundamental law, then they ought to be
concerned, reasoned Federalists, that repeal would undermine this
function by politicizing the judiciary. Thus the same institutional vision for the courts was present. James Ross warned that “[i]nstead of
an august and venerable tribunal, seated above the storms and oscillations of faction . . . you have a transient, artificial body, without a
437
will or understanding of its own, impelled by your own machinery.”
Since principled judges would “never consent to become the tools
and victims of factions,” they would refuse to take office, leaving the
438
federal courts to be piloted by “the dregs of the law.” In the House,
Bayard took up the point, linking judicial independence to the
439
“No menacing power
Framers’ effort “to curb the fury of party.”
should exist,” argued Samuel Dana, “to bias [judges’] decisions by the
440
influence of personal hopes and fears.” Without judicial independence, there would be little prospect of a neutral exposition of the law,
eliminating “the further security [that] the judicial power” provided

435

436

437
438
439
440

Id. at 179 (“The doctrine of constructions . . . is dangerous in the extreme. . . . My idea of
the subject, in a few words, is, that . . . the construction of one department of the powers
vested in it, is of higher authority than the construction of any other department; and
that, in fact, it is competent to that department to which powers are confided exclusively
to decide upon the proper exercise of those powers: that therefore the Legislature have
the exclusive right to interpret the Constitution, in what regards the law-making power,
and the judges are bound to execute the laws they make.”); see 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 58 & n.1 (1919) (discussing Breckenridge’s role).
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 654–55 (1802) (“And here permit me to express my satisfaction,
that gentlemen have agreed to construe the Constitution by the rules of common sense.
This mode is better adapted to the capacity of unprofessional men, and will preclude the
gentleman from arrogating to himself, and half a dozen other characters in this Committee, the sole right of expounding that instrument . . . . Indeed, as one of those who would
be unwilling to devolve upon that gentleman the high-priesthood of the Constitution,
and patiently submit to technical expositions which I might not even comprehend, I am
peculiarly pleased that we are invited to exercise our understandings in the construction
of this instrument.”); accord id. at 531–33 (statement of Robert Williams) (arguing for legislative and executive power to interpret the Constitution).
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 167 (1802).
Id.
Id. at 650 (statement of Rep. Bayard).
Id. at 920.
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beyond elections alone.441 The point gained momentum as Federalists sought to draw into the debate the logic that had moved delegates
at Philadelphia to reject the Council of Revision. A dependent court,
they argued, could not fulfill its expository function, and thus, its
constitutional function of giving effect to ‘public opinion’ over the
442
passion of the majority. As Benjamin Tallmadge reminded the representatives, “passion and party views too frequently mislead the
judgment and obscure the understanding. A sober and dispassionate
corrective becomes, therefore, absolutely necessary. Your tribunals of
443
justice afford the necessary relief.”
Almost no one was willing to concede the conclusion. In private
conversation, radicals like William Branch Giles might argue that the
444
federal courts should be “political.” In larger gatherings, however,
445
Giles would take the opposite position. And most Republicans responded by turning the argument against the Federalists, pointing
with disapproval to the political conduct of federal judges in the crisis
446
The move was a natural one, since the dominant Reof 1798–99.
441
442
443

444

445

446

Id. at 926 (statement of Samuel Dana).
Id. at 649–50 (statement of Rep. Bayard)
Id. at 948; see also Letter from James Bayard to Andrew J. Bayard (Jan. 21, 1802), quoted in
1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 211–12 (1922) (“A
judge, instead of holding his office for life, will hold it during the good pleasure of the
dominant party. The Judges will of course become partisans and the shadow of justice
will alone remain in our Courts.”); Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King (Feb.
20, 1802), in 1 WARREN, supra, at 213.
See REID, supra note 58, at 107 (discussing Giles’ statements). Reid treats Giles as representative of the Republican view in 1800 of judicial independence, which I think is a serious mistake. See id. at 106 (presenting Giles as a leader).
Kathryn Turner cites a toast delivered by William Branch Giles after passage of the 1801
Judiciary Act: “The Judiciary of the United States—from the 4th of March next, may the
judges lose their political sensibilities in the recollection that they are Judges, not political
partisans.” Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 522 (1961) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the principal Republican complaint about Federalist judges was that they had
become political. See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 237, at 255–56 (describing the Republicans’
objection to the Alien and Sedition Acts and the “partisan judiciary” that would enforce
the new laws); O’Fallon, supra note 272, at 234 (similar). Republicans were angered by
judges’ political grand jury charges. See CASTO, supra note 237, at 128–29 (discussing how
Jefferson and his allies grew to dislike the judges’ use of grand jury charges to deliver lectures); WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 261–62 (noting that Republicans were angered by
what judges said in grand jury charges). Republicans were also angered by judges’ actions barring juries from deciding on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, Engdahl,
supra note 275, at 297. Similarly, Republicans resented judges’ refusal to allow defendants to call witnesses in defense, CASTO, supra note 237, at 166–67; WOOD, EMPIRE, supra
note 77, at 261 (2009) (noting that Judge Chase badgered defense attorneys and did not
allow them to call witnesses). Furthermore, the Republicans were angered by judges invoking the common law of libel, which, unlike the Sedition Act, did not admit truth as a
defense, WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 260 (“Neither truth as a defense nor juries’ de-
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publican criticism during the crisis had been that Federalist judges
“were partial, vindictive, and cruel,” “obeyed the President rather
447
than the law, and made their reason subservient to their passion.”
Here the logic of court reform, which aimed to de-politicize courts of
law, would work in favor of Republicans. Federal judges who engaged in politics while on the bench could now expect impeach448
ment. Indeed, avoiding a wave of judicial impeachments was one of
449
His strategy, as others have
Marshall’s primary aims in Marbury.
shown, was to draw a substantive distinction between law and politics,
450
and to limit the domain of the courts to the former. Judicial review
was tied to the core task of deciding “particular cases,” i.e., disputes
capable of non-political resolution, thus reinforcing the narrowed judicial office that emerged from court reform efforts in Virginia, and
451
which was described in Kamper by Judges Tucker and Roane.
While the effect of judicial politics on the Marbury opinion is well
known, what is less appreciated, but just as important, is its effect on
the judicial office itself. Indeed, the danger this generation perceived in a politicized judiciary is best evidenced by the fate of socalled “extrajudicial activities,” in which federal judges often assumed
452
In the period immediately before
an expressly political function.
1800, the most visible of these activities was the Supreme Court Justices’ practice of delivering “political charges” while riding on cir-

447
448

449

450
451
452

ciding the law was allowed under the American common law.”); Alfange, supra note 46, at
350–51 (discussing that many were disappointed with judge’s invocation of “a federal
common law of crimes.”).
1 WARREN, supra note 443, at 191.
This was the Republican theory of the Pickering impeachment, and explains the Republicans’ steadfast denial that Judge Pickering was suffering from some form of mental illness. See REID, supra note 58, at 90–109 (discussing trials that Judge Pickering presided
over while mentally ill).
See J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE 306 (1989); Jed Glickstein, Note,
After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 543, 574–75 (2012) (discussing Marshall’s reaction to judicial impeachment trials).
See, e.g., NELSON, supra note50, at 60–67.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the Kamper opinions and the narrowing of the reach of
judicial review).
The two leading examples of extrajudicial activity that took on political content and function in the late 1790s are political charges and advisory opinions, but there were a variety
of other activities as well, including ex officio service. See generally Maeva Marcus & Emily
Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789–1800, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 31 (Robert A. Katzman ed., 1988). On
the issue of advisory opinions, see JAY, supra note 237, at 149–70; Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 144–58 (1973) (“The
general understanding during that period was that federal judges, like their English
counterparts, were to render advice to the executive and legislative branches.”).
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cuit.453 Political charges were charges delivered to grand juries in
which the judge might defend (or criticize) the President’s administration, or offer his own views on the political controversies of the
454
The practice had a significant history in America. Grand juday.
ries had long been used as a bidirectional point of influence: both as
a means for government to shape public opinion, and as a means for
the leading members of the community to present the government
455
with complaints about its officers’ nonfeasance and corruption.
The Revolution deepened the government’s need for this institution,
primarily as a means to convince the people to honor their obliga456
Yet it also transformed the understanding and
tions under law.
practice of political charging, by giving it an educational function firm457
In Ralph Lerner’s memorable
ly rooted in republican theory.
phrase, the Supreme Court became a kind of “republican schoolmaster,” whose Justices, riding on circuit, were tasked with ensuring that
the people understood their rights and duties—knowledge necessary
not only to making appropriate choices as voters and jurors, but, ul458
timately, to ensuring the survival of republican government. Yet the
political charge was a delicate task, and it could be badly mishandled
459
It required the
by the wrong judge in the wrong circumstances.
453
454

455

456

457
458

459

See CASTO, supra note 237, at 127–29; Lerner, supra note 392, at 129–55.
See Lerner, supra note 392, at 127–31 (“The Justices were quick to see and seize the
chance to proselytize for the new government and to inculcate habits and teachings most
necessary in their view for the maintanance of self-government.”).
See, e.g., ROEBER, supra note 311, at 176–77; John D. Cushing, The Judiciary and Public Opinion in Revolutionary Massachusetts, in LAW AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 168, 168
(George Athan Billias ed., 1965).
See David J. Katz, Grand Jury Charges Delivered by Supreme Court Justices Riding Circuit During
the 1790s, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1056–62 (1992) (“[O]ne might think that the philosophical theme of these grand jury charges would be individual liberty; it was not. The
theme which pervades these charges is duty.”). This was also true at the state level, as
judges used grand jury charges to legitimize proposed or recently ratified state constitutions. See Cushing, supra note 455, at 175–76 (discussing the way that judges used jury
charges in an obvious attempt to gain support for new state constitutions).
See Lerner, supra note 392, at 127–32; Katz, supra, at 1060–61.
Lerner, supra note 392, at 127–32 (suggesting that judges regarded themselves as educators whose mission was to “sustain republican government.”); see also Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 452, at 32 (arguing that grand jury charges gave justices “a forum for political discourse.”). As Shannon Stimson has shown, the petit jury also had an educational
function in republican theory. People were educated by serving on the jury with their
peers—but also had to be educated in order to serve appropriately. STIMSON, supra note
80, at 88.
Lerner, supra note 392, at 155 (“The manner in which the judge performed his duties was
of decisive importance. . . . It took high political finesse to use the grand jury charge as a
means of political education.”). Even at the height of political charging, grand juries
rarely returned responsive indictments, and a Justice could even acknowledge that he expected none. There was a staged quality to the whole affair. See Katz, supra note 456, at
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judge to “travel[] out of the line of Business,” and to offer remarks
that were, in the words of Chief Justice John Jay to one jury,
460
By the late
“not . . . very pertinent to the present occasion . . . .”
1790s, it was difficult for nationally minded judges to engage in political charging without stirring the anger of an audience inclined to461
And if the matter was difficult to
wards Jeffersonian principles.
handle for those with judgment and tact, then a fortiori it was impossible to handle for men like Justice Samuel Chase, whose blunderbuss
462
charges resulted in his own impeachment. During the Chase trial,
neither party was willing to defend political charging; Chase’s own
counsel dutifully announced to the Senators that he was “one of
those who have always thought, that political subjects ought never to
463
be mentioned in courts of justice.”
The practice of political charging, then, could not be sustained. It
was inconsistent with the emerging understanding of judges and of
courts of law in a republic. If judges were duty-bound to decide cases
by expounding the law, and if this process was to be a non-political
one, then federal judges could not maintain a statesman’s diet of po464
litical activity. The same tension led to the demise of other extraju465
dicial activities with a political character, such as advisory opinions.

460
461

462
463
464

465

1052, 1055 (“Justice John Blair candidly admitted that did not expect [the grand jury] to
indict anyone . . . .”).
Lerner, supra note 392, at 133l; see also Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 452, at 32 (“The
grand jury charge took [judges] outside the limits of a case or controversy. . . .”).
To understand why, consider an example of a charge delivered by Justice William Paterson sometime in the 1790s: “What, indeed, can be expected from uninformed and ignorant minds? They know no country; they have no patriotism. Enough, if they know the
spot, on which they were born and rocked; that is their country. Enough, if they know
and consult the little interests and narrow politics of the neighborhood, in which they live
and move; that is their patriotism. . . . Persons, ignorant and uninformed, are easily imposed upon and led astray; they are unable to detect error . . . they are the fit, and, indeed, usual instruments in the hands of artful and aspiring men to serve the purposes of
party, and to work out the ruin of a state.” 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 458 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990).
See Lerner, supra note 392, at 152–55 (discussing Chase’s “frontal attack against Jeffersonian doctrine” and Chase’s resulting impeachment).
Lerner, supra note 392, at 154.
Wood, supra note 31, at 165 (“This legalization of fundamental law and the development
of judicial review went hand in hand with the demarcation of an exclusive sphere of legal
activity for judges. If determining constitutional law were to be simply a routine act of legal interpretation and not an earth-shaking political exercise, then the entire process of
adjudication had to be removed from politics and from legislative tampering. After 1800,
judges shed their traditional broad and ill-defined political and magisterial roles . . . and
adopted roles that were much more exclusively legal.”).
Cf. Wheeler, supra note 452, at 152–53 (describing a similar development in the case of
advisory opinions, and concluding, “[t]he advisory relationship for which Washington
and Jefferson hoped also threatened the judicial process itself. For one thing, in stating
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In theses cases and others, judges would have to give up the politics.
What they received in exchange was an understanding of their role
within republican government that made sense of judicial independence and of the legalization of constitutional dispute. That understanding recognized in courts alone a power to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws.
CONCLUSION
The inquiry into the idea of a “case” and “expounding” the law
suggests the following interpretation of the Standard Justification.
Premise 1 of the Standard Justification was the proposition that it was
the duty of the court to decide cases according to the laws of the
state. This included the Constitution, on the grounds that the Constitution was fundamental law. The question was what justification
there was for including the Constitution. In brief, the answer is that
(1) a court decides cases, (2) deciding cases requires the court to expound the law, and (3) expounding the law involves explaining how
the court’s judgment follows from, and thus is part of, state law. The
last step requires the court to consider the Constitution, since if the
law on which the court’s judgment is based is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the court is making law, rather than deciding the case in
accordance with existing law.
This reading of the Standard Justification supports the following
three conclusions. First, we cannot modify the Standard Justification
as proposed above to support a presidential power of nonenforcement. The President does not decide particular cases, and
since he does not, he has no duty to expound the law. Since he has
no duty to expound the law, nothing about his office of enforcing
ordinary law requires him to consider and give effect to fundamental
law. The executive duty of the presidency is a ministerial duty, at
least from the perspective of the Federalist era.
Second, while other arguments in support of a non-enforcement
power are possible, it seems unlikely that there is a colorable originalist argument to that end. As I have argued, there is little evidence
that the Framers thought the Standard Justification supported a pres-

the law extrajudicially, the Court would not be stating the law through the process best
designed to secure a true interpretation of it. Courts reach decisions through a process
designed to formulate the issues sharply. They are aided by counsels’ debate . . . . Absent
those arguments, the decisions stood a greater chance of being in error. More important, the Justices thought they would retain a bias toward an opinion once publicly
stated.”).
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idential power to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws. The same
argument applies to the Article II Vesting Clause, the Oaths Clause,
or the Take Care Clause, which are the textual foundations most often recruited to support non-enforcement. The Framers were at least
as good as we are at drawing inferences, and if they believed the Vesting Clause (or whatever) supported a power of non-enforcement,
they should have concluded so. We have no record that they did.
More than that, we have no record that they did despite the evidence
that they had reason to draw the conclusion. If the concern that led
to the development of judicial review was the politics of ‘passion’
that, at various points during the period, infected the legislature, the
executive could have served as a check just as much as the judiciary.
Third, the Standard Justification rests on ideas about the forum of
a court of law, not about judges per se. This is important for understanding how judicial review could emerge in a system that regarded
constitutions as a special kind of law—fundamental law—that “differed in kind” from ordinary law, inasmuch as they were an act of the
466
people regulating the government. I have not argued here that the
Constitution was legalized because of an English tradition that featured the judge as the repository of fundamental law, which he applied against the sovereign in his common law court (assuming there
was such a tradition). American practices were somewhat different.
Fundamental law was legalized in the 1780s because of independently
held convictions about proper proceedings in a court of law, and
about the role courts could and should play in giving effect to ‘public
opinion,’ ideas which derived from the political experience of the
1780s and the French Enlightenment, as much as the common law
467
These ideas pinned the legitimacy of republican govtradition.
ernment to “the reason of the public,” and after the Revolution forensic litigation seemed a natural vehicle in which to determine and ap468
ply this reason. Since it was supposed to be the public’s reason, not
the court’s, it was crucial that the judge faithfully expound the law rather than make it. That distinction has proved difficult to maintain.
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467
468

See Snowiss, supra note 46, at 90 (discussing the judicial charge as “agents of a constitutional principle.”).
See supra notes 304–33, and accompanying text.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).

